# policy REVIEW

Winter 1985 Number 31 Four Dollars

## Beyond Containment?

### The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations

Richard V. Allen
Robert L. Bartley
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Midge Decter
Lawrence Eagleburger
Samuel Huntington
William Hyland
Max Kampelman
Jeane Kirkpatrick
Irving Kristol
Walter Laqueur
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## The Case for Strategic Defense

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## Evolution's Missing Links

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Winter 1985

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# Letters

## Sidney Schanberg, David Roberts, Jr., Richard Viguerie, Ambassador Thomas Pickering, William Walsh, Colonel John Waghelstein, John Silber, Edwin Dorn, Governor Joseph Garrahy, Joseph Bishop, Ronald S. Godwin

### Sign of the *Times*

Dear Sir:

I was astonished to read in Dinesh D'Souza's otherwise worthy article (Fall, 1984) that "Sidney Schanberg won a much deserved Pulitzer Prize for his reporting of the genocide in Cambodia." Merely quoting Schanberg's statement from the *New York Times* article of March 13, 1975 that "unlike administration officials in Washington . . . most Cambodians do not talk about a possible massacre and do not expect one," does not do justice to the services that Schanberg's articles performed for the Khmer Rouge before and after the fall of Phnom Penh.

In the same piece, for example, Schanberg described Khieu Samphan as a "nationalist with a reputation for integrity, incorruptability, and a concern for peasants, who is highly respected among non-Communist Cambodians." Four days before the fall of Phnom Penh, Schanberg concluded that for "the ordinary people of Indochina . . . it is difficult to imagine how their lives could be anything but better with the Americans gone." He noted with optimism that "Cambodia, being a country blessed with rich agricultural land and a relatively small population, can be revived without any major reconstruction program as would be necessary in an industrialized nation. . . ." He also suggested that the United States could and should enjoy amicable relations with the new regime, and quoted with approval an anonymous embassy official who remarked that "the world changes fast these days. . . . We'll be back here. It may take a couple of years, but we'll be back."

Apparently Mr. D'Souza is among those who admire Schanberg's famous article of May 9, 1975, but it is hard to say why. To be sure, Schanberg reported the enforced evacuation of Phnom Penh and a great many executions, but there was nothing exceptional in this, as the Khmer Rouge made no effort to conceal the evidence. Indeed, the Communists left the bodies of men, women, and children strewn about the road along which Schanberg and other Western reporters were escorted into Thailand. Not even Schanberg could help noting that "some executions [had been] meted out to government officials," but his bottom line was that "none of this will apparently bear any resemblance to the mass executions that had been expected by many Westerners."

Although Schanberg was obliged to admit that he and other Western journalists had been wrong in their expectation that Cambodia would be "a possibly flexible place, even under Communism, where changes would not be extreme and ordinary people would be left alone," he nonetheless tried to leave his readers with the impression that the apparent cruelty of the new regime was inspired by benevolent intentions:

> Was this just cold brutality, a cruel and sadistic imposition of the law of the jungle? Or is it just possible that, seen through the eyes of the peasant soldiers and revolutionaries, the forced evacuation of the cities is a harsh necessity? Perhaps they are convinced that there is no way to build a new society for the benefit of the ordinary man, hitherto exploited, without literally starting out from the beginning.

This particular observation drew high praise from Anthony Lewis, who acclaimed Schanberg's efforts



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"to take himself, and us, out of our Western assumptions for a moment," "to throw off the blinders of American ideology and see the reality of war as it affected the lives of Cambodians," and "to perceive and convey other people's vision." Schanberg, wrote Lewis, was not blinded by the "self-centered cultural outlook," the "cultural arrogance," that rendered Ford and Kissinger unable to appreciate the possibility that "the revolutionaries and their peasant army see the return to the countryside as the only way to start on their vision of a new society."

In an article for the August 23, 1975 issue of *Saturday Review*, Schanberg declared for an even-handed, ambivalent and non-judgmental attitude toward the new social vision:

> I am not among those who have been able to make swift moral judgments of the new rulers of Cambodia—either by calling them cruel and barbaric for emptying the cities right down to hospital patients and ordering the people on a long march into the countryside, in which thousands were certain to perish; or by hailing them as brilliant revolutionaries for casting off the shackles of the old, exploitive consumer society and forging a new agrarian system in the rice paddies, in which the peasant will finally profit from his labor.

He expressed the belief that "the Cambodian movement is unlikely to be monolithic, and we have still to see what influence, if any, the moderate and nationalist voices will have on the Khmer Communist movement." To encourage the putative moderates within the Angka Loeu, Schanberg proposed a program of U.S. economic assistance:

> The Khmer Rouge have said that they will accept aid from foreign states if it is without strings. On both humanitarian and pragmatic grounds, reconstruction aid would seem a policy worth considering. Not only would it help the Cambodian people at a time of great need, but also it would serve Washington's more practical interest in retaining influence in Asia.
>
> One hopes that the leadership in Washington will eventually acquire the farsightedness to discern there are other ways of looking at Cambodia besides ideological and geopolitical ones—ways that would put people, not just governments, into the foreign policy equation.

and William Shawcross himself. And perhaps Stanley Karnow's credentials as a pundit of the Indochina War would be somewhat tainted if it were generally recalled that he prophesied in the *New Republic* that the imminent fall of Phnom Penh would prove to be "the salvation of the Cambodians."

David Roberts, Jr.
Houston, Texas
*[Mr. Roberts is a member of Social Democrats USA].*

**For some time after the fall of Phnom Penh, Schanberg minimized the crimes of the new regime and wrote of the Khmer Rouge with sympathy and understanding.**

**David Roberts, Jr.**

To this day Schanberg admires his own work in Cambodia, and insists that he was right in charging that the Cambodians who fled to Phnom Penh were running from American bombing rather than from Khmer Rouge terror, even though the population of the city continued to swell after the bombing cut-off of August 15, 1973.

During the last weeks of the Lon Nol government, Sydney Schanberg predicated his dispatches on the assumption that most Cambodians would be better off under Communist rule. For some time after the fall of Phnom Penh, he minimized the crimes of the new regime and wrote of the Khmer Rouge with sympathy and understanding. No one who could recall the example of Walter Duranty had any right to be surprised that Schanberg nevertheless won a Pulitzer Prize, but who would have expected to find the committee's choice seconded in the pages of Policy Review?

Of course Schanberg is not the only non-Marxist-Leninist writer whose tracks need covering vis-à-vis Cambodia. My research has yielded incriminating quotations from, inter alia, Anthony Lewis, Tom Wicker, Richard Dudman,

*Sidney Schanberg replies:*

Ideologues of the extreme right and left fueled the Indochina war, anointing their chosen sides with sainthood and branding the other side with evil and immorality. Mr. Roberts, on the right, continues this sad and destructive practice.

Nowhere in his long letter of distortions and fabrications does he express compassion for the Cambodian people as individuals; he is concerned only with proving his ideological point, with proving that his side possesses absolute truth and that the other side was responsible for the fall of Cambodia.

Roberts doesn't let facts or accuracy get in his way. In the tradition of ideologues, he culls a few sentences from a large body of work and announces triumphantly that he has discovered sin. A simple perusal of my extensive reporting from and about Cambodia would quickly demonstrate the falsity and maliciousness and defamatory nature of his contentions that my articles "performed . . . services . . . for the Khmer Rouge" and that I "minimized the crimes of the new regime and wrote of the Khmer Rouge with sympathy and understanding."



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Such a perusal would reveal that, on the contrary, I wrote stories about the brutality and random killing of the Khmer Rouge prior to their seizure of power and afterward—and that I still write and speak about this. Not only did I not minimize the savagery of this regime, but I wrote the first major chronicle of their maniacal behavior in the long May 9, 1975 report for the *New York Times* that Roberts cites—a report that was used by anti-totalitarian groups before the United Nations as evidence of the massive human rights violations in Cambodia.

Roberts scoffs at journalists who pose questions rather than make ideological judgments that satisfy his dogma. He scoffs, too, at "an evenhanded, ambivalent, and nonjudgmental attitude." Finally he scoffs at someone who would write, as I did, that "there are other ways of looking at Cambodia besides ideological and geopolitical ones—ways that would put people, not just governments, into the foreign policy equation."

People don't count for extremists like Roberts, only ideology—and thus he gives himself away.

He is too busy pursuing dogma to read the entirety of my work. The newsletters of the extreme right have provided him with all the out-of-context selections he needs.

Roberts has no use for intellectual honesty. He knows that virtually all Cambodians living in government-held areas and most members of the press corps believed, despite the wartime brutality of the Khmer Rouge, that these Cambodian Communists would—once they had achieved victory—see no further purpose in random killing and would opt instead for reconciliation with their fellow Cambodians. He also knows that the instant this belief proved to be wrong, I and others said we had been wrong, loudly and clearly. And I have been saying it loudly and clearly ever since—in articles and statements that Roberts conveniently chooses to ignore. Ideological extremists do not admit their own errors and therefore cannot credit others with doing so.

It is not surprising that such an extremist would write a dishonest letter. What is surprising is that a publication like *Policy Review*, which pretends to fairness and scholarliness, would—knowing its dishonesty—lend it credibility by printing it.

Sydney H. Schanberg
Columnist
The *New York Times*

**It is not surprising that such an extremist would write a dishonest letter.**

**Sydney Schanberg**

Dear Sir:

Regarding Dinesh D'Souza's article, "Retreat from Radicalism": the *Times* has shown some improvement—it couldn't have gotten much worse—but it may be less the result of a change at the *Times* than of a change in American journalism.

Over the last few decades, as the role of government expanded, journalists began to depend increasingly on government and special-interest sources for stories; they became extremely sympathetic to them.

Gradually, the leftward bias was magnified as reporters were promoted to metro editors and metro editors were promoted to editors-in-chief. They hired people like themselves—people who attended the same schools, went to the same parties, and worked in the same political campaigns—effectively freezing out people with conservative backgrounds. How many aides to Kennedy or George McGovern are now news producers or political editors? How many aides to Barry Goldwater or Ronald Reagan have gotten jobs like that?

Today most of the "prestige" media refuse to hire conservatives, and the results are apparent in, for example, the laughable treatment of the religion and politics issue during the presidential campaign. The nationally known journalists (other than opinion columnists) who would be likely to vote for Ronald Reagan can be counted on the fingers of two hands.

By moving to the left, American journalism largely abandoned its historic function as a harsh critic of the establishment. It became the most strident voice—outside the government itself—for the status quo. As government grew more powerful and began to stomp on ordinary working people, most of the major news media cheered it on in the name of progress.

Conservative influence in the news media probably hit bottom about 1980. When Ronald Reagan and the conservatives swept the elections that year, a lot of people looked very foolish because they had not seen it coming. The top people in the major news media resolved not to repeat the mistake they made in 1980, and they began to treat conservative opinions with more respect. They realized that their credibility would suffer if their stories continued to reflect a leftward view while the public shifted toward the right.

If, as Mr. D'Souza writes, the *Times* has become less of a voice for radical chic, it is simply a reflection of its times.

Richard Viguerie
Publisher
*Conservative Digest*

## Markets and Freedom

Dear Sir:

I read Claudia Rosett's article ("Economic Paralysis in El Salvador," Fall 1984), with a great deal of interest. While I do not agree with the central thesis of the article (i.e., even if the war is won, El Salvador may be left with a centrally planned economy unable to compete in world markets and geared to subsist on U.S. handouts), I believe that she does point out



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some real dangers in the economic reforms instituted in 1979. The Duarte government is working to correct many of these, and we are assisting through our A.I.D. program.

The economic reforms need to be put into perspective. The reforms were a last-ditch effort by Salvadorans to save their society and prevent a takeover from the extreme left. Taking advantage of the popular unrest that had reached a crescendo of violence and anarchy in 1979, the left was orchestrating mass popular movements aimed at taking over the government. The Romero government fell under the pressure and a group of reform-minded military, joined by a few like-minded civilians, took over and decided that if they and the country were to survive, it was necessary to open to popular participation the political, economic, and social life of the society. The first and most radical junta did not last long, but the commitment to reforms as a political and social necessity continued. The results were the three basic reforms: land, banking, and export marketing. Those reforms prevented a Marxist-Leninist takeover of El Salvador. This is not to say, however, that they have been implemented perfectly or do not need modification.

Miss Rosett gives less weight to the substantial accomplishment of the Salvadorans and our economic assistance than I would. A major goal has been accomplished: an economy, and more importantly, its infrastructure, which in 1980 were spiraling toward disintegration under continual attack from guerrillas and facing certain collapse, were stabilized. The decline has been reversed; and this year, we hope there will be positive growth for the first time in four years. Last year, the downward spiral was halted. Given the conditions here in El Salvador, this is no mean feat, and is a tribute to the courage, perseverance, and industriousness of the Salvadorans.

I agree with Miss Rosett's concern over the uncertainty of the status of property rights. The government is working actively to get the titles of the land reform farms issued. Unfortunately, it is hampered by the lack of funds for compensation (existing U.S. legislation prevents us from assisting) and by an antiquated land registry system dating back to Spanish colonial days. We are encouraging the government to meet their compensation obligations and we are working with the government on the land registry. Unfortunately, there are also forces in the society that are reluctant to relinquish state direction of the cooperatives.

We have had no involvement with INCAFE (the national coffee company), and are not as conversant with its operations as with land reform institutions. However, the basic problem with coffee production is the low international commodity prices in recent years and uncertainty due to the land reform. The latter is being addressed.

Last December, a new constitution was passed which provides an absolute guarantee of the right to own private property. It also set a maximum ownership limit of 245 hectares per person. This effectively settled Phase II of the reform, affecting principally coffee lands, which had been announced but not implemented and which had been an open and debilitating issue for four years.

We have not had any involvement with the banking reform. However, the credit rationing mentioned by Miss Rosett derives from the sudden drop in the country's income due to low prices for its major commodities while simultaneously fighting a war and trying to repair and operate the basic economic and social services needed to keep its economy operating. Under such circumstances, credit would be scarce in any banking system. The need to finance the land reform has also added to the credit shortage.

We are in full agreement with Miss Rosett's comments on the two-tiered exchange rate. El Salvador must unify the exchange rate as soon as conditions permit, and President Duarte's policy of "deslizamiento" (literally "sliding") is committed in the same direction.

In an ideal world, the reforms would not have been necessary, but they are not leading inevitably to a "command" economy. Forces do exist in the Salvadoran society, however, which tend strongly in that direction, partially in response to the previous exclusive domination of the economy by a narrow political and economic elite prior to 1979. We agree that both these forces should be resisted if the economy is to recover and develop over the longer term. We believe that the government is resisting these forces satisfactorily so far.

I hope that these comments will serve to place Miss Rosett's article in perspective; my staff and I found it both provocative and stimulating.

Thomas R. Pickering
U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador
San Salvador

Dear Sir:

Claudia Rosett's article "Economic Paralysis in El Salvador: What the Guerrillas Don't Destroy, Central Planning Does," is on target in its points about the destruction of property by the guerrillas, the nationalization of banks and industries, and the failure of the land reform program. But the article hardly goes far enough.

As long as we have 535 Secretaries of State in Congress we will be prevented from permitting any American funding to be used for compensation of land owners under the existing land reform program. Hence, the worthless mortgages, bonds, and the lack of titles to the so-called new owners of the land will inevitably be continued.

Political pressure by American trade unions will prevent the lowering of tariff barriers to manufactured goods from El Salvador. The traditional production of coffee, bananas, and sugar will not be the answer. These products are already glutted on Western markets. If our liberal and social-minded political philosophers demand further development of cooperatives and redistribution of the land, these products will not be produced and marketed efficiently. Therefore, El



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Salvador, like other countries of Central America, will be dependent upon developing the type of industries, such as textiles, that are now so prevalent in the Far East. What Western businessman would invest in the development of such industries knowing that the benefit of his investment will never be realized?

The development of credit potential for small land owners, as we advocated through the Kissinger Commission, has received little attention from Congress so far. Will we or Western Europeans be satisfied to guarantee either local or international banks against loss should such a plan be put into effect? Will our political attitudes permit unconditionally the small land owner to sell his land back to perhaps a larger land owner when he finds he is incapable of satisfactory production? Too often we place full blame upon those in these small nations without recognizing that they frequently attempt central planning because they believe that it is a requirement for them to receive either bilateral or multilateral assistance.

William B. Walsh, M.D.
Board of Directors
Project HOPE
*[The author was a member of the Kissinger Commission on Central America].*

Dear Sir:

In "Economic Paralysis in El Salvador," Miss Rosett eloquently states the case against state control and for private enterprise, a case that could well have been written by the oligarchy, whose intransigence and pig-headedness did much to bring about the insurgency, and who lost the most by the reforms of 1979.

The question is not solely economic; it is also a question of the trade-off between efficiency and equity. If the reforms were poor economics, they were a political necessity. I am convinced that without those reforms this discussion would be in the "what might have been" category with the FMLN guerrillas in control in El Salvador.

Reforms in agriculture, banking, and export were the keys to averting a guerrilla takeover, and Miss Rosett's case that they are an economic disaster is a bit overstated. She ignores much of the literature on this inevitable trade-off. A look at the works of Wolf Ladejinsky, Arthur Okun, or W.W. Rostow, or the experiences in land reform in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Mexico, or Bolivia would be instructive. While acknowledging the war as the major cause of the decline, she ignores the fall of world coffee and sugar prices that has seriously affected El Salvador's solvency. A quick look at Costa Rica, with comparable production, with no war and no appreciable government intervention reveals much the same problem. Wars generate government controls (our own included); internal wars require them to be generated as quickly as possible. Simply stated, in El Salvador's case, it was a question of reform or revolution. The Salvadoran junta of 1979–1982 recognized this without our tutelage.

I have some other minor disagreements with the article. We are not, as Miss Rosett states, trying "to overwhelm the guerrillas with resources." We are trying to maintain the economy in the face of guerrilla attacks and possibly provide an economic turnaround. We are attempting to provide a minimum level of basic public/social services, such as health, education, electric power, bridges, and water, and to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees.

In regard to the banking reform: pre-coup arrangements made it easy for the oligarchs to borrow money they didn't need and difficult for the campesinos who needed it. A look at pre-coup capital-intensive industry demonstrates this point. Generating labor-intensive industry; e.g., tourism, will remain difficult until the level of violence is dealt with. Today's banks have given the little man opportunities he lacked under the old regime.

In regard to the bonds that Miss Rosett describes as "worthless," my contacts in El Salvador report that they are being traded at 50 percent of face value—a big discount, but certainly not worthless. Finally, the land reform's "threat of expropriation" was clarified in December 1983, with the passage of the new constitution. As one of my more knowledgeable friends in AID put it, "The sword of Damocles has already fallen on all those it's going to fall on."

One can only agree with the article's conclusions: "Free market incentives are powerful allies of freedom and economic progress." I also believe, however, that a country with equitable land ownership, a hope for the future, continued reform, and an army and government viewed as part of the solution instead of part of the problem, constitutes a better chance, if not the only chance, in El Salvador's case, of beating the Marxist-Leninists.

John D. Waghelstein
Colonel, United States Army
Strategic Studies Institute
Army War College
*[Colonel Waghelstein was head of U.S. military trainers in El Salvador].*

Dear Sir:

Claudia Rosett's brillant article, "Economic Paralysis in El Salvador," prescribes the only course that can bring lasting peace to Central America: the amelioration and elimination—by the only means that ever worked—of the devastating poverty now being exploited in the region by the Soviet Union. The moderate socialism being practiced by the government of El Salvador has already been tested in industrialized countries like the United Kingdom, where it has helped to convert what was once the powerhouse of the world into a marginal industrial economy. Applied to an undeveloped economy such as El Salvador's, such genteel and democratic socialism does not merely complicate the prospect of attaining prosperity, it annihilates it. The evidence for this is widespread and compelling: all over Africa, disdain for the market economy has limited the fruits of modernization to the happy elite.



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President Duarte has already shown himself to be a man of immense personal courage and devotion to democratic ideals. If he can add to these essential qualities a full measure of economic realism, he may go down in history as the second liberator of his country.

Dr. John R. Silber
President
Boston University

## Extending the Mandate

Dear Sir:

Adam Meyerson makes a compelling argument: American conservatives "cannot make a full claim to national leadership" until they can bridge the "wide river" that separates their movement from black Americans (Fall, 1984). I hope other conservatives agree. It is clear that many blacks are looking for alternatives to liberal Democratic thinking.

But Meyerson's essay shows what a long way conservatives have to go in crafting a successful appeal to blacks. Take, for example, the three "Ps" that crop up in the article: personalities, pronouncements, and policies.

**Personalities.** The essay is sprinkled with names. Some are dropped gratuitously, and some are misappropriated. But some of the names appear to reflect Meyerson's judgments about the kinds of people who best represent the conservative movement. If I were to construct a list of conservatives—black or white—who are respected in the black community, very few of the names that Meyerson uses would be on it.

**Pronouncements.** Meyerson reminds us that President Reagan's "evil empire" speech also contained a denunciation of racism. One observation: to blacks, the "evilest empire" of all is South Africa. Conservatives have waxed eloquent about the sufferings of Soviet dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, but I have not heard them agonize aloud about Steven Biko, Nelson Mandela, and thousands of others who have been imprisoned without trial, tortured, or murdered for protesting a regime that is at least as repressive as the Soviet Union, and far more racist. Blacks see this as evidence of hypocrisy on the issue of human rights, especially since some of the conservatives Meyerson mentions are viewed as apologists for South Africa.

Marshall has made the point in numerous opinions.

According to a Gallup survey commissioned by the Joint Center for Political Studies, nearly three-quarters of blacks have concluded that Ronald Reagan is prejudiced. That may not be surprising. What is surprising is that nearly one-third of whites agree with blacks on this point. A president who is widely viewed as prejudiced is not likely to be taken seriously when he talks favorably about civil rights, especially when his policies are perceived as having narrowed the meaning of the term.

**The harsh reality is that recent economic and social policies have been harmful to blacks.**
**Edwin Dorn**

**Policies.** Having written that conservatives must do more than "make speeches" to win black support, Meyerson proceeds to describe "deeds" that amount to little more than tokenism and speechifying. The harsh reality is that recent economic and social policies have been harmful to blacks. Fully one-third of black workers were unemployed at some time during 1982, and black unemployment today is higher than it was in 1980. Poverty rates have grown, as has the gap between black and white incomes. In short, few blacks have seen evidence that the "conservative opportunity society" holds promise for them. Not all of the recent deterioration in black economic well-being can be blamed on Reagan Administration policies, but much of it can be. What infuriates blacks is conservatives' efforts to pretend that black Americans actually are better off under these policies.

The conservative movement has failed to attract middle-class blacks largely because blacks tend to see civil rights as a litmus test issue, just as American Jews tend to see support for Israel as a litmus test issue. To blacks, civil rights is not simply a matter of narrow procedural niceties; it also includes addressing the persisting effects of discrimination. Contrary to what Meyerson implies, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Roy Wilkins understood that, and Supreme Court Justice Thurgood

To blacks, the call from the far shore has not really been about building bridges, but about taking a blind leap into the cold, swift currents and swimming for dear life. If conservatives are going to appeal successfully for wider black support, they must do some serious thinking about the kinds of people who exemplify their movement, about the consistency of their pronouncements, and about the effects of their deeds. They also must learn much more about the black America that lies on the opposite shore.

Edwin Dorn
Deputy Director, Joint Center for Political Studies
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Reading Adam Meyerson's, "Conservatives and Blacks" in the fall issue of *Policy Review* was like a man dying of thirst, in the desert, discovering water. This is a case of an authentic conservative discussing blacks without hate, hostility, or glee at their reverses.

There have always been true, basic conservative values in the black community. Blacks have had as their idols the captains of indus-



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try, not Karl Marx or Lenin. Even during the Depression, in the midst of dire poverty, the Communists were able to make only negligible progress among blacks.

Blacks have a strong record of patriotism. Even when their country restricted their opportunities for combat duty during World War II, they begged to enter combat units to fight for their country and fought with valor.

However, blacks will always be suspicious of those who call themselves conservatives, if their first article of faith is black hate and prejudice. Authentic conservatives must respect blacks enough to not try and choose those blacks who will speak for them and misrepresent their aspirations. Conservatives must shun black buffoons and hustlers (those who make money by lying to them) whether they come from government or academia.

Conservatives have the potential to win the confidence of blacks when they sincerely articulate views such as Adam Meyerson in "Conservatives and Blacks." But they must also disavow those who regularly send forth anti-black propaganda. When this happens and conservatives stop sponsoring opportunistic "Amos N' Andys," they may see a larger number of blacks ready to believe them and ready to join their ranks, but only then. Blacks will never join the ranks of racists whether they call themselves "liberals" or "conservatives."

Roscoe R. Nix
President
Montgomery County, Md. Branch
NAACP

*Adam Meyerson replies:*

I am grateful for Mr. Nix's kind comments, and also for Mr. Dorn's letter. Let me respond to Mr. Dorn's three "Ps."

In my article I mentioned a number of conservatives who were hiring blacks in key positions, speaking before black audiences, denouncing racism, and urging that their fellow conservatives pay more attention to black Americans. Mr. Dorn objects to some of the personalities I mentioned, although since he doesn't name them, I don't know which ones. Let me just say that when I praised Jesse Helms for hiring a black press secretary, I was not citing his entire record as a model in race relations. I do, however, believe that conservatives should make an active effort to hire talented blacks for non-token positions of real responsibility, as Senator Helms did in this case.

Mr. Dorn thinks conservatives should pronounce against apartheid and human rights violations in South Africa. I agree. I think conservatives should stand for the dignity of man in every country in the world; apartheid is clearly repugnant to conservative principles, and we should be on the record as saying so. At the same time, I think that conservatives, like all Americans, should speak to other countries with humility and without self-righteousness, particularly about race relations, where America's own history is none too proud.

I am also afraid that I cannot accept the designation of South Africa as the "evilest empire." Nothing that South Africa has done to its black citizens, awful as it is, is as evil as the deliberate policy of the Communist government in Ethiopia to follow the example of Stalin and starve millions of its own people.

Mr. Dorn is angered by "conservatives' efforts to pretend that black Americans actually are better off under [President Reagan's] policies." I make no such claim. On the contrary, as I indicate in my review of Charles Murray's *Losing Ground* in this issue, President Reagan has continued the failed policies of the Great Society welfare state.

Conservatives will gain substantial black support if we can successfully implement three sets of policies:

1) Sustained economic growth without inflation.

2) Programs that help poor people move onto the ladder of economic opportunity. An example would be an adult illiteracy program that successfully taught people how to read and write.

3) Genuine affirmative action. This would combine strict enforcement of anti-discrimination laws—if necessary, as President Reagan says, "at the point of a bayonet"—with special efforts to recruit talent from all sources. It would not involve racial quotas, which patronizingly assume that blacks cannot succeed on their own merits.

During the presidential campaign, Walter Mondale accurately expressed many of the fears that black Americans have about conservatives. "When this crowd talks about independence," he said, "it's code for forgetting you. When they talk about bootstraps, it's code for budget cuts. And when they talk about the free market, it's code for discrimination. And when they talk about work, it's code for saying that you're lazy."

Conservatives will win black support when blacks are convinced of the following: When we talk about bootstraps, it's code for helping all people help themselves. When we talk about the free market, it's code for opportunity for all. And when we talk about work, it's code for our confidence in all Americans.

## Industrial Debate

Dear Sir:

I would like to respond to Professor Allan Feldman's article regarding the defeat of the Greenhouse Compact (Fall 1984).

First, contrary to Professor Feldman's claim, the Compact would not have meant higher taxes for Rhode Island. The break-even point for the Compact would have been reached if only one-third of its programs had succeeded. Few voters understood or believed this, however. Based on the cautious projections of the state Budget Office, the Compact would have lowered taxes by bringing more wealth into the state and expanding the tax base.

Second, while personal income in Rhode Island is almost on a par with the national average, it is substantially lower—and shrinking—



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compared to our neighbors in Massachusetts and Connecticut, or of most other heavily industrialized states.

Third, the voters were not rejecting industrial policy as an idea, or as a possible solution to Rhode Island's economic problems. According to a Providence College post-referendum survey, a majority of Rhode Islanders believe that the state's economy is worse than that of other states, and three-quarters believe that the state government must play an active role in addressing the state's economic problems.

All of this is not to say that supporters of the Greenhouse Compact made no mistakes. We probably developed a program that tried to do too much too quickly. But I am convinced from my discussions with local and national businessmen and economic analysts that the Compact's major programs were sound and necessary. Many of these programs are being implemented or contemplated in other states. In fact, the *Wall Street Journal* noted in October that "Development Aid from States Is a Growing Factor for Firms." The article stressed the development of small businesses in many states. Part of the article focused on Massachusetts, citing the state's significant investment in over two dozen young companies.

Kevin Phillips, a leading conservative Republican Party strategist, has recently authored a book entitled *Staying on Top: The Business Case for a National Industrial Strategy*. Phillips argues that conservatives should abandon a rigid adherence to laissez-faire economics, and accept an openly pro-business, activist role for government in reviving America's industrial base.

Despite the defeat of this proposal, the groundwork established by this ambitious project and the cooperative spirit it established between business and labor still remains. Future governors will be able to build upon this solid foundation to the benefit of all Rhode Islanders.

J. Joseph Garrahy
Governor of Rhode Island

*Allan Feldman replies:*

Those of us who opposed the Greenhouse Compact industrial policy plan argued that it would result in higher taxes in Rhode Island. Most voters seemed to agree with this assessment, in spite of the Greenhouse proponents' claims, repeated by Governor Garrahy, that the Compact's break-even point would have been reached if only one-third of its programs succeeded. Why the voter skepticism? Careful analysis by economists at Brown University indicated that the hypothesized state revenue gains attributable to Greenhouse programs were vastly exaggerated, and that program costs were greatly underestimated.

**Most agree that there is a role for government in state economic development.**

**Allan Feldman**

But the voter skepticism was mainly a result of recent taxing experiences. During the eight years of the Garrahy administration, total state taxes rose 84 percent. State personal income tax collections rose an astonishing 174 percent. Between 1977 and 1982 our overall state and local tax burden moved up from 18th to 10th worst in the nation. In short, during Governor Garrahy's tenure, state and local tax collectors have reached deeper and deeper into voters' pockets. The voters were therefore sensitive to implausible claims that a $250 million Greenhouse program would cost them nothing.

Governor Garrahy compares Rhode Island with neighboring Connecticut and Massachusetts. He would connect Massachusetts' economic success to recent and relatively minor programs like its state venture capital operation. In my opinion, Massachusetts' recent growth is connected to Proposition 2½ and former Governor King's tax and expenditure limitation efforts. A big plus for Connecticut is its lack of an individual income tax. New Hampshire is very similar to Rhode Island in terms of population, labor force history, proximity to Boston, and so on, but it has taken the low public expenditure, low tax route. Its economic growth has far surpassed Rhode Island's.

In spite of its overwhelming defeat at the polls, Governor Garrahy remains convinced that industrial policy is the wave of the future, that government ought to take an activist role in targeting industries and firms for development. In my view, politicians and government officials would do no better at "picking the winners" than private capital markets. In fact, they would do worse: they would respond to pressures from special interest groups, PACs, lobbyists, and unions. They would not respond to the ultimate economic arbiter, the consumer, nor would they respond to the taxpayers bankrolling their efforts. This view is shared by professional economists from left to right, and it's also shared by the Rhode Island electorate.

Most agree that there is a role for government in state economic development. It should provide schools, quality roads, and police and fire protection, as well as reasonable, evenhanded labor law. And it should avoid discouraging private economic activity through burdensome taxation. But the Greenhouse Compact industrial policy plan would have furthered none of those ends; rather it would have expanded government intervention in the private sector. Let government first put its own house in order.

## Building Heroes

Dear Sir:

Michael Warner's article, "Democracy's Hall of Fame," reinforces a critical point (Fall, 1984). The qualities of the leaders he stud-



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ied—will, courage, and determination—cannot be imported from abroad. In combatting insurgency, self-confident, and self-reliant local leadership is absolutely essential for success. This was true in all the cases that Warner salutes. Magsaysay, Betancourt, Savimbi, and Eugenia Charles all were inspirations for their own countrymen.

What we must remember is that none of these leaders were outsiders. None were American puppets. The United States could undermine them through failure to provide aid and support; the United States could strengthen them by providing such aid and support. What the United States could not and cannot do is to create them.

Harry G. Summers, Jr.
Colonel, Infantry
Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College

overly strict view of the First Amendment. The ACLU's hostility is, like many of its positions, highly selective. It certainly opposes the Reverend Jerry Falwell and his Moral Majority, but its spokesmen strongly support left-wing religious groups like the National and World Councils of Churches, just as the ACLU supported "religious" protests against the Vietnam War. As the Vigilantes point out, much of the ACLU's opposition to religion is simply petty and silly—the usual killjoy spirit of anti-religious or religious zealots.

Of particular interest is the Vigilantes' demonstration that ACLU activists, like Barry Lynn, actually want to *suppress* expressions of right-wing opinion. In 1971, I could only accuse them of indifference to violations of civil rights when committed by leftist militants.

**Much of the ACLU's opposition to religion is simply petty and silly—the usual killjoy spirit of anti-religious or religious zealots.**

**Joseph Bishop**

## Uncivil Liberties

Dear Sir:

Thirteen years ago, I wrote an article in *Commentary* criticizing the ACLU for devoting its resources to various left-wing political causes rather than enforcing the Bill of Rights. From reading "The ACLU Takes Liberties" by Richard and Susan Vigilante (Fall 1984), it does not appear that much has changed. The ACLU's occasional interest in civil liberty, such as its courageous defense of the American Nazis' right to parade in Skokie, is still less important to its management than its numerous left-wing political crusades.

The Vigilantes were generally very kind, perhaps too kind, to the organization. I don't think that the ACLU's hostility to religious groups has much to do with an

It would be unjust to accuse the ACLU of being a Communist front; as the authors point out, old-fashioned Stalinists are scarce these days. But it might as well be, since so many of its activities work to the advantage of the Soviet Union and its friends. We may hope that "The ACLU Takes Liberties" will, for a while, recall it to its real business, which is to defend the constitutional freedoms of "good thinkers" and "old thinkers" alike.

Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.
Yale University Law School
New Haven, Connecticut

Dear Sir:

As the author of a new book on the ACLU, I share many of the reservations that Richard and Susan Vigilante have about its performance. However, we're not in agreement on everything.

My research on the ACLU would not lead me to conclude, as the Vigilantes did, that "the ACLU has long attracted the support of many conservatives." I think the record will show that relatively few conservatives have been drawn to the ACLU; it's won the support of some libertarian conservatives but hardly any traditional ones. The ACLU of the 1920s and 1930s was too close to the radical camp to inspire much conservative support. Indeed no industrialist sat on its governing boards in those years. Although the ACLU did move right in the '40s and '50s, it still didn't attract many conservatives. And since the 1960s, hardly any conservatives have been motivated to join the ACLU.

The Vigilantes are quite right to emphasize the ACLU's lackadaisical attitude toward freedom of religion. When the organization was founded, it did not list religious liberty as one of its ten objectives. Over the past 65 years, the ACLU has been consistent on this point: freedom from religion is given priority over freedom of religion.

The Vigilantes argue that the ACLU surprised many of its critics in 1979 when it supported the right of Pope John Paul II to say Mass on state and Federal property during his visit to the United States. The evidence is quite the contrary: ACLU affiliates filed suit in five of the six cities the Pope visited, arguing that public property and government funding should not be used to accommodate the Holy Father (only Chicago, still reeling from Skokie, remained aloof).

The Vigilantes quote ACLU notable Nat Hentoff as saying that "the one thing you won't find in the ACLU" is "some kind of softness on Communism." The authors also make the point that the 1940 Resolution barring Communists from serving on the governing boards of the ACLU is no longer operative. It should be noted, however, that although the 1940 Resolution was rescinded (it was responsible for ousting Elizabeth—not Helen—Gurley Flynn), the present policy of the ACLU requires all governing members to be "unequivocally commit-



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ted" to civil liberties. That this policy is not enforced can be verified by considering the status of William Kunstler. He is a member of the Union's National Advisory Council. He is also the person who said in 1979 that "I do not believe in public attacks on socialist countries where violations of human rights may occur." It was Nat Hentoff who printed the Kunstler quote in the *Village Voice!*

The Vigilantes state that their research did not turn up one initiative of the ACLU's that advanced U.S. interests and hindered Communist expansion. The record shows, however, that throughout the 1940s and 1950s the ACLU was consistently supportive of U.S. initiatives and critical of Communism. Indeed it conspired with the FBI by turning over evidence of suspected Communists. But ever since Vietnam, the ACLU has resorted to its position of the 1920s and 1930s. It is decidedly against most U.S. foreign policy initiatives and silent on the matter of Communist expansion.

Finally, I think the real reason the ACLU has so often strayed from its civil libertarian agenda has less to do with the declining number of civil liberties violations (a claim I would not make) than with the radicalization of the organization itself. The politically driven ACLU cannot restrain itself from seeing every injustice as a civil liberties issue. From the very beginning, the ACLU has inclined toward non-civil liberties concerns. Its *sine qua non* has always been social reform. On that score, the ACLU can claim consistency.

William A. Donohue
Chair, Social Sciences
La Roche College
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Dear Sir:

Richard and Susan Vigilante are to be commended for their excellent article exposing the inconsistencies and intolerance of the ACLU. Without question, no organization has done more to deny Americans freedom of religious speech and thought than the ACLU. And no case better illustrates the religious intolerance of the ACLU than their effort to deny graduates of Liberty Baptist College the right to teach in Virginia public schools simply because the teachers of these students may ascribe to the Genesis account of creationism. According to the ACLU, this would constitute an impermissible state advancement of religion.

But what is the logical outcome of such an absurd position? Is it not to deny public employment to certain people holding creationist views? And why does the ACLU fear creationist views? The ACLU's secular agenda is threatened every time a government official develops a public policy based on God-given rights. For there is no God-given right for a mother to kill her unborn child or for a pornographer to exploit infants and children or for a homosexual to solicit acts of sodomy. A public official who believes in God-given rights is the natural enemy of the ACLU social agenda.

The ACLU is nothing more than a self-appointed guardian and distributor of dubious, self-defined human rights—an organization that wants to use the courts to push its version of social change onto society. In my opinion, their efforts to purge religious convictions from the public conscience is not motivated by some high ideal to uphold the U.S. Constitution but, rather, to prevent speech that upholds the credibility and sanctity of religiously inspired values.

Ronald S. Godwin, Ph.D.
Executive Vice President
Moral Majority

## The Wrong Medicine

Dear Sir:

In "The Best Health Care for Everyone: Medicine in the Conservative Opportunity Society" (Policy Review, Summer 1984), the Honorable Newt Gingrich presents several interesting arguments for modifying and improving health care delivery in the United States. Unfortunately, the paper opens with several serious misstatements.

He says that cholera, smallpox, yellow fever, typhus, typhoid, and bubonic plague have been *eradicated.* Only smallpox fits the bill. Worse, he claims that ". . . the parasites that caused these dread diseases" have been *destroyed.* The facts are that improved sanitation, personal hygiene, vaccines, and antibiotics—in that order—are responsible for the relative freedom from these diseases enjoyed by people living in the industrialized nations of Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. With the exception of smallpox (eradicated) and bubonic plague (now a disease occurring sporadically in the western United States, parts of South America, and Southeast Asia), all the other diseases mentioned still exist in endemic and recurrently epidemic form, and remain serious problems for much of the world's population.

Perhaps of even more importance (because of the dramatic picture of an iron-lung on the second page of this article) is the erroneous statement that polio has been eradicated. Nothing could be further from the truth. As a result of immunizations, only approximately 10 cases of paralytic poliomyelitis are reported in the United States every year. The picture is similar in Western Europe and in the other industrialized nations. That the virus is not eradicated even in these countries is attested to by occasional micro-epidemics among non-immunized persons both in the United States and in Western Europe. Much more importantly, poliomyelitis claims scores of thousands of victims every year in the developing countries—an important part of the rationale for the World Health Organization's Expanded Program on Immunization, and for Dr. Jonas Salk's continuing efforts to bring the benefits of immunization to those parts of the world.

Harold J. Simon, M.D., Ph.D.
Professor of Community Medicine
University of California, San Diego
San Diego, CA



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

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# Beyond Containment?

## The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations

What is the nature of our conflict with the Soviet Union? What are our ultimate objectives in this conflict? In dealing with the Soviet Union, what have been the greatest successes of American foreign policy over the past 40 years? What have been the greatest mistakes?

Do cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union benefit the United States? What kind of economic policy should we have toward the Soviet Union? Under what circumstances should the United States commit troops to Central America and the Caribbean? For what purposes should we arm anti-Communist guerrillas?

What kind of relations should we have with China? To what extent should we exploit vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union at home and in Eastern Europe? Have arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union benefited the United States? What is the likelihood of a major war with the Soviet Union in the next 10 years?

*Policy Review* asked these questions of 21 leading foreign policy thinkers—liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans—who share a vigorous opposition to Communist totalitarianism and Soviet imperialism. The participants were interviewed separately, and they edited their remarks. Their answers shatter the stereotypes of anti-Communism, and illuminate the foreign policy choices that Ronald Reagan will have to confront in his second term.



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# Symposium Participants

**Richard V. Allen.** President, Richard V. Allen Company; National Security Advisor to President Reagan, 1981–82.

**Robert L. Bartley.** Editor, *Wall Street Journal.*

**Zbigniew Brzezinski.** Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); National Security Advisor to President Carter, 1977–1981.

**Midge Decter.** Executive Director, Committee for the Free World; Trustee of The Heritage Foundation.

**Lawrence Eagleburger.** President of Kissinger Associates; Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Department of State, 1981–84.

**Samuel Huntington.** Center for International Studies, Harvard University; Coordinator of Security Planning, National Security Council, 1977–78; author, *Living with Nuclear Weapons* (1983).

**William G. Hyland.** Editor, *Foreign Affairs;* Deputy Director, National Security Council, 1975–77.

**Max Kampelman.** Partner of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman; Ambassador and chairman, U.S. delegation to Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Madrid.

**Jeane Kirkpatrick.** U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

**Irving Kristol.** Editor, *The Public Interest;* John M. Olin Professor of Social Thought, New York University Business School.

**Walter Laqueur.** Chairman of the International Research Council (CSIS); Editor, *Washington Quarterly of Strategic and International Studies;* author, *The Political Psychology of Appeasement: Finlandization and Other Unpopular Essays on World Affairs* (1980).

**Charles Lichenstein.** Senior Fellow in International Relations at The Heritage Foundation; Alternate Representative to the United Nations, 1981–84.

**Edward Luttwak.** Senior Fellow, CSIS; author, *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union* (1983).

**Richard Perle.** Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

**Robert L. Pfaltzgraff.** President and Director, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

**Richard Pipes.** Baird Professor of History, Harvard University; Director, Eastern European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council 1981–1982; author, *Survival Is Not Enough* (1984).

**Eugene Rostow.** Distinguished Visiting Research Professsor of Law and Diplomacy, National Defense University; Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981–83.

**Donald Rumsfeld.** President and Chief Executive Officer of G.D. Searle & Company; Secretary of Defense, 1975–77.

**Robert W. Tucker.** Director, American Foreign Policy Department, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University; author, *A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise* (1972).

**Adam B. Ulam.** Director, Russian Research Center, Harvard University; author, *Russia's Failed Revolutions: From the Decembrists to the Dissidents* (1980).

**William R. Van Cleave.** Professor, Defense and Strategic Studies Program, University of Southern California; author, *Strategic Options for the Early Eighties: What Can Be Done?* (1979).



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# What is the nature of our conflict with the Soviet Union?

**Donald Rumsfeld:** Our differences are rooted in a fundamental conflict of values. We believe in the primacy of the individual and that the state is to be measured by how well it serves the individual. The Soviet leadership believes in the primacy of the state and that the individual is to be measured by how well he or she serves the state. We believe in individual freedom for ourselves and we recommend it for others. The Soviet leadership does not. We value our independence and we respect the self-determination of others. The Soviet Union does not.

Second, the Soviet Union represents the gravest threat to our values and our security, and, as a result of its sustained military investment, is a greater threat today than ever before. We have fundamentally different political systems, different economic systems, and the Soviet Union has the military power to put our system and our values at risk. Since World War II, they have engaged in a relentless expansion of their influence that has changed the equilibrium in the world.

The conflict is likely to continue because of Soviet actions to subjugate others, whether in Eastern Europe, Afghanistan, or their denial of freedom to their own people. The threat they pose is global, because of the reach and power of weapons, because of the interconnected nature of world economies, and because human beings are willing to resist efforts to deprive them of basic liberties in whatever part of the world they live.

**Lawrence Eagleburger:** It is in essence a conflict over the survival of our system. It is an ideological conflict between our view of humanity and theirs, a conflict over the role of the individual human being in society, the individual's obligations to society and vice versa, and things such as freedom of speech. In its realpolitik dimension, it is a conflict between two countries with fundamentally different historical perspectives. For hundreds of years, the Russians have looked at the outside world with distrust, fright, insecurity, and uncertainty. Paranoia is not a bad term for describing the Soviets. I would suggest that paranoids are dangerous people.

**Jeane Kirkpatrick:** It is a variety of great power conflict. There is an ideological dimension, but it is not primarily a contest of ideas. There are other Communist states, for example Yugoslavia, China, and Albania, with which we have important disagreements about the nature of the good society, about what works, about what is important, but with which the United States is not in conflict. We are in conflict with the Soviet Union because it is an expansionist power, with imperialistic aspirations and imperialist habits. It has frequently used violence to achieve its purposes.

**Richard Perle:** It has a number of dimensions. The one with which I and others in the Defense Department are most immediately concerned is the military dimension. The Soviets are building military power in all its aspects at an unrelenting rate, and in so doing, imposing a staggering sacrifice on their own population. The Soviet leadership believes that there is an inescapable relationship between military and political power and therefore it desires military predominance wherever it can be obtained.

The ideological aspect of the relationship has been a disaster for the Soviet Union. Virtually no one in the world believes in the superiority of Soviet ideology. On the contrary, the current trend in the world is the rejection of Soviet totalitarianism. The economic dimension, too, has been disastrous to the Soviets, whose own economy performs poorly.

**Midge Decter:** The Soviet Union is a revolutionary force, and whether or not Soviet leaders believe in their revolutionary ideology is beside the point. They are prisoners of that ideology, and they are inevitably bound to conduct an ideological struggle against Western liberal democratic institutions. Their expansionism is not just a desire for warm-water ports. To maintain their power, the Soviets must create throughout the world a series of subservient satellite governments. Communism must grow or die. Wherever it is instituted, the Communist system is economically unviable and politically unpopular. It therefore will be destroyed if it stands still.

**Richard Pipes:** It is not an ordinary international conflict in the sense that it arose out of territorial or commercial disputes. It is essentially an outgrowth of the Communist system which drives the ruling class of the Soviet Union to create international tension as a means of legitimizing and maintaining its power.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski:** The Soviet Union sees itself still as an aspirant to world preponderance whereas the United States has been the preponderant world power. That inherently creates conflict. More concretely, the contest has been and still is largely over control of Eurasia. The Soviet aspiration, almost explicitly articulated in the wartime meetings with the Allies, was that after World War II the Soviet Union would be the preponderant power on the Eurasian continent, American would disengage, Western Europe would be fragmented, and the Far East would be powerless. The last 35 years have seen consistent Soviet efforts to push the United States out to the extremities, both eastern and western, of the Eurasian continent, and concurrent American efforts to contain Soviet efforts to that end.

**Robert Pfaltzgraff:** Geostrategically, it is a confrontation between the world's leading maritime power, the United States, and the world's largest land power, the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union the key to world hegemony lies in control of that long arc that extends from northwestern Europe to northeast Asia, and comprises Europe, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. From the standpoint of American security, we have been unprepared to permit the domination of those



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rimlands of Europe and Asia by a hostile power, whether it be the Soviet Union today, or Nazi Germany and Japan during the Second World War. Our political values could not survive if all of Europe and all of the Asian-Pacific area were controlled by a power or combination of powers hostile to the United States. The Soviet quest for hegemony clashes with the effort of the United States to preserve freedom, independence, and political pluralism.

**Eugene Rostow:** The Soviet Union is on an expansionist course and has been ever since the revolution of 1917. The traditional expansionism of the Russian Empire is reinforced by the ideological element, but the Soviet Union has long since given up any serious commitment to scientific socialism. What is important is that the Soviet Union is an expansionist military culture. The military side is the only successful aspect of the Soviet experience. The danger of the Soviet Union to the West is exactly the same kind of danger that other societies faced from Alexander the Great, Napoleon, the Kaiser, and Hitler.

**Irving Kristol:** We have an ideological conflict, a conflict of world views, a conflict over the future shape of world civilization. The only comparison I can think of is the conflict between medieval Christendom and Islam. This is not a typical 19th century conflict of great powers fighting over material interests. It is not a fight over resources and raw materials. To the degree that it is a conflict over strategic positions, that is only because of the underlying ideological conflict.

**Robert Bartley:** The conflict is pretty much as George Kennan described it in 1948. You have a power that by its historical traditional and geographic position is likely to be expansionist anyway. This is married to a somewhat messianic creed. And our problem is how to live on the same planet with these folks. Not just matters of national interests but very substantial values are involved here. If Soviet Communism managed to establish an ascendancy over the earth, it would be a real setback for freedom and liberty, for the values that Western civilization has stood for over the centuries.

**Max Kampelman:** The very nature of the two systems leads to an inherent conflict. We find it extremely difficult to be partners with a totalitarian system that engages in brutal measures against its own citizens, and that has an ideology in which violence plays an important role. But beyond our philosophical differences, we are in conflict because the Soviet society is militarily aggressive. The Soviets do not appear to be restrained by the normal rules of responsible international behavior. Indeed one of the basic precepts of Communism is that they do not have to live up to bourgeois laws or mores that are contrary to long-range interests. We therefore must question whether the Soviets would ever join us in a common effort toward peace.

**William Van Cleave:** It is a systemic, vital, total conflict, with geostrategic, ideological, and military dimensions. It is based on irreconcilable differences between two fundamentally different systems, the other of which seeks to overturn and dominate wherever feasible. It is the central conflict of our times, and its outcome will determine the political future of the world. It is a contest over whether most of the world will be dominated by free institutions or by a Soviet-style totalitarian system, subservient to military force.



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## What are our ultimate objectives in our conflict with the Soviet Union?

**Rostow:** To achieve a balance of power, and persuade them to accept the rules indispensable to a stable balance of power system. Every other hegemonial, ambitious, predatory power in history has given up the idea of conquest sooner or later. They all reach their limits. Of course we should prefer to stop the Soviets through persuasion rather than through war. I am not too gloomy about the possibility of inducing such a change in Soviet policy. If we can convince them that their ambitions can never be realized the Soviets will recognize that the Germans and the Japanese are pursuing a much more sensible course.

**Richard Allen:** In the first place, the dissolution of the Soviet external empire (the countries illegally occupied or influenced by the Soviet Union), and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet military forces to the boundaries of the Soviet Union. It should also be our long-range objective to frustrate the permanence of the Soviet system and to alter its world outlook. These goals may not be readily achievable, but they ought to be very much in our minds.

**Samuel Huntington:** The original ideal of containment was that it would lead to a mellowing in the Soviet Union. To a certain extent it has: the Soviet Union of Mr. Chernenko is clearly different from Stalin's. But it is a mistake to think that we can bring about major change in the Soviet political system and society. We certainly should make an issue of human rights, but we shouldn't delude ourselves about how much we can do. In particular cases we can make it too expensive for the Soviet Union to pursue some courses of action, but we clearly can't compel or induce the Soviet Union to become a liberal democratic system.

**Van Cleave:** To secure, perpetuate, and advance our institutions and values, and to safeguard our security so that freedom and free enterprise can continue to prosper.

Our principal objective is to contain and neutralize the Soviet threat. But while we are basically a defensive power, a defensive containment strategy need not be totally passive and reactive. We must actively compete as well as contain. We must take the initiative at times. I would reject the notion of a Brezhnev Doctrine, particularly as it applies to the more recent expansion of Soviet power and seek to reverse Soviet advances, and exploit problems in the Soviet empire.

**Perle:** First and foremost, we need to maintain the collective strength of the Western democracies so as to limit Soviet encroachment. Second, we need to give support—political, ideological, economic, and military—to those countries that have come under pressure from the Soviet Union or its surrogates, and are struggling to maintain their territorial integrity and trying to develop political institutions free from Soviet totalitarian rule. Third, we should be ready at all times where there is a mutuality of interest with the Soviets to explore ways to cooperate. But we mustn't make the mistake of finding mutuality where none exists, out of an inordinate desire to cooperate for the sake of cooperation.

**Kirkpatrick:** Our hope would be for a Soviet Union willing to live at peace with the rest of the world, without resorting to violence and subversion and without pursuing expansionist policies. It would also be for a democratic government in the Soviet Union that would respect the human and civil rights of all its citizens. Our operational policy goal is more the former than the latter. We do not actively seek to intervene in Soviet affairs, nor do I think it is practical to do so, except by way of information, which is a useful instrument.

**Eagleburger:** Our goal must be to find ways to live on the same planet with the Soviet Union, to avoid war in a constantly changing set of circumstances, without sacrificing the independence of the West or our fundamental views of humanity. I am not saying peace at any price. When we talk that way, as we do on occasion, we dangerously mislead the Soviets and we hand them the initiative. The Soviets must have no doubt that there are principles we will fight for under any circumstances.

Our longer-term objectives are to reduce and eventually eliminate the Soviet stranglehold over Eastern Europe, and to change the nature of the Soviet system. But we need to recognize that these goals are inherently in tension with our objective of avoiding war. They therefore have to be managed with nuance, sophistication, and a great deal of patience. Hal Sonnenfeldt and his famous Sonnenfeldt Doctrine have been pilloried for years. But all Hal was trying to say was that in dealing with Eastern Europe, the United States needs to understand that the Soviets consider current conditions there as fundamental to their own security, and that if conditions in Eastern Europe change, we run the real risk of World War III, if we are not careful. I cannot believe that it is anyone's national interest to force a change in the Soviet situation in Eastern Europe overnight. The dangers of war are too great.

**Pfaltzgraff:** Since the Second World War, the objective of successive administrations has been the containment of Soviet power. The Truman Doctrine, applied first in Greece and Turkey, the Eisenhower Doctrine in the Middle East, the Nixon Doctrine of building additional centers of power around the world as a counterpoise to Soviet expansionism, and the Carter Doctrine following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were all based on containment. What distinguishes the Reagan Administration has been its willingness to go beyond simple containment in order to attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the Soviet Union. In my view this is an important but usually neglected dimension of American foreign policy. I believe that an American strategy must be based first and foremost on the prevention of Soviet expansion, but that to achieve success, American strategy has to focus upon Soviet



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weaknesses. We should not leave the Soviets with the opportunity to exploit the vulnerabilities of the West.

**Kristol:** Our objective is to prevent the takeover of world civilization by Marxist-Leninist ideology. Ultimately, it is to have that ideology retreat geographically and undergo internal transformations of a kind that would diminish the conflict.

**Edward Luttwak:** In statecraft, there are no ultimate objectives. Given the quality of our performance as a superpower, and the fact that we operate under a system of government that prohibits the pursuit of a coherent strategy, I think it is quite idle to waste time in defining ultimate objectives. We can say that some things are not objectives. It is not, it never has been, and I certainly hope it never will be, our objective to start a war in order to defeat the Soviet Union militarily, and thus remove the problem in the way that we once eliminated the problem of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Even in World War II, we were not sufficiently offended by Nazism to use force until the Japanese took us into the war.

So let us not kid ourselves. Let's stick to minimum short-term objectives. And they, of course, are to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union, that is to say, containment. Rollback is impossibly ambitious given present self-indulgence and indeed given the present dangers.

**Walter Laqueur:** Twofold. To prevent the political conflict from turning into something far more dangerous. And to prevent the Soviet Union from winning the conflict.

**Bartley:** To persuade as much of the world as we can—even the Soviet Union itself—that our view of mankind, our way of organizing society, is the better one. That's a pretty ambitious objective. Over our lifetime, our objective ought to be to contain Soviet expansionism and to avoid all-out war, in the hopes that their system will gradually evolve into something a little less threatening to us.

## In dealing with the Soviet Union, what have been the greatest successes of American foreign policy over the past 40 years?

**Eagleburger:** Both we and our allies tend to denigrate the achievements of American foreign policy. This is in part because we lack a sense of self-confidence, and because our sophisticated European brethren know how to play on that lack of confidence. God knows, I am a strong believer in the trans-Atlantic relationship. But some Western Europeans have really gotten my dander up with their lectures on how they are so much more prescient than we are. The United States is not responsible for the fact that this has been a pretty hideous century. In fact, the United States is by and large responsible for whatever stability we have had.

Our preeminent achievement has been the creative way that we and our Western European allies have dealt with the trans-Atlantic relationship. With all its faults and problems, our alliance is unlike any relationship before in history. We have established institutions of consultation and joint planning that have stood some very serious tests. With the encouragement of the United States, Western Europe has been able to build itself into a different kind of entity. We have also done a remarkable job in creating a substantially different kind of society in Japan. Given the nature of our system, and given our isolationist tradition, we have dealt reasonably creatively and courageously with the Soviet Union. We certainly were greatly instrumental in creating an international economic order at Bretton Woods that by and large served the world well, though it is now in need of some overhaul. On any balance sheet I could write up, the profits have been a hell of a lot greater than the losses.

**Charles Lichenstein:** I think the major successes came after the Second World War and the disasters of Yalta and Potsdam. We belatedly recognized that the Soviet world constituted a real and present threat to the independence of countries, to the autonomy of peoples, to their welfare, and to their opportunity to enjoy freedom.

The successes can be spelled out in more precise terms: the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Marshall Plan, and the NATO Alliance which then proliferated into other not-so-firm, not-so-successful, but still significant alliances. We don't think of CENTO or SEATO much any more, but the general purpose of those alliances remains.

I believe that it was important to assist the Shah to return to power in the 50s in Iran; I think it was important to interject American power in Guatemala in 1954; I think it was important for the United States to assist the Republic of Korea in defending its freedom. Indeed, I would go as far as to say that the fundamental purpose of our entering into the conflict in Southeast Asia in the mid-60s was sound, and has in fact had enormous benefits even though we lost the war. The Vietnam effort signalled to other countries in Asia that there were circumstances under which the United States would leap to the defense of struggling, nascent democracies. Let's also add the Grenada mission: it too was a signal of our determination.

**Brzezinski:** I would say the construction of a reasonably viable alliance in Western Europe which did hold the Soviets essentially to the line that emerged in the wake of World War II. In the Far East, the containment of the Soviets along the 39th parallel in Korea and the safeguarding of Japan were very major successes. And beyond that, and very importantly, the normalization and expansion of the American-Chinese connection, which today involves the emergence of a de facto tacit collaboration in the containment of Soviet influence.



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

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**Van Cleave:** In the 1947–1950 period, the United States conceptualized and adapted into policy the principle of containment, and recognized the need to shore up our allies and to maintain substantial peacetime forces, even to deploy some of them abroad. These commitments represented profound changes in American foreign policy. Without them, we would have faced a far more dangerous world.

The achievements of the 1950s under Eisenhower and Dulles have generally been underrated. During this period, the United States and the West were generally successful in containment, and our decisions to use military power were careful and resolute. We tried to use military power decisively and early enough so that our military confrontation was limited and successful.

**Huntington:** The greatest accomplishment was in preventing Western Europe from going Communist in the 40s and 50s. This involved the diplomatic planning of the Atlantic alliance, the Marshall Plan, and the assistance we gave to non-Communist groups in Western Europe such as free labor unions. It seems almost bizarre now, but Italy, France, and Germany could easily have gone Communist during the 10 years or so years after World War II.

Containment, with a few exceptions, has been successful. Another success of sorts is that over time, we have been able to maintain the military balance with the Soviet Union. We have done this in fits and starts, of course; in the 70s defense went down too far, but now we are redressing the problem. Many people thought this would be impossible for a democratic country to do.

**Pipes:** I think we have been remarkably unsuccessful in dealing with the Soviet Union. We have engaged in didactic diplomacy. We are nice to the Soviet Union when it "behaves" and we try to punish it when it turns aggressive. But we have never gotten to the root of the problem of why Communist regimes are aggressive.

**Kristol:** We really haven't had many successes. The Soviets have had some notable failures, but I don't think we can regard them as successes on our part. We have been lucky in the case of Yugoslavia, and we have been lucky in the case of China, where the Soviet leadership made ex-allies out of allies. Some people see the existence of NATO and the fact that the Soviet Union has not taken over Western Europe as an accomplishment. I don't regard such negative facts as accomplishments. If you start thinking that way, you are playing defensive football and you end up on the one-yard line.

A success would be for a country governed by a Marxist-Leninist regime to undergo a political transformation. We have had no such success in the post-war period. Nor have we and our allies gained, in physical conflict, territory that the Soviet Union and its allies had possessed.



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**Rostow:** Containment has been a success starting from the protection of Greece and Turkey, the Berlin airlift, the formation of NATO, the Korean War, and the security treaties in Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Even though the Vietnam War was a mess and a tragedy, and was badly handled in many ways, nonetheless the expansionist process was stopped there. Thailand and the small Southeast Asian countries are still independent and flourishing.

**Hyland:** Our major success, though I am not sure that we can claim much credit for it, is that our system 40 years later looks better than their system. There was a time, in the 20 and 30s, when intellectuals visiting the Soviet Union would say they had seen the future and it worked. Even after the war, the Soviet Union was seen as a model of industrialization for the Third World. Today, the Soviets are clearly not the wave of the future. Scarcely a country wants to replicate the Soviet economy. Unfortunately, there are countries that would say that the Soviet system is a good model for organizing power and keeping it.

American foreign policy on the whole has been very successful. At the end of the war, Western Europe was wrecked, destroyed, demoralized. Japan was more or less the same. Two huge giants, Russia and China, emerged from the war adhering roughly to the same Stalinist system, and positioned geographically to sweep around the world. Forty years later, the United States is allied with the great countries of the world—Germany, France, Italy, Britain, Japan—and has friendly relations with China. There have been some setbacks, of course. On the whole, however, I think we have done fairly well.

**Rumsfeld:** One is that since World War II nuclear weapons have not been fired in anger or miscalculation. That has been accomplished without a compromise of our values or our freedom. Another is NATO and the fact that not an acre of Western Europe has fallen to the Soviets since World War II. Finally, our relationships with our friends and allies in northeast Asia, given their strategic importance, their economic systems, and the similarity of their political approaches, is another achievement, including the fact that the Peoples' Republic of China is not intimate with the Soviet Union and appears to be moving away from an excessively controlled economy.

**Tucker:** I am impressed by the fact that we have kept instability, armed conflict, and all those undesirable consequences that follow from it, at a reasonable level. A post-war order has grown up, and, despite some of its shortcomings and injustices, it is an eminently tolerable order. Within the framework of this post-war order, not only the peoples of the Western world have prospered, but I think most of the people of the Third World have done better than they had ever expected to.

One success is that the grave apprehension we had at the beginning never materialized. We feared a divided Europe would mean war. In fact, it has meant peace, a peace that has astonished us. And in general, the recovery of those countries and continents that were so devastated by World War II is a great success. This is part of what I would call the development of the post-war order.

**Adam Ulam:** Well, our successes were not so much vis-à-vis the Soviets as in creating some basis for the restoration of the world system and world stability. The Marshall Plan was a tremendous success. Another was the introduction of democratic government in Japan. In actual confrontations with the Soviet Union, we have often been outflanked and outfoxed. The Cuban missile crisis was only a qualified success. We still have Castro's Cuba, which envenoms the situation in much of Latin America.

**Kampelman:** We have kept the flag of liberty flying. America remains a very important, indeed an indispensable, symbol to people who do not enjoy liberty.

## Do cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union benefit the United States?

**Perle:** I think they do. They give our performers a chance to see what the Soviet Union is like, and that's almost always an enlightening experience. They don't have much effect on the Soviets, since access to the performances is closely controlled. They don't accomplish the improved mutual understanding that many proponents claim for them. But they do improve our understanding of what the Soviet Union is like.

The Soviets are ambivalent about cultural exchanges, because, among other things, Soviet performers tend to defect. There's a joke going around Moscow:

Q: "What is a Soviet string quartet?

A: The Moscow Symphony after a tour of the United States."

It is an indictment of the Soviet system that they have to send guards with their performers. The cultural exchanges have greatly enriched American music and ballet and theater through the defections that have taken place. I suppose that's the key benefit of the program.

**Laqueur:** They don't do any harm, but it shouldn't be a one way street. We send people to study 18th century iconography. They send people to study the most advanced military technology.

**Kristol:** No. They send scientists, we send sociologists. They use cultural exchanges for military purposes basically. I think cultural exchanges to the degree that they work at all only work well with friendly nations. Not with enemy nations.



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## What would you have done differently over the last 40 years?

**Bartley:** I would have mined the harbors of North Vietnam in 1965 instead of 1973 or, alternatively, I would have pulled out of Vietnam before the Diem coup in 1963. The problem in Vietnam was that we got involved in something that need not have been a major commitment. But once we committed ourselves—and the critical point was when we sanctioned the Diem coup—we pulled our punches. Either we should have pulled out, or, if we were going to go in, we should have gone in with both feet.

The whole period of arms control negotiations has given us very serious problems, by facilitating the Soviet movement toward strategic parity and maybe in some sense strategic advantage. I think that we probably should have built an ABM system in the early 1970s instead of negotiating it away. Our technology wasn't very good at that time, but it would have been better by now, and we wouldn't have the Minuteman vulnerability problem, where we're trying to pur square pegs into round holes to keep a land-based deterrent.

Even more fundamental, I would never have toyed with the idea of mutal assured destruction (MAD) as strategic doctrine. I think the notion that the purpose of our strategic weapons is to blow up women and children and to attack cities is at the heart of our moral ambivalence about nuclear weapons and about defense in general. I'm not sure that MAD has ever really been our policy, but many of our policy makers have acted as if it were. This was a very important psychological mistake.

**Kristol:** We should have done many things differently, beginning with the Yalta agreement. We made a great mistake in the last months of World War II by not going to Berlin and Prague and getting there before the Russians. It was a tragic error. The Truman Administration did not wish to offend the Soviets by seeming to be worried about their occupying areas in Eastern Europe. We should have been worried and we should have taken preemptive action.

In 1956, we should not have forced the British, French, and Israelis to withdraw from the Suez Canal. We should have accepted their occupation and then insisted that the Canal be operated by the United Nations. If that had happened, we would not have had the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. And if there had been no 1967 War, there would not have been any Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Suez was a stupid error on our part based on the notion that the Western European nations were in some sense "colonialists" and that it was our mission to support the ex-colonial nations whenever they were in conflict with Western Europe. We thought that would gain us their good will and their cooperation in international affairs. That was an illusion.

We have also passed up many opportunities for more assertive actions vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. I don't mean military action, which is not feasible. But we could have taken all sorts of symbolic action that would have made it clear to the people of Eastern Europe and the rulers of the Soviet Union that we do not recognize the legitimacy of Marxist-Leninist rule in Eastern Europe. This would have rendered the Soviet regime a lot more insecure than it is. I have often wondered why we have not recognized the Ukraine and Byelorussia as independent states. The Soviet Union insists that they have separate seats in the Assembly of the United Nations, so why do we not recognize them as independent states and request that they enter into diplomatic relations with us?

We should never have permitted the imposition of a Marxist-Leninist regime on the people of Cuba. We should have made it clear to Castro from the beginning that he could have any kind of economic or social system he wished so long as he had no ties with the Soviet Union, but that we would regard the establishment of such ties as a hostile action to which we would respond with military force.

**Brzezinski:** This question requires you to go all the way back to Yalta and Potsdam. I certainly would have waged World War II more explicitly for the political purpose of creating a more congenial world environment after victory over the Axis powers.

I certainly would have reacted differently to the several signs of major internal Soviet weakness. We had the Berlin uprising of '53, the Hungarian uprising of '56, and even the more recent manifestations of unrest in Eastern Europe. In particular, in 1953, there was a remarkable opportunity to ask the Soviets to reconsider their commitment to the division of Germany and Europe. The Soviets were weak and fearful. They themselves were searching for some new formula for Central Europe. We still had, for all intents and purposes, a monopoly on nuclear weapons. That was perhaps the moment to seek some arrangement for the neutralization of Central Europe along the lines of what subsequently was applied on a much more limited basis to Austria.

In very recent history, I certainly would not have been as inclined as some of my friends were to take a rather tolerant view of Soviet proxy expansion in the Third World. Not only did this encourage the Soviets to do what they subsequently did in Afghanistan, it also aborted the chances of stabilizing American-Soviet arms competition through a mutually beneficial strategic arms agreement. I have said on more than one occasion that SALT II lies buried in the sands of Ogaden.

**Kirkpatrick:** Certainly the Allied policy at the end of World War II was seriously flawed. Soviet intentions with respect to Eastern Europe appear quite clear in retrospect, and were apparently clear to Churchill at the time. But we simply accepted the Soviets' good intentions. I don't believe that the Yalta agreement is responsible for Soviet domination of Poland today. It's the Soviet Army that's responsible for that. But the Yalta agreement was quite appalling in its lack of prudent verification and enforcement measures.

Enormous mistakes were made in and around the



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Vietnam war. I think our doctrine of limited war, of graduated force, was seriously mistaken. The Soviets are better at the use of force than we are. I think that force should only be used as a last resort, but if it's going to be used, it should be used in a definitive fashion. Graduated response never wins wars.

My own judgment, in hindsight, is that we should never have been in the Vietnam War in the first place. I have a powerful preference against direct U.S. involvement in most conflicts. Instead, we should rely on U.S. assistance to countries in the region directly affected. We need to face the fact that we are not omnipotent, and we must avoid being seduced into fighting on a hundred different fronts. But between isolationism and the direct use of U.S. troops lies a wide range of uses of American power to help others help themselves. This is why our self-denying ordinances, such a the Clark Amendment making it impossible to assist non-Communist forces in Angola, are such a terrible mistake.

Our self-denying ordinances at the time of the Hungarian and Czechoslovak revolutions were also counterproductive. I do not mean that we should have gone to war. But we should not have been as concerned as we were to prevent help from reaching Hungarians and Czechs seeking greater independence from their imperial bonds.

**Ulam:** At the end of World War II we were in a position of power like that of no other country in modern history. People usually talk about the monopoly of nuclear weapons, but that in my mind is much less important than the fact that we had about 50 percent of the industrial production of the whole world. We were almost unscratched by the war, compared with other belligerents. Here was the Soviet Union with more than 20 million people killed, its economy in ruins, and yet Soviet diplomacy succeeded in intimidating us to the point that we let them take over Eastern Europe. We could have stopped Stalin—it would not have taken any bombs or any military measures—simply by loudly saying, "Boo." Not doing so was a capital mistake which we are paying for now.

In the 60s we fell into the notion of mutual assured destruction and stopped adding to our strategic arms while the Russians went on building their own ICBMs. Now that was predicated on the assumption that we had enough nuclear weapons and also that our technology was superior. But from a psychological point of view, it was a great mistake not to at least match the Russians missile for missile. The voters in West Germany, England, and the United States look at figures, not at obscure technical problems, and what they saw by 1972 was that the Russians had 1,600 ICBMs with much greater megatonnage, while we had somewhere around 1,050. No wonder they were scared.

Another great mistake was that we did not change the whole structure of NATO by the mid-60s. The original concept of NATO was that because of the destruction of Western Europe, the Western alliance would never be able to match the Russians soldier for soldier and tank for tank. Consequently we would have to devise a nuclear umbrella. Well, by the mid-60s the nuclear umbrella was getting very porous and Western Europe had fully recovered. We should have insisted beginning then that Western Europe match the Warsaw Pact in conventional forces.

**Hyland:** Near the end of the war and immediately after, we should have been much more aggressive in pressing Russia on Eastern Europe. We had the nuclear monopoly and were occupying most of Czechoslovakia and eastern Germany. I think Churchill was right, we should have sat tight, instead of demobilizing. But that was probably unrealistic. Americans weren't ready for the Cold War right away.

Vietnam was one of the great disasters of American history. It ripped the country apart at a time, in the wake of the Kennedy assassination, when we needed healing. And it distracted us into a fight that drained our resources and energy. Finally when we emerged from it in the 70s, we realized that the real problem was not Indochina but the Soviet Union. I think the war was fought the wrong way. Wars are serious business, and if you fight them, you should fight them to win. I suppose in hindsight I would say don't go to Vietnam, because even winning would be terribly costly and divisive and, after all, the main problem for the United States in the world is not who controls South Vietnam. But at the time, I thought it was the right war.

**Tucker:** I would have been more modest about the scope and goals of containment. I would have been much more reluctant to have extended containment to Asia. We had no business issuing all those promissory notes, particularly on the Asian mainland where it was clear that we would be hard put to fight conventional protracted wars. This I think was a great mistake. It led to Vietnam, and then, having overextended ourselves, we unwisely moved in the opposite direction in the 1970s.

**Decter:** We should have remained heavily armed after World War II until such time as we had forced the Soviets to cry uncle, instead of looking for every excuse to deceive ourselves about Soviet intentions.

The deal that Kennedy made with the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis was much celebrated at the time. In fact, it was disastrous. The Soviets removed their missiles in exchange for our allowing them to remain heavily based 90 miles off our shore. In so doing, we encouraged them to believe that we could be bought off with cosmetics.

The SALT process is something we should never have entered into. It did nothing to stop the Soviet nuclear buildup. It did much to give us the totally wacky illusion that there was some talisman, "arms control," that was going to make us safe and solve our problems.

A bitter mistake was to believe as part of détente that we could entrap the Soviets economically. I think the idea was that we could make them consumption junkies, but it was we who got entrapped. Today a significant part of the Western banking system is hostage to the Soviet bloc, so that when the Solidarity insurgency happened—the best news we have had in years and years—we were



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afraid to take advantage of it. We were afraid for our own economic health to help Solidarity by calling in loans and declaring Poland in default.

**Pipes:** The whole détente policy was ill-conceived and based on a shallow understanding of the problem. We adopted the notion that we could influence Soviet behavior by essentially commercial devices. I am gratified that now even Kissinger admits that our policy of economic concessions did not gain us the desired political results. You simply cannot attenuate Soviet aggressiveness by bribery.

Moreover, I would not have gone into Vietnam, though once there, we should have fought to victory. We made a major effort in a marginal region, and our failure there practically paralyzed us for 10 years. To some extent, it still does so. I think we should never engage Soviet proxy forces with our own forces in any massive way. This is a situation which precludes victory on our part.

**Allen:** We should not have accepted the subjugation of all of Eastern Europe in 1945–48. The decision to supply Berlin by air rather than over land might have been a fundamental error. While it was certainly a heroic act, it could have been done in another, more direct way to teach the Soviet Union it could not subvert agreements. Our decision to pull the rug out from under the Kuomintang, which forced the Nationalists into an impossible coalition with the Chinese Communist party, was another fundamental mistake. So was the decision not to implement any aspect of a policy of liberation as opposed to containment during the Eisenhower years, especially at the time of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions in 1956. The decision of Suez, however upright and moral it may have seemed at the time, was a mistake. Allowing the Bay of Pigs invasion to occur without providing proper support, and accepting Soviet assurances at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, guaranteed that we would pay on the installment plan for our failure to act decisively in an area that was clearly within our own vital sphere of interest. Certainly, decisions about Vietnam were also defective—in particular, the decision to continue the war after the advent of the Nixon Administration; we ended up with a situation less desirable than we would have been able to achieve in early 1969 if we had simply withdrawn our forces from Vietnam. The failure of the United States to develop, articulate, and implement a long-range policy toward Central and Latin America has resulted in the exceptionally dangerous situation that exists there today.

The most impressive and devastating mistake has been to permit the destruction by the Congress of the basis for bipartisan foreign and national security policy. This process, which began in earnest during the Johnson Administration and the Vietnam War, has continued to this day, with enormous cost to the national interest. Finally, the overwhelming desire for arms control agreements played an important role in guaranteeing that the United States would be in a precarious military position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the 80s and into the 90s. The balance has been shifted decisively against us in a strategic field as well as the tactical and the conventional fields. Especially



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during the Nixon era, such agreements were sought as much for domestic political purposes as they may have been for the ostensible purpose of bringing peace and tranquility to the East-West relationship. I think that SALT I and SALT II were defective agreements in that they codified Soviet superiority to the United States.

**Pfaltzgraff:** At the zenith of American military and economic power, in the decade after World War II, I would have attempted to keep the Soviet Union from consolidating its position in Eastern Europe. This would have required the United States to forego immediate military demobilization, which probably would have been politically impossible. But I would have made an effort to ensure that the Soviet Union lived up to its wartime commitments with the United States about the future of liberated territories in Eastern Europe.

Second, I would have attempted to create a global alliance structure. For example, rather than a series of bilateral alliances in the Asian-Pacific area, I would have attempted to build a multilateral structure that would have permitted Japan to share more fully in the security of the region. In Europe, a multilateral structure made it possible for Germany and her neighbors to reach agreement with the United States about the level and type of contribution that the Federal Republic would make to the common defense. In the absence of such a framework in the Asian-Pacific area, it became impossible, or at least very difficult, to elicit from Japan a commitment to expand its military forces without arousing the fears of its neighbors.

Vietnam was a bad mistake, mostly because we were unprepared to win the war. We didn't do what was necessary to win it in an earlier stage and we finally lost the will to win. As a consequence, we have suffered psychologically, which is dangerous for a superpower. Since our departure from Vietnam and the collapse of South Vietnam, we have failed to recognize our obligations of leadership in terms of coherence, steadiness, and predictability. A lot of countries, unsure that they can protect themselves on their own, have been badly shaken in the confidence that they can rely on us. It would have been better not to go into Vietnam in the first place.

**Eagleburger:** I would never have forced the British, the French, and the Israelis out of the Suez in 1956. By doing so we changed the balance of power in the Middle East—a change that could, at least, have been delayed.

**Kampelman:** Hindsight is such a wise counselor. Obviously, the fundamental plague was the Vietnam war. It has damaged us internally even more than it has damaged us externally. With the benefit of hindsight, I would say that either we should not have involved ourselves in Vietnam, or, having become involved, we should have ended our involvement more quickly and more decisively in our favor.

Hindsight also tells us that we should not have permitted the problem of Cuba to fester. If it were possible, we should have embraced Castro and brought him to us as our man. If that were not possible, we simply should have so cut off Castro's support and so strengthened the democratic elements in his society that he could not establish his dictatorship that he did establish.

Less important, though still symbolic, we should not have permitted construction of the Berlin Wall. We should have cut away the barbed wire as soon as it was put up. That message would have been received by the Soviets, and it would have saved us a great deal of travail and misunderstanding.

**Rumsfeld:** We seem to have great difficulty taking our case to the world. We believe that freedom is the natural state of man and is a God-given right, and that we have the best case in the battle for the hearts and minds of the people of the world. Yet despite their many failures, the Soviets, while not prevailing, seem not to be losing this struggle. Second, I do not believe the level and quality of attention we have paid to our own hemisphere has been what it should have been, and that could pose grave risks to us. Finally, it is inexcusable to have allowed the military strength between the United States and the Soviet Union to shift as it has over the last 25 years. The Vietnam War contributed to this: billions of dollars were skewed into that conflict and away from necessary investment for an appropriate deterrent.

**Rostow:** I think Ike made a very bad mistake in Cuba, in allowing Castro to come to power. Ike also failed to take advantage of his opportunity in Indochina. That was a tragic mistake from two points of view. First, it allowed Communist influence to move into the whole of Indochina, whereas if we had helped the French Army of half a million in 1954 there is not much doubt that the Communists could have been handled. That had an effect not only on the frontiers of the battle, but on our relations with France, which suffered profoundly. This error was compounded by Ike's incredible performance at Suez in 1956. There again, the French and British were embittered in their relations with us. If Nasser had been knocked off in '56, how many Middle Eastern wars would have been prevented? The Soviet penetration of the Middle East, which is tremendous, would have been checked very sharply.

Finally, the failure to win in Vietnam was an important mistake, shared by a series of presidents. I would definitely have "done" Indochina differently. Our cause was perfectly sound and just. But our military policy failed. On the one hand, civilians prevented the Air Force from bombing the key targets. On the other hand, civilian control totally failed to discipline the armed forces as they sacrificed every priority of war to their own bureaucratic priorities. We tried to wage war with a salad of uncoordinated military bureaucracies.

**Laqueur:** I would have tried to better educate the public about the nature of the conflict. We have had wide swings in public opinion—from a blind belief in détente to exaggerated views of the strengths and aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. Our line with respect to the Soviet Union should have been more consistent. Inconsistency confuses us and them.



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# What kind of economic policy should we have toward the Soviet Union?

**Tucker:** I don't believe that anything we can do economically will have a critical effect on Soviet high policy. It never has had in the past, and despite the pretensions of détente of the 1970s, there is little indication that it would do so now.

I think we are past the point where anything should be denied the Soviets. We have had an argument over grain and I think there is a national consensus not to restrict sales. We have given up attempting to influence our allies to deny the Soviet Union either hard currency or, more importantly, high technology transfers. It is unrealistic to try to change this. The events of the past three years have demonstrated quite conclusively that our allies are going to go their own way, just as we go ours in the matter of grain.

**Kirkpatrick:** It makes no sense for the West to subsidize the Soviet Union with favorable credit terms, money, or technology. When we do it, we free their resources for military development. And we pay twice: first, for the cost of the subsidy, and second, for the cost of the weapons that we have to develop to keep pace with their military buildup. I don't think we should do anything to take the strain off the Soviet people under conditions of the chronic failure of Soviet agriculture. Restricting grain, however, doesn't make much difference, because it is fungible and readily available. But there aren't many commodities like that. As long as they are paying the full market price, and in cash, that is not subsidization.

It is extremely important to remember that given a choice between political goals and economic goals, the Soviets always choose political goals. They always choose power over goods. We choose goods over power. One of the scary things about the last few years is that the Soviets may have finally understood that we aren't power seekers like they are.

**Pipes:** Economic policy is very important, for two reasons. One is the Soviet dependence on economic assistance from the West. From the 1920s on, the USSR has relied enormously on Western technology. Antony Sutton did a study showing that Western technology was incorporated in 95 percent of all Soviet industrial establishments constructed in the 1930s. The second reason is that, under normal conditions, economic policy is the only field where we are able to exert pressure. Since you do not want to resort to military means for fear of getting into a war, and since there are severe limits on what you can do politically, economic countermeasures remain the only effective instruments at our disposal. Their use can be very painful to the other side.

I think we should make the military alliance intimately connected with an economic alliance. We should tell Europe and Japan that we may find it difficult to stand ready to come to their rescue if they continue to ship the Soviets high technology and give them subsidized credits. It makes no sense to let our allies build up Soviet might, which we then have to match.

**Perle:** Normal trade in consumer goods with the Soviets seems perfectly acceptable and consistent with Western interests. Trade in high technology, and the development of relationships of dependence on resources, seem to me dangerous and unwise.

**Kampelman:** When we provide economic assistance to the Soviet Union, we make it more possible for its rulers to maintain their strength and their internal control. The difficulty is that the Soviets understand this as well, and believe that they can survive without our help. They may not be willing to pay a price for our economic assistance. This remains to be seen.

It is essential, for the foreseeable future, to keep sensitive technology from the Soviets. This is extremely difficult, but the effort is worth undertaking. If we cannot prevent the transfer of technology, delay is helpful.

On the other hand, we should let the Soviets know that we are prepared to move toward a more normal trading relationship, down the road, if we can be persuaded of their peaceful intentions, and if they begin living up to their international obligations. This carrot should be present in their calculation. But we have got to be careful in this area. Much of the American and Western business community is so eager for trade that the Soviet authorities don't believe they have to pay a price to reach their commercial objectives.

**Decter:** I don't think we should make a distinction between economic policy and political policy. Economic policy should be subservient to the political and security needs of the nation, as painful as that might be to certain sectors of our society. I think the business community has been behaving badly, and, from its own long-term point of view, stupidly, in relation to the Soviet Union. While I am for a free market, the security interests of the nation cannot be sacrificed to short-term business interests.

I am opposed to all trade, to all aid to the Soviet bloc. The most important thing we can do now is stop helping the Soviets keep their regimes stable. We must not supply them with grain. Whatever lightens the economic burden of the Soviet Union frees the Soviet regime by that much for its military buildup.

**Rostow:** One of the most distressing things is to watch otherwise sensible people, frustrated and wanting to do something short of military confrontation, think they can hurt the Soviet Union with economic sanctions. Economic sanctions have never worked. They didn't work against Napoleon. They didn't work against Hitler. They didn't work against the Kaiser. They didn't even work against Rhodesia. Economic sanctions are a fraud and a delusion. People are always looking for a sanitary way to avoid war. There is none. Of course we should restrict trade in highly sensitive, advanced technology, but we must recognize that the Russian people are extremely able and well trained at a high level of science—the Hungarians, Czechs, and the Poles as well.



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Tohru Nakamura, courtesy of PepsiCo International

**Van Cleave:** This is one of the most difficult things for us to manage because of the free enterprise, free market nature of our system. We must avoid economic transactions that enable the Soviet leaders to relieve internal pressures and to spend vast expenditures on the military. We must also avoid transactions that enable the Soviets to increase their pressures and influence on our allies. We should not permit them, for example, to amass enormous credits to Western banks, which makes Western financial institutions dependent on the Soviets.

I would embargo every strategic commodity, and define that very broadly. Anything that helps the Soviet Union spend large sums of money on its military is strategic. This includes grain. We need to be consistent and must avoid appearing to impose a sacrifice on our allies, as we did, for example, in asking them to forego the pipeline, while not embargoing grain.

**Luttwak:** Lenin said, "They (the capitalists) will sell us the rope with which to hang them." Well, we are selling the grain. The Soviets can buy much of the grain they need from Argentina or Australia, but the United States is the residual supplier and they cannot do without us.

This total refusal to use the grain surplus as a tool of policy is the most conspicuous failure of the Reagan Administration. Governments throughout history have employed grain surpluses as an instrument of statecraft. We have to understand that if the Soviet Union could not get U.S. grain, it would have to liberalize its agriculture. It would then become less of a totalitarian state, and therefore less dangerous. It is completely hopeless to persuade our allies to be severe in their economic dealings with the Soviet Union when we ourselves supply the crucial ingredient in their ability to continue their economic policy. Compared to us, our allies have been remarkably disciplined in what they sell to the Soviet Union.

**Allen:** I believe in unlimited trade in consumer goods as long as goods do not represent high technology contributions to the Soviet Union. I also believe that agricultural trade can at times be helpful in the relationship. The area that requires maximum control and utmost vigilance is the area of technology because of the growing Soviet capability to integrate technology in a way that we had not thought them capable of doing before. I welcome every attempt to tighten the definitions used in East-West trade, and I believe that our long-range objective in conducting trade should be to make the Soviet Union pay the price of its own inefficiency. Whether trade can, as former President Nixon and many others argue, serve as an incentive to alter behavior is a highly dubious proposition. After all, this was the basis of the détente theory—that one could entice the Soviet Union into a web of self-enforcing agreements that would involve the transfer of technology, know-how, and credits to the Soviet Union in return for which the Soviet dependence would grow and therefore its behavior would improve. That, of course, has been demonstrated to be nonsense.

**Kristol:** I think we can permit trade with the Soviets, but only on two conditions: First, you obviously do not sell them the kind of high technology products that they cannot manufacture themselves and that would strengthen their military establishment. Second, trade should be on a cash-on-the-barrelhead basis. We should not extend any long-term credits to the Soviet Union. That is a form of economic aid.

I don't think it would make sense for us to engage in boycotts of the Soviet Union. Such economic boycotts never work. We should trade with them if it is to our advantage. It makes no sense not to sell the Soviets our farm products if we can benefit, and the Soviets can always buy them from other countries.

**Eagleburger:** I think the grain embargo hurt the Soviet Union. It didn't bring the economy down, but it did require them to find other sources at a great deal more expense. It also caused a political upheaval in this country. So, economic leverage cuts in both directions. Over a very long period, there is still merit to the principle that if



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the Soviet Union is sufficiently integrated into the world economic system, it would face a very complex problem in trying to extricate itself. But I do not believe that economic leverage will be sufficient to make the leopard change its spots. He may snarl a little less. There is no question that the Soviets would like access to our high technology, and there is no question in my mind that we ought to prevent most of that. We have succeeded in getting our allies to take the issue more seriously than in the past. But far more than we realize, we have also suggested to the rest of the world that United States industry is not a reliable supplier. The long term consequences of that to our international competitiveness have yet to be seen. I am not against the concept of controlling the transfer of technology, but it needs to be done with coherence and restraint. Otherwise, I am afraid that we will have harmed American industry more than we will have harmed the Soviet Union.

**Lichenstein:** Cabbages and wheat are just as strategic as computers and weapons systems. Everything we know of the Soviet economy suggests that grain production imposes a greater stress on their system than arms production. If I ran the Central Intelligence Agency, I would constantly seek analyses of the input required for each unit of output in different sectors of the Soviet economy, and if I were President I would use that as a guide for negotiations with the Soviets.

## Under what circumstances, and for what purposes, should the U.S. commit troops to Central America and the Caribbean?

**Kirkpatrick:** There are not many. I think the Grenada operation was a legitimate and successful use of U.S. power. We had a specific and limited objective in conjunction with other countries in the region, and we operated with a favorable balance of forces. Of course, we have to honor our treaty obligations, and we also have to defend ourselves.

My big quarrel with doctrines such as the Hart Doctrine is less about the commitment of combat troops than about the other uses of U.S. power. I believe there are many situations where it would be feasible and desirable to use U.S. power short of sending U.S. combat troops. These involve such things as economic assistance or trade policy or military aid, including arms sales. There is a great deal we can do to help other countries help themselves.

**Kristol:** We need a new version of the Monroe Doctrine for Latin America. Any country in that area could have any kind of economic or political or social system it wishes, including a Marxist-Leninist regime. But we would insist that no country in the hemisphere have military ties with the Soviet Union or act as Soviet allies against the United States. Under this new Monroe Doctrine, we would not try to dominate these countries, but we would set minimum requirements if they wish to live free from interference. We can live with a Marxist-Leninist regime in our hemisphere just as the Soviets can live with Finland. But we have the right to demand of Nicaragua what the Soviet Union demands of Finland in its foreign affairs and in its attitude toward the Soviet Union.

If Nicaragua insists on supporting the rebels of El Salvador and exporting revolution throughout Central America, I think it would be extremely foolish for the United States to exclude the possibility of using military force. Military force would be warranted if we concluded that we could not stabilize the situation in Central America without a reorientation of the foreign policy of the Nicaraguan government.

**Eagleburger:** If Nicaragua were to conduct major military operations outside its borders, either singly or jointly with the Cubans, we would have a treaty obligation, under the Rio Treaty, to commit troops. If the political will in the United States existed, I can imagine circumstances short of a direct major military intervention by Nicaragua that would require the use of U.S. troops. I doubt that that will exists. But should Nicaragua and Cuba succeed in Central America, the long-term consequences for the United States would be terribly dangerous and would go a long way to transforming our nation into a truly isolationist, xenophobic society. We would become so consumed by problems to our south that we would tell the rest of the world to go hang while we dealt with our problems. Therefore, investing in Central America now prevents a tremendous and costly investment later on. This is a worst-case scenario, but it is a worst case we cannot afford.

**Van Cleave:** I would send far greater naval forces today to prevent the flow of arms from Cuba to Central America. We should station forces in the region—including a permanent naval task force—both to let all parties know the seriousness with which we view the conflict there, and to prepare for the contingency of using our troops in combat if necessary. We should be prepared to use ground forces if we cannot otherwise contain the Cuban-Nicaraguan objective of revolution without frontiers; that is, if a Cuban-Nicaraguan supported revolution threatens to spread throughout Central America. Short of direct combat, there are many measures we can take in the region. If we were freer to engage in covert action today, and to give military assistance to the contras in Nicaragua, we would reduce the probability that we would have to send our own troops. By denying these options, Congress is increasing the probability that we will have to use troops.

**Ulam:** We should be able to react to any overt military intervention by Communist forces in Latin America. But



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after Vietnam, from the point of view of practical politics, I doubt very much that this is something we could or should do. In fighting Communist subversion everywhere, the amount of help we give to the forces fighting Communism is less important than signs of endurance, of not giving up in impatience, as we did in Vietnam, I think. Our democracy simply can't seem to tolerate long-standing conflicts.

**Lichenstein:** We have to be prepared to use American force as a last resort to prevent countries of importance to our strategic interests and to our own security from falling under Soviet domination. I would hope that the country or countries involved would feel the same way and would be prepared to undertake their own risks and expend their own resources. But in a country as important to us as Mexico, for example, I could contemplate a situation where we might feel compelled to intervene even if the Mexican government did not agree with us in our strategic calculation.


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**Decter:** We should probably be committing them right now in Nicaragua, with the aim of overthrowing the Sandinista government and making sure that a decent and friendly government is installed in that country. We should probably commence, many years too late, to apply pressure to Castro, telling him that there will be consequences to suffer unless he calls off his dogs.

In deciding whether to use military force, the question we should ask is whether a country is playing an active expansionary role. We must teach the Nicaraguans, for example, that support of guerrilla insurgencies in Central America will not be tolerated by the United States.

**Allen:** If another non-Communist government is threatened by revolutionary forces clearly inspired and supported by Cuba or the Soviet Union, the United States should take action to ensure that that nation is protected. This is best done by building indigenous military forces to resist such aggression, as in the case of El Salvador. Sending American troops has to be a last resort, but the willingness to deploy American forces in defense of interests and goals shared by all nations of the Americas is a very important indicator of our willingness to defend ourselves elsewhere.

**Tucker:** Clearly, we would have to respond to the introduction of either Cuban or Soviet military forces in Central America. Short of that, I don't think we are required or that it would be wise to send American combat forces into the region. As time goes by, the situation in Central America seems to improve rather than to deteriorate. Consequently, I am hopeful that the prospect of having to send military forces is now largely past us.

**Kampelman:** I have no objection in principle to the use of American troops in pursuit of our national interest. I certainly see the virtue of communicating a readiness to use force if necessary. Troops, however, should only be used after careful examination of whether diplomatic options are still open to us. This has to be accompanied by careful analysis of whether the military objectives are attainable and at what price. The weighing of factors must include our ability to defend the use of troops in the forum of world public opinion. I am not suggesting that world public opinion dictate our decision, but our best interests require us to be aware of it.

There is an ongoing war for hearts and minds. We don't want to lose that. We have a particular problem in Central America because of our history. The forces of democracy in Central America would like to know that our power is available to defend them or even to advance their interests against the onslaught of totalitarianism. But even these forces of democracy, I believe, remember history, remember what they perceive to be the indiscriminate use of American armed forces in Central America, and are not free from a concern about Yankee imperialism.

**Brzezinski:** I would say that if internal revolutionary upheavals were transformed into externally organized and militarily backed invasions, then vital American interests would be so engaged that a military response would be appropriate.

**Pfaltzgraff:** American forces should be committed to the region only, as in the case of Grenada, when the



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United States believes it can achieve decisive results in a short time, to rid a country of a clear and present danger to its political stability. We cannot commit troops to a protracted military stalemate in the Caribbean or Central America. This calls for a clear definition of the political and military objectives. It means taking steps to prevent the inflow of forces, equipment as well as manpower, from the Soviet Union, Cuba, or other Soviet surrogates.

**Bartley:** That would depend on the battlefield situation. If there is no other way to stop the further establishment of Communist-dominated societies in Central America, we should not rule out sending troops to stop it. If Nicaragua launched an overt attack on its neighbors, we should not rule out sending U.S. troops to respond. In that circumstance, the objective of the campaign ought to be to change the government of Nicaragua.

## For what purposes should we arm anti-Communist guerrillas?

**Van Cleave:** For the purpose of overthrowing Marxist-Leninist governments and giving the people the opportunity for self-determination. In Nicaragua, this is a feasible objective. In Afghanistan it is not; there we simply ought to aid people whose objective is to make the Soviets suffer for the brutal occupation of their country.

**Rostow:** Only when justified under international law. As I say over and over again, I believe that the rules of international law with respect to the international use of force have been terribly weakened in recent years, and unless the Soviet Union gives up its policy of aggression, we will be forced to do likewise. We don't want to do that. Our deepest national security interest is in restoring the state system and its rules against aggression. I don't think we are yet at a point where we have to abandon them.

**Luttwak:** Not to arm anti-Communist guerrillas means that we are not willing to help those who are opposing our enemy. The Soviet Union never hesitates to arm any group or band that wants to harm us. Unilateral forebearance weakens us.

The Nicaraguan contras are people who share our goals. The Afghans do not all share our goals. Many are Muslim fanatics, but they are fighting our enemy and we must have the seriousness and courage to help those who are being a great deal more courageous than we are in opposing the might of the Soviet armed forces. We have been very clever in inventing excuses not to help guerrillas fighting Communism, whether the Afghans or Savimbi in Angola. My favorite is that the Pakistanis won't let us send more than a certain amount of arms to the Afghan rebels because they are worried about Soviet retaliation.

If we were serious about helping the Afghan rebels, we wouldn't be shipping arms through Pakistan at all. We would deliver arms the way that we delivered them to the French resistance. By air. Direct.

**Kirkpatrick:** I think it's reasonable to help the Afghans, the Kampucheans, and the Nicaraguans. It is feasible but not legal to help UNITA in Angola. These are all large indigenous forces in situations where Communist governments have not fully consolidated power. In the case of Afghanistan and Kampuchea, there is also an external invasion. In all of those cases, there are large external sources of supply.

**Rumsfeld:** There are a variety of ways to help people who have interests that are compatible with ours. We can help them by using our own force, we can provide weapons, we can provide financial, economic, or political assistance. Clearly when people are opposing Soviet aggression, there are times when it is in our interest to use some or all of these arrows in our quiver. Obviously, our first choice is to use the more modest ones.

There is no doubt in my mind that it is in our interest to help the Afghan resistance. It is not in our interest that the Soviet regime be successful in expanding its influence, but we are without significant options in that part of the world. Clearly no deterrent dissuaded the Soviets from invading Afghanistan. They looked at us, they looked at the Western European nations, and it was a five minute decision, with the first four for coffee. There was no major debate in Western Europe or the United States as to whether U.S. or allied forces should be used. Our remaining options involved political influence, which we tried to use, economic influence, which to a minor extent has been used, and finally providing modest assistance to others who are resisting that invasion.

**Allen:** I am strongly in favor of arming anti-Communist guerrillas and I am in full support of a policy designed to arm the contras in Nicaragua, the Afghans in Pakistan who make forays into Afghanistan, and other key locations. I don't think that this is a principle that should be universally applied, but I do believe that there are selected cases in which there is a moral imperative that we assist these beleaguered people who have a chance to punish the Soviet Union and its surrogates, occupying forces who don't belong in such places.

**Decter:** Under circumstances where our arming them would have some chance of success. Certainly Nicaragua, certainly Afghanistan. These are people who even without our help would make great trouble for the Soviets. They have volunteered to do so. We should give them any possible assistance that is prudent. It would, of course, be unwise to do anything that would endanger the security of Pakistan. I do not have enough information to know whether arming, say, the Afghan mujaheddin would do so.

**Lichenstein:** I would be quite calculating on this. I would not be romantic, and I wouldn't do it everywhere. If we calculate that, over the long term, a Marxist-



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Photo by Charles Bork/Courtesy of the Committee for a Free Afghanistan

Leninist, Soviet-dominated regime in Nicaragua is harmful to our national interests, then assisting indigenous people opposed to the regime is one of the interim steps the United States might take. It is less risky and expensive than directly interjecting U.S. power. On the other hand, if it were our conclusion that the contras were an unreliable, unsteady, instrument of U.S. policy, we should be prepared to cut them off without a cent.

**Ulam:** It depends on the general character of our relations. If the Soviets stop supporting guerrillas in countries like El Salvador, then I would be inclined not to promote any conflict. Our aim is to make the Russians stop what they are doing, and if we can do that, then we can wait for Communist regimes to collapse under their own weight. When the Communists begin to behave in a responsible fashion, then by all means, let's reciprocate.

**Kristol:** We have a moral obligation as well as a political obligation to support the Afghan guerrillas and I think we should do more than we have been doing. In Nicaragua, it all depends on how likely a guerrilla movement is to overthrow the regime. If it is unlikely, then one uses the guerrilla movement as a kind of bargaining chip to force a reorientation of Nicaraguan foreign policy. If there is a real chance of the guerrillas overthrowing that regime, then we certainly ought to support that movement to that end. Why not, after all? The risk of such assistance is that we might find ourselves involved in some nasty little wars in this hemisphere or outside this hemisphere. It is a risk we have to be prepared to take and someone has to persuade the Pentagon that these are the wars we are likely to be fighting. The way things stand, the Pentagon seems to be reluctant or unwilling or unable to contemplate any war except a re-run of World War II, this time against the Soviet Union.

**Pfaltzgraff:** We must arm guerrillas, in my view, whenever a government supported by the Soviet Union is trying to export its political system to neighboring countries through armed intervention in one form or another. It makes no sense to permit aid to come to Communist forces in El Salvador while at the same time taking no action in support of the contras in Nicaragua.

**Brzezinski:** This decision requires common sense as well as a reasonable linkage between tactical and strategic objectives. For example, I would not arm anti-Communist guerrillas and then abandon them once they have achieved purely tactical advantages for ourselves, because that is totally damaging to our political and moral credibility. If we feel that our interests are so engaged that arming anti-Communist guerrillas becomes necessary, then we must be prepared to some degree to share with them certain common strategic objectives as well.

**Eagleburger:** No one seems to object to U.S. clandestine assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters. There is general agreement in the United States that the Afghans are the good guys resisting Soviet aggression. I am all for sup-



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porting the Afghan freedom fighters.

I believe that we were right in assisting Nicaraguan rebels, if for no other reason than that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If the government of Nicaragua is under attack internally, it is less likely to be aggressive externally. But, before giving aid in this kind of situation, it is important to ask whether our own domestic situation will enable us to sustain our support. It is hideously immoral to lead people to put their lives on the line on an assumption that the United States will not only help them get started but will help them thereafter, and then walk away from them leaving them exposed.

## What kind of relations should we have with Communist countries such as China?

**Pipes:** Our relations with any country, right or left, ought to be based on one fundamental question: is this country aggressive? Is it seeking to impose its system on other nations by force? If it is not, we can have good relations with it, no matter what its ideology or our attitude toward its system of government. Since the death of Mao, China has turned inwards and ceased being aggressive, and so we are friendly toward China, just as we are toward Yugoslavia. We may deplore their Communist regimes, but these countries are not trying to export their systems and therefore they do not represent a threat to our national security.

**Allen:** We should have good relations with China. I would urge caution in the sale of certain kinds of military technology and weapons systems to China and I would urge others not to be carried away by the notion that China has somehow become a strategic ally to the United States when in fact it has not.

At the same time, the United States cannot afford to budge from full implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act. The United States should continue to view any alterations of the status of Taiwan by force as a threat to peace in the region, as the law states, and the United States should take great pains to ensure that Taiwan is provided the defense that it needs to keep the military balance in the region. Any aspect of the relationship that supports the expansion of peaceful trade and peaceful relations throughout Asia is in our national interest.

**Brzezinski:** As good as is feasible and practicable. I was deeply engaged in normalizing that relationship and in shaping at least the initial stages of what might be called tacit strategic partnership. I believe the Reagan Administration after an initial period of fumbling has resumed these efforts, and the American-Chinese relationship is becoming more comprehensive. That is good from the strategic as well as economic point of view.

**Van Cleave:** Very, very careful. We don't want China adventurous and hostile in the area. We see that China has substantial differences with the Soviet Union, and we want to see the continuation of those differences.

In terms of strategic or political benefit, there is little we can expect from China or from close ties with China. China is a totalitarian Communist state whose values are antithetical to our own. In most areas of foreign policy, China's positions have been opposed to ours. We must watch the evolution of events, to see how Peking reacts to the Vietnamization of Southeast Asia, to Taiwan, and to the ASEAN countries. We may have careful, not hostile relations with a totalitarian government, depending on its external behavior and its relations with the Soviets. I find it curious that so many Americans object to our relations with Chile, El Salvador, or South Africa, while having a romantic view of our relations with China.

**Ulam:** When China becomes a first-class industrial and military power—fortunately I will not be around then—we may have just as much trouble from the Chinese as we do currently from the Soviets. But, for the next 10 to 20 years, good relations with China are a practical necessity, a way of balancing Soviet behavior throughout the world.

**Kristol:** It depends on what kind of relations China wishes to have with us. If China is more frightened of the Soviet Union than it is concerned about the ideological antagonism between its system and ours, then we should have reasonably friendly relations with China. But, it is important for the American government to make it clear that it doesn't like the Chinese system, and that our friendly relations are entirely a matter of expediency. The Chinese certainly make that clear to their own people. We should be equally clear to ourselves.

**Laqueur:** We can have normal, better than normal, relations with China. Unlike Russia, China has not been an expansive country throughout its history. The Chinese are far more modest in their security interests than the Soviets, and for the next 20 to 30 years will be preoccupied with internal reform.

**Decter:** Our relations with China should be very, very cautious. China for the moment is strategically useful to us. But we should neither exaggerate its strategic usefulness nor should we lose sight of the fact that Communism is real and poses a threat to us. It ought to be possible to maximize our interests with such powers without going overboard. The problem with us is that we can never seem to engage in mutually useful arrangements with a country without investing it with enormous virtue. During the first rapprochement with China, we had to be subjected to endless accounts by visitors to that country about how absolutely wonderful it was. All this while horrors were going on.



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# To what extent and how should we exploit vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union at home and in Eastern Europe?

**Allen:** The Reagan Administration has taken the initiative in the field of information and broadcasting, and I think that this will bear important fruit if it is sustained over a period of years. I also believe that steps taken by the President and Secretary of State in the autumn of 1984 to emphasize that we do not recognize that Eastern Europe is forever consigned to Soviet domination is an important step. We should constantly work toward making Eastern European nations unreliable allies of the Soviet Union, or at least call into question the reliability of the populations and military forces of Eastern Europe. We should also consider supporting measures such as those taken by Western European nations, notably the Federal Republic of Germany, in furthering the goals of Ostpolitik, which is designed to bring about an atmosphere of trust and confidence among Western European and Eastern European nations. To the extent that these efforts are successful, long-range Soviet interests are undermined.

The nationalities of the Soviet Union are also a very important and fertile ground for American and Western European policy. The Soviet leaders have systematically sought to eradicate the culture and linguistic inheritance of the many populations and nationalities of Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union itself. Population trends indicate that these nationalities are growing at a faster rate than Russians. The nationalities are, in a sense, a ticking time bomb in the Soviet Union—not destined to explode at any precise moment, but representing a considerable asset to the forces that are now arrayed against Soviet totalitarianism.

**Pfaltzgraff:** I think that we need to take every opportunity to support organizations, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland, that seek an alternative to the existing political order. I realize, of course that there are limits to what we can do: the greater the success of such organizations, the greater the likelihood of Soviet and/or domestic Communist repression. But it was important that during the Polish crisis of 1981, Solidarity received food, clothing, and medical supplies from independent trade unions and other groups in the United States and Western Europe.

I believe that our broadcasts to the Soviet Union should help to increase awareness among the non-Russian nationalities that are becoming increasingly important demographically. We need to encourage the free movement of ideas. We need to make greater use of our most advanced technologies in broadcasting to the peoples of the Soviet Union.

I believe that we should feel no embarrassment about encouraging forces that oppose the Soviet regime. The Soviet Union feels no embarrassment in declaring its wholehearted commitment to such activities outside the Communist world as an explicit part of what it calls détente.

**Brzezinski:** Purely tactical exploitation of internal difficulties for short range gains can in the long run be counterproductive if it stimulates strong Soviet reactions, as well as a sense of disappointment on the part of those who work with us when they find that we are not prepared to sustain them beyond the tactical stage. This is the reason why, for example, the fomenting of revolutions in Eastern Europe is not a desirable objective. At most, it could only yield a tactical benefit to us, while prompting a very major negative consequence for the Eastern Europeans involved. The same is true of Soviet internal problems.

But on a cautious but sustained basis, we ought to address ourselves much more to the various non-Russian Soviet nations which are entitled to genuine national self-determination and who are, by and large, ignored by the global community. There is no reason why 130 million Great Russians should control directly another 140 or so million non-Russians within the Soviet Union and another 130 million East Europeans indirectly outside the Soviet Union. The reality of that imperial control contributes greatly to a worsening in the East-West relationship, and it creates aggressive impulses within the Kremlin itself, given the inherent insecurity of such imperial arrangements.

**Kirkpatrick:** We should not agree to accept the legitimacy of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe. I don't believe we should subsidize the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe with favorable terms of credit or purchase. I believe in cultural exchange, educational exchange, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe, as ways of keeping open alternative sources of information about the world. Any humanitarian assistance that we provide should be through private channels, such as CARE or church groups and not government-to-government.

**Van Cleave:** We should do whatever we can to encourage the forces against socialism in the Eastern European countries, to give them hope that in their lifetime there may be realistic alternatives. We should do what we can to make things difficult for the Soviet Union in ruling and controlling their empire. We can do that far more in the satellite parts of the empire than in the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet vulnerabilities at home tend to be exaggerated. They have been dealing with economic and nationalities problems throughout their history. Nevertheless, we should do what we can. One of the strongest advantages we have is in the political and ideological arena, yet we do far too little there.

**Kristol:** Yes, of course we should try to exploit their vulnerabilities just as they try to exploit our vulnerabilities. There are all sorts of ways of doing this short of military conflict. I have never understood why the United States at the United Nations and in the court of world



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

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opinion has not launched a massive, sustained attack on Soviet policies toward emigration. The notion that people cannot emigrate from a country is a unique innovation of the 20th century. It is a barbarous innovation. We should be constantly exposing the Soviet Union to ridicule and contempt for refusing to permit its citizens to emigrate. This is a human rights issue, in some ways it is the most fundamental human rights issue. And it is an issue that the Soviet Union would find extremely difficult to cope with. There are other issues on which we can be a lot more assertive than we have been. We should never have signed the Helsinki Agreement unless it included religious toleration within the Soviet Union.

**Luttwak:** The Soviets are much less vulnerable in Eastern Europe than they seem and I don't think we can do much to make them more vulnerable. For a variety of reasons, the people of Eastern Europe are not in fact willing to make the Soviet Union pay a price for dominating that zone. Secondly, the regimes of Eastern Europe have managed, with different levels of success, to reach accommodations with both their people and the Soviet Union. The notion that the Soviets would feel insecure having to fight a war with client-state allies whose peoples undoubtedly detest the Soviet Union is wrong.

So neither in war or in peace are the vulnerabilities that great. Certainly, we should have a very differentiated policy. We should mark a whole series of subtle gradations in how we treat each country in Eastern Europe, according to two criteria: 1) how dependent they are on the Soviet Union 2) what they are doing militarily. We should favor those governments that contribute the least in defense to the Warsaw Pact. We should be mindful also of the kind of relations a government has with its own people: a softer government has less freedom of action to do harmful things to us. Eastern Europe, of course, should not be in the Soviet sphere of influence, but it is. But we have proven to the world that we have no intention of doing anything about it—by not lifting a finger to help the Hungarians in 1956. We didn't have to send in the American army. But we could have let a few truckloads of bazookas go through.

As for helping Soviet dissidents, we should always emphasize our recognition and admiration for their individual courage. We should be much more effective than we are in helping the ones who come over to us to restore shattered lives. The Soviet emigré arrives in America and is left on his own. He is treated as if he moved from France of his own volition. Obviously, we should try to sustain the dissidents however we can. We can't send the army but we can send other things, like books and money—private gifts, I mean.

**Laqueur:** Our options here are limited. Ideally, we should make the most of tensions with the Soviet Union. But we have to remember that however much they may dislike Soviet tutelage, the Eastern European nations frequently dislike each other more.

We should wish them well, and let them know we commiserate with them. But anything too demonstrative will probably only backfire. The Soviet Union regards Eastern Europe as its back garden, and American freedom of maneuver is very limited.

**Tucker:** We developed economic ties during the 1970s that exacerbated Soviet vulnerabilities, and continue to do so today. I view them with complete favor. Inevitably, these economic ties to Eastern Europe wind up being more than just economic ties. Beyond this, I am increasingly skeptical. We face the old problem of how far we can go without bringing about Soviet military intervention and this I do not wish to do.



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**Perle:** We have an obligation to keep alive, even if it now seems remote, the prospect of a future in which people subjugated to the Soviet Union will again be free to decide their own destiny. It is important to recognize the militarily dominant position the Soviets have with respect to many countries, especially in Eastern Europe, and to show great caution in encouraging popular action that would invariably be followed by death and destruction.

**Kampelman:** We should insist that the Soviet Union live up to its international commitments. Doing that is not an interference in the Soviets' internal affairs. It is reasonable. Nobody forced Mr. Brezhnev to sign the Helsinki Agreement in 1975. No one forced the Soviet Union to sign the United Nations charter. We should simply be saying that the Soviets must live up to the obligations they have assumed. If that can be done, then we will have taken large steps toward international stability.

The identical principle applies to Eastern Europe. Indeed, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 provides legitimacy for contact between Eastern and Western Europe. That agreement was signed, not by two blocs, but by 35 sovereign states. It does not act on the assumption that there is a division of Europe.

I stated in Madrid, on behalf of our government, that we take issue with the distortion of Yalta and do not accept the notion of the division of Europe. On the other hand, we are not, and as a government, should not be, urging Eastern European countries to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Rather, we urge that each country's sovereignty be respected and strengthened and that it make its own decisions.

**Ulam:** I think some people in Eastern Europe would acquiesce in a Soviet sphere of influence in the old-fashioned, pre-1914 sense, the kind of relationship that the Soviets have with Finland today. Finland is internally a democracy, but it has to abide by what the Soviets say in defense and foreign relations. One reasonable goal of our policy should be the Finlandization of *Eastern* Europe. We should persuade the Soviets that it is in their long-term interest to allow more freedom to these countries.

**Rostow:** Well, our fundamental security interest—probably our most fundamental security threat—is to make sure that one government does not control both Russia and Germany, and thereby dominate the Eurasian land mass. This is why the Eastern European states were set up after World War I. We have a profound interest in maintaining their independence and integrity. Our interest in the Far East is exactly parallel. We don't want China and Japan or China and Russia to be under one controlling authority.

President Kennedy said in a broadcast to the Soviet Union that there would never be peace between the United States and the Soviet Union until the promises of Yalta and Potsdam are carried out. That is undoubtedly true. It is a very good line to pursue. I don't think we should try to achieve free elections in Eastern Europe by force of arms. But circumstances may shift. The Russians may go after Iran, for example, in which case we might contemplate sending arms to Eastern Europe.

**Bartley:** We probably should try to cause the Soviets more problems in Eastern Europe than we have been. I don't think we should send troops or arms to aid rebellions in Hungary or Czechoslovakia. But I do think we ought to propagandize, and try to encourage splits between the Soviets and the Eastern Europeans. In particular, we ought to start thinking about policies that suggest that if a war were ever to occur in Europe, we would make important overtures to the Eastern European people, including their armed forces. Our goal should be to raise questions in the Soviet mind about the reliability of these armed forces in the event of war.

**Pipes:** What we want is to induce changes in the Communist system, for it is the system as presently constituted that causes aggression. There are, of course, limits to what we can do. Much of it is negative, such as denial of technology, credits, and other forms of assistance.

Daniel Ortega, the Nicaraguan leader, recently admitted an astonishing fact that in the 12 months ended last June, the Western nations, our allies, had supplied Nicaragua with $400 million in loans and credits while the Communist countries provided it with only $65 million. That means that our allies are helping to keep the Sandanistas, Soviet allies, afloat. This is outrageous.

Furthermore, it is important not to legitimize the leadership of the Soviet state. I think it is a mistake, for example, to hold summits with Soviet leaders unless this seals accords that serve our intersts. The practice of summits under other conditions tells the populations of Soviet-dominated countries that we accept their regimes as equals of democracy.

**Huntington:** In an ideal world, no one should be in the Soviet sphere of influence. But from a Soviet point of view, Eastern Europe is absolutely critical for its own security. You would have to have a major war for Eastern Europe to come out of Soviet sphere of influence. In a piece I wrote some years ago, I said that the three strategies to follow with respect to Soviet satellites were either to wean them away, or to weaken them, or to do both. In Eastern Europe, a weaning strategy is appropriate. By developing contacts and trade with Eastern European countries, we may encourage them to become more independent of the Soviet Union.

**Rumsfeld:** The Soviets' success in the world is a result of their determination to invest a very high percentage of their gross national product—I think it is in the range of 12–17 percent—year after year, in the accumulation of military power and the options that that power provides. The West must improve its ability to communicate with respect to the political and economic aspects, provide encouragement to those who resist the denial of freedom, avoid economic steps that help perpetuate the power of those who deny freedom and independence to others, and continue to assure the necessary deterrence.



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# Have arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union benefited the United States?

**Pipes:** I think not. I think on the whole they have been a failure. The number of warheads on both sides has kept growing. The Russians are violating existing agreements in numerous ways. Also, the terms of the agreements allowed them, perfectly legally, to build up a vast force of sub-strategic or marginally strategic weapons, such as the SS-20s, which do not fall under the SALT limits. Arms control resembles our economic concessions. It was devised primarily to get the Russians involved in relations with us in the hope of modifying their behavior. But it has not worked that way. They simply continue to build weapons. Arms control could be useful but only if the Russians were persuaded that superiority was unattainable.

**Eagleburger:** I would say yes, on two levels. First, this democracy of ours demands that its political leadership engage in the exercise. No administration can afford to seem unwilling to negotiate arms control. Second, and more fundamental, arms control negotiations and arms control agreements, for all their warts, have provided a degree of stability in relationships with our allies and with the Soviet Union. A totally unconstrained nuclear arms race with the Soviets in the last decade and a half would have generated an awful lot of pressures that to some degree we have ameliorated.

SALT I, in my judgment, was an historic accomplishment. That does not mean it is forever enshrined in stone. I have great sympathy for the President's "star wars" approach. He is trying to say that the whole issue of arms control has to be looked at in a different way, and that it is an insanity to pile one offensive nuclear system on top of another.

**Van Cleave:** I don't think anyone can seriously argue that they have. Not a single one of the objectives that the United States posited for arms control has been advanced. Every single one has been diminished. Our strategic forces are more vulnerable, not more survivable. The military balance is less stable, not more stable. Instead of parity, we have a balance that has worsened in the Soviets' favor and contributed to more adventurous Soviet behavior. Moreover, arms control has had a depressant effect not only on our military programs but also on our ability to deal with the Soviets. It has thoroughly muddled our thinking.

**Rostow:** Not so far. Some arms control exercises are purely political theater performed with the utmost cynicism. I find this repulsive, I guess, because I dislike that kind of deception. The theory that taking small steps to reach agreements with the Russians, inch by inch, is the way to build momentum for peace is thoroughly foolish and totally discredited. And it is an insult to the serious people who direct the Soviet Union. It is a condescension to them, as if they were feeble-minded children. They are not at all childish or feeble-minded.

Nuclear arms negotiations are serious or can be serious. They can be dangerous if they lock us into a position where we will be unable to do what we have to do to sustain our security. On the other hand, they can be useful adjuncts to a foreign policy of containment and collective security if they are compatible with true détente.

**Bartley:** On net, they've been deleterious. The kind we've had so far have restrained U.S. programs in very important ways, primarily through self-restraint. Take, for example, cruise missiles armed with conventional warheads. This is a very promising weapon. But we haven't been pressing its development, because a mixture of nuclear and conventional warheads on cruise missiles makes arms control impossible. For the sake of arms control, we've developed the nuclear ones, but haven't pressed the conventional ones. It's insane.

If we had an ABM now, the strategic balance would be much more stable and people would feel better, even if they knew that no defense was perfect.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have negotiated very loose controls and if these get in the way of their programs they cheat.

Maybe we could do better in arms control negotiations, but it's hard to conceive how we could have these kinds of treaties with people who are going to cheat.

**Huntington:** Yes, by and large. I don't think they have harmed us. We made a mistake in the SALT II negotiations by not getting a handle on the Soviet heavy missiles. We have made some other mistakes. But I don't buy the argument that arms control negotiations necessarily lead us to let our guard down. We have enough countervailing forces in American society to make sure that doesn't happen. To gain support for SALT II in Congress, the Carter Administration had to commit itself to some very significant arms programs. That is the way our system works.

**Luttwak:** Arms control in theory should always help the United States. Our best suits are economic competition and the appeal of our society and culture, while the Soviet Union has very little except its military power. Military power is not our strongest card, but our weakest, so if both countries reduce arms, other things being equal, we should be ahead.

But actually arms control has gone down a perverted, counterproductive track from the beginning. Our comparative advantage is in nuclear weapons, because of their high technology. The Soviets' comparative advantage is in conventional forces. But only nuclear arms have been controlled.

**Kristol:** Arms control negotiations have only benefited the Soviet Union. We always end up negotiating with



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


## Arms Control

ourselves or with our allies, not with the Soviet Union.

In any case, the whole notion of arms control is a will-of-the-wisp. We have had many arms control treaties in the past, and they have never prevented war, have never had any significant effect on international relations. The notion that arms control treaties make for a more peaceful world is absurd. We had arms control treaties prior to World War I, we had arms control treaties prior to World War II, treaties with Germany, treaties with Japan. They turned out to be scraps of paper.

I see no purpose at this point to be served by arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Arms control treaties have no consequences for war or peace.

**Hyland:** On balance, I think the United States has benefited. What the United States has done over the past 15 years has probably been necessary to win public support for the defense program, to show that we were not blindly war-mongering. The ABM Treaty is the one area where we have had real arms control. It may now be time to review it; nothing lasts forever. But I think that the ABM Treaty bought us about 10 years of rough stability in a period when it was very difficult for the United States to adjust to and respond to the inevitable buildup of Soviet military power.

**Rumsfeld:** Arms control has had a modest record. Most agreements have simply ratified what was; they have not affected the future.

Talking with the Soviets is worth the effort. But one has to begin with the reality that we come from entirely different positions. They disagree so fundamentally with our views of freedom and self-determination that our interests will not necessarily converge.

Second, we have to recognize that just because there are meetings does not mean that there necessarily must be a result. Sometimes Americans feel they must make concessions, regardless of their nature, in order to achieve results. But once one goes into a negotiation on that basis, the outcome is preordained.

The Soviets have invested in the tools of military expansionism both when we were engaged in arms discussions and when we were not. There's not been a notable difference in their behavior during negotiation.

The problems of verification and compliance are real and fundamental. There must be adequate means of verification—the stakes are too high. This means the exchange of considerable detailed information.

**Perle:** I don't think the negotiations have helped us in the main, although one can point to minor agreements that have been helpful.

This need not inevitably be the case. We can in principle achieve arms control agreements that enhance the stability of the military balance and are therefore in our interest. But to achieve that, we have to insist on a higher standard of agreement in the future than we have in the past.

The problem in the past has been a tendency to seek agreement for its own sake, with insufficient regard to the terms and obligations on each side that resulted from the negotiations. And, of course, the Soviets have been violating even those obligations they have undertaken.

But we must keep trying to negotiate genuine peace agreements. We must have the courage and patience to negotiate for as long as it takes to achieve good agreements while resisting the pressure to accept bad ones.

**Kampelman:** The substance of the negotiations has been of only limited benefit. SALT I, for example, resulted in an increased level of nuclear armament. It did not in any way meet the aspirations of the United States that this agreement might reduce the level of nuclear confrontation. The reverse occurred, with the Soviets continually building up their threat against the world.

On the other hand, I operate on the assumption that you cannot wish the Soviet Union away, that we live on the same globe. We have to patiently, persistently, confidently keep talking to them. Negotiations, per se, are of incalcuable value.



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## Are the Soviets paranoid?

**Pipes:** No. They are aggressively inclined.

**Luttwak:** Well, all empires appear paranoid. The Romans were paranoid, if you like. They conquered central Italy to make Rome secure, Gaul to make northern Italy secure; eventually they had to go all the way to Britain just to have security for downtown Rome. That is not paranoia, that is the mechanism of empire.

**Kampelman:** Yes. Kissinger said that even paranoids have enemies. Totalitarians are insecure. Whenever a small group of people governs large masses without the legitimacy or stability that comes from consent, they are afraid. They fear their neighbors, they fear strangers, they fear one another. I know a 73-year-old scientist who lives in Moscow who couldn't get permission to emigrate. They even fear him and other helpless people like him.

**Rumsfeld:** Any clique that is in power only by force, not by consent or popular approval does, in fact, have to be fearful of its own people and of the nations it is attempting to control and subjugate. But if by paranoid, one means that the Soviets are frightened of an attack by the United States, Germany, Western Europe, or NATO, that I think, has been overemphasized. The Soviet leadership is not naive. They are exceedingly well read in the Western press and reasonably sophisticated about the operations of the U.S. Congress and our relations with allies. I do not think that the Soviet leadership gets up in the morning fearing a NATO attack across Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union.

**Laqueur:** There is a paranoid streak, but they put it to good use. They have strong nerves. At the same time, there is an element of distrust that was most pronounced in Stalin, a tendency to see intrigues where there are none. But they deliberately exaggerate their paranoia for political reasons.

**Bartley:** The Soviets have a very peculiar national character, which no doubt has deep historical roots, back to the fact that they never experienced the Renaissance and Reformation, which we in Western culture take for granted. If you read Russian history, you have to be impressed by the persistence of highly authoritarian governments with a tendency to bully, and the persistence of a strain of almost crazy saints, like the current dissidents. I don't know whether I'd call that paranoid. I do think we assume they are more like us than they really are.

**Perle:** There is an element of irrational fear in their perceptions of the People's Republic of China and to a lesser degree of the United States. There are some analysts who believe the Soviets to be paranoid and somehow take comfort in that fact. I don't find it at all comforting if true. Paranoids are dangerous. The Soviet leadership knows very well that it rules by fear, force, and indoctrination. All governments whose rule is based on those factors have a tendency to be fearful.

**Pfaltzgraff:** Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia on average has been acquiring territory the size of Holland every seven years. I would say that the victims of Russian expansionism have the right to paranoia.

**Brzezinski:** Any imperial structure that rests primarily on force tends to develop a paranoid outlook. Do not forget that the Russian empire is the only empire in which the oppressed peoples very explicitly feel themselves culturally superior to their oppressors. In the past, every other major empire created the impression that the imperial center was culturally superior to the areas that it controlled, in addition to being politically and economically predominant. That enhanced its power. By contrast, the oppressors in the Soviet empire have an acute inferiority-superiority complex, which certainly enhances their paranoia.

## What is the likelihood of a major war with the Soviet Union in the next 10 years?

**Allen:** Quite small in my view, thanks to the Reagan Administration's regeneration of American forces after more than a decade of failure to develop and deploy new weapon systems.

**Kirkpatrick:** I believe not very great. I don't agree that it's more likely today than at times such as the Berlin blockade, the Cuban missile crisis, or the Korean and Vietnam wars.

One of the ways we make it less likely is by being strong and clear and firm. Vacillating only confuses the Soviets as well as ourselves. We also should seek quite deliberately to find islands of common activity and common interest with the Soviets. I am not talking about summitry, but quiet and lower-level talks. I don't believe we can settle problems with the Soviets by grand negotiation. But it is important to find limited areas of agreement, as many fail-safe devices as possible, and to have open lines of communication at all times.

**Ulam:** Luckily, I would say the likelihood is very small. I don't see a war coming except through a series of accidental escalations, or by us giving the Soviets the impression that they could launch a conventional military venture in Western Europe without any fear of retribution. I think they are just as afraid of a nuclear war as we are, even though at times they pretend that they are not really afraid of it.



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**Rumsfeld:** I would place a low probability on a major nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. I would place a high probability, bordering on certainty, of continued regional and local instability and conflict as the Soviets continue to probe and seek to expand their influence. The United States must have adequate deterrence across the spectrum, and I don't mean just nuclear deterrence. We must have sufficient conventional capability—the ability to project power—in order to dissuade the Soviets from engaging in the kinds of adventures that create instability, and the potential for escalation.

**Luttwak:** The Soviet Union has always been expansionist but not aggressive. Its method has been to expand its control by threatening force, not by using force. There is now a real danger that the Soviet Union might become more aggressive as its economic prospects continue to darken and as an age of pessimism overtakes its leaders who long ago lost their revolutionary attitude. Subject to that, we ought to be able to avoid a war with the Soviet Union.

**Pipes:** The likelihood of a major war with the Soviet Union is very slim. How it might become more slim does not depend on us; it depends on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union does not want a war. It prefers to engage in a gradual but unceasing war of political attrition.

**Kampelman:** I don't think there is much of a likelihood but there is always the possibility. Wars are not always the product of rational decision-making. Sometimes they are the product of miscalculation, and where there are tensions, there is always the potential for miscalculation.

**Lichenstein:** The likelihood of war is fairly slim, partly for good reasons, and partly for bad ones.

The good reasons are that under President Reagan we are increasingly confronting the Soviets with choices that they would prefer not to make, as we make it clear to them that there will be risks and costs attached to aggressiveness.

The bad reasons are that we might be scared out of our bloomers and submit to provocation, intimidation, and threat, saying "No, no, no, no, it isn't bad enough yet, we are not going to commit the fullness of our power." I think this would be very damaging in the long run.

**Decter:** I don't think a major war is likely. There does seem to be a likelihood that the Soviets will drag us into small conflicts all over the world. If we had a sufficiently strong, clear, articulated policy, we would decide where the battles would be instead of the Soviets. We're always fighting on terms the Soviets choose.

**Hyland:** The chance of war is not very great. The danger of war with the Soviet Union will not result from the arms race or from the possession of this or that weapon, but from the inability of the two countries to work out rules of accommodation in handling their areas of conflict. We have to guard against a series of blow-ups like those that preceded 1914: everyone then was sure that they could handle anything and it turned out they couldn't.

**Van Cleave:** I don't think anyone's crystal ball is clear enough to answer that. I believe that over the next 10 years the Soviet Union will continue to push what it believes are its current advantages in the correlation of forces. Indeed because of the extraordinary Soviet military buildup, I believe the Soviets will be more threatening and aggressive over the next 10 years than ever before.

How can we counter that without sacrificing our val-



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ues and without precipitating a major war? The first step is to do much more than we have been doing in building up our military power. In my view, what the Reagan Administration has done is inadequate. We have to reduce Soviet opportunities by being willing to act decisively and early. We need a strategy that tells the Soviets ahead of time what we mean to do if they act aggressively. Our current strategy of uncertainty is a recipe for Soviet miscalculation.

**Rostow:** Not very great. The Soviets are pressing hard, and pursuing an aggressive diplomacy. But two things will restrain them. One is that they don't trust their own people. The lesson of 1956, when Russian soldiers joined the Hungarian revolution in the streets of Budapest, has not been forgotten in Moscow, or in Eastern Europe.

The second thing of course, is uncertainty about whether a Soviet regime could survive a nuclear war.

**Huntington:** I would say the danger is slim. The danger of war arises in two circumstances. One is a situation where we in effect invite the Soviets to be aggressive, as we did in 1950 when we said that we were not going to defend South Korea, and then we felt that we had to react vigorously. One most significant action reducing the risk of war in the past five years or so was President Carter's announcement that we were prepared to use military force to resist external force coming into the Persian Gulf area. Without the Carter Doctrine, the Soviets could have well been more inclined to get involved in the Gulf and at some time we would have had to react.

The other danger would be for the Soviets to feel cornered, to feel that the prospects of peace are so unpalatable that they are willing to suffer the risks of war. In 1941 after the oil embargo, the Japanese concluded that the continuation of peace with the United States meant national suicide. They went to war because they felt threatened by peace. There is a potential danger we could push the Soviets into a situation where they could conceivably make a similar calculation.

**Tucker:** I think the likelihood is very low, because it is difficult to imagine getting into a conventional war with the Soviet Union that wouldn't immediately raise the spectre of nuclear conflict. And I think the superpowers will go to almost unimaginable lengths to avoid that possibility. I cannot imagine either the United States or the Soviet Union contemplating the use of nuclear weapons, save in circumstances where they were persuaded that the other side was preparing to use nuclear weapons and therefore it would be better to strike first.

**Perle:** I can only see one situation that would present the likelihood of a major war with the Soviet Union, and that is if we should be so foolish as to diminish our own defense effort, permitting an imbalance to develop. If we maintain our strength, there will be no war.

**Eagleburger:** If it happens, it will be by accident or misjudgment. In a popular book, the third world war begins in Yugoslavia after the Soviets misjudge the willingness of the West to reply. That is why what we say and do is so important: it gives the Soviets perceptions of how we would react. Over the next years, I think there will be a lot of brushfire wars, which always contain the seeds of confrontation. But a major war, I think, is unlikely.

**Pfaltzgraff:** The Soviet Union is unlikely to resort to war for the achievement of its objectives, except where it enjoys overwhelming military strength. Since World War II, the Soviet Union has directly used military power only in East Germany in 1953 against defenseless people, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 with overwhelming odds in its favor, and finally in 1979 in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Soviet writings posit very clearly that military power is to be used in wars only when the correlation of forces, military and nonmilitary, lies clearly in favor of the Soviet Union. I believe that the Soviet Union would enlist the use of military power against the United States only if it believed it could win decisively in a surprise engagement. In short, the prospect for the Soviet use of military power lies exclusively in a situation in which the United States was perceived clearly to be far weaker than the Soviet Union.

**Brzezinski:** Very low. And if I am wrong, neither you nor the readers of this interview will be around to hold that against me.

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# The Case for Strategic Defense

## New Shield of the Republic

Lewis E. Lehrman

Today our nation can be destroyed in hours if not minutes by Soviet nuclear weapons. Our only defense is to deter the Soviet Union through counterforce strategy and the threat of massive, brutal retaliation against Soviet cities and civilians. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), as this strategic nuclear doctrine is known, provides the United States with no defense should deterrence by nuclear terror fail.

If military intelligence notified the President today that several Soviet ICBMs had penetrated our airspace, he would have but two options. First, anticipating a larger Soviet strike, the President could launch a massive nuclear retaliation against Soviet cities and military targets. Second, believing the Soviet launch to be an accident, he could accept the deaths of millions of American citizens, and, to avoid escalation, do nothing. The absence of any defense against a nuclear strike is such a profound flaw in our military strategy that no one should wonder any longer at the strength of the nuclear freeze movement.

There is a clear and present remedy for the defects of this vulnerable strategy. On March 23, 1983, President Reagan proposed a major research program for space- and land-based ballistic missile defense systems. The Reagan plan promises to bring about a revolution in our national security policy in the next generation.

At present a number of technological obstacles impede the development of effective anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. But many of our most exacting scientists and weapons experts now believe that these impediments can be removed in the next 10 to 15 years—no more time than it took to put a man on the moon. The Pentagon's Strategic Technologies Study Team, headed by James C. Fletcher, former head of NASA, concluded that advanced strategic self-defense systems are feasible.

There is also solid supporting evidence from the private sector. In 1981, the Heritage Foundation brought together more than 50 scientists, engineers, and cost experts to study the feasibility of medium-term options for strategic defense. This study group, known as "High Frontier," concluded that the United States could, within a decade, deploy a defense capable of filtering out 95 to 98 percent of a Soviet first strike at a cost of less than $20 billion—provided the system was funded as a high-priority, Manhattan-style project. Independent studies by Boeing Corporation and United Technologies have reached similar conclusions.

### I. A Revolution in Military Strategy

The projected costs of a comprehensive strategic self-defense—including ballistic missile defense, air defense, and civil defense—are not high. Indeed, compared with the likely costs of defenseless nuclear war, they are cheap. Much of the ballistic missile defense cost can be absorbed by reducing funding of offensive nuclear programs. Certainly, a nation with a Gross National Product of $4 trillion (by 1986) can afford to invest $20 billion each year, if necessary, to reduce sharply the threat of nuclear annihilation.

Critics argue that a "perfect" strategic defense can never be devised, and that even if it could, it would threaten the "stability" of the balance of terror. They worry that the promise of free world self-defense would prompt the Soviets to launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack, out of fear that we, with our new nuclear shield, might be tempted to attack a less well-defended Soviet Union.

To assume that the Soviets will launch a suicidal nuclear attack is to assume that their leadership is both stupid and irrational. If the Soviets are in fact deterred from striking now, why will they be less deterred when America has a space-based defense? Of course, the Soviet leadership may be irrational. They might launch a first strike against America for any number of reasons—even today. But that argument is one of the best reasons for making a determined effort right now to defend ourselves. It is because the Soviet oligarchy may at some point become paranoid and irrational that we ought not to base our survival strategy on mutual terror and the premise that Soviet leaders think the way we do.

Lewis E. Lehrman *is chairman of Citizens for America, and a trustee of The Heritage Foundation.*



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

Drawing by Alexander Hunter for *Policy Review*.



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In truth, self-defense would have a stabilizing effect over time. Recent breakthroughs in offensive technologies now threaten the stability that total reliance on nuclear offense was supposed to provide. The MIRVing of pin-point accurate missiles, for example, makes it quite plausible that, someday, both the United States and the Soviet Union could possess a comprehensive first strike capability, with neither side having a second strike capability. It is possible to envision a scenario in which both Americans and Soviets would have arsenals of 1,000 missiles, each armed with ten super-accurate warheads. In such a situation, either side could destroy the other's missile force by using only about a fifth of its total. By contrast, if each side had only several missile fields protected by effective strategic defense, each increment of accurate MIRVing would produce a diminishing return of power. Should the Soviets build another missile, we would simply add another, cheaper, intercept vehicle to our ABM field. Strategic defense thus provides a hedge against a sudden tip in the balance on the offensive side. And strategic defense cannot be threatening, because it develops very gradually, as it protects step by step only increments of people and deterrent power.

Two safeguards could persuade the Soviets, and the world, of our good intentions as we deploy a strategic defense system. First, the technology of self-defense might eventually be passed on to our allies and to the Soviets—as the President has already suggested. Second, as our defensive deployments add to the survivability of our offensive forces, we could unilaterally dismantle offensive systems superfluous to a second strike deterrent. We have no interest in destroying innocent Russians, or even their not so innocent leaders. Therefore, once we can defend ourselves, we have little interest in denying the same capability to the Soviets.

Strategic defense would permit us to abide by a just war doctrine, which requires us to discriminate between innocent civilians and military targets. This Judeo-Christian moral foundation of Western military strategy must once again be restored. The non-combatant populations must no longer be held hostage. Nor need they be.

## II. Strategic Self-Defense Viewed Historically

Persuaded by the MAD strategy inherited from President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Nixon Administration signed an ABM Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1972. This agreement limited ABM deployment to 100 interceptors at two sites (later reduced to one), thereby depriving the United States of the option of effective strategic self-defense. SALT I included the ABM Treaty and also an Interim Agreement on Offensive Nuclear Weapons, which set unequal ceilings on deployment of ICBM and SLBM launchers. Many supporters of SALT I contended that the Soviets had accepted the American view on mutual security. SALT I was positive proof, they said, that the Soviets agreed with the MAD emphasis on mutual vulnerability of civilian populations. Thus a survivable second strike offensive force, designed for assured total destruction, became the overriding goal of each superpower.

**Strategic defense would permit us to abide by a just war doctrine, which requires us to discriminate between innocent civilians and military targets.**

The Soviets' present strategic doctrine, and their unparalleled offensive nuclear weapons deployments since 1972, have falsified the arguments undergirding the ABM Treaty of 1972 and the myopic military strategy from which it emanated. Soviet leaders are contemptuous of MAD. As early as 1974 the Soviet leadership deployed a new generation of multiple warhead ICBMs whose yield and accuracy could destroy United States ICBMs in their hardened silos. Such weapons directly repudiate the MAD principle that neither power should deploy weapons that threaten the other's means of retaliation. Contrary to the assumptions of MAD, the Soviets expanded their ICBM arsenal from 1,400 warheads in 1972 to 5,578 in 1982. Total Soviet ICBM megatonnage has increased threefold. Today, the Soviet Union can destroy up to 95 percent of American ICBMs in a first strike, using only a very small portion of its own ICBM force. The Soviet Union has upgraded its submarine nuclear forces as well, deploying long-range multiple warhead SLBMs on four new classes of submarines. Over 250 Backfire bombers have been fielded and at least 240 SS-20 ballistic missiles are now targeted on Europe.

Soviet agreement to the ABM Treaty was not based on an acceptance of American strategic notions of mutual population vulnerability. Instead the Soviet Union was profoundly concerned about the United States lead in ABM technology. The Soviets simply wanted to prevent the United States from deploying an ABM system to protect American civilians, as well as strategic forces, from the threat of a Soviet first strike.

Soviet strategy at that time was not a total secret. As early as 1967, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin explained publicly the Soviet view of strategic defense, when he told reporters in London that "the anti-missile system is not a weapon of aggression, of attack; it is a defensive system." Soviet military literature after 1972 has continued to stress the importance of defense against nuclear attack. The USSR continues to spend over $2 billion a year on civil defense, while the United States Congress appropriated only $148 million for civil defense in fiscal 1983. Soviet air defenses are being upgraded with new interceptors and surface-to-air missiles to shoot down low-flying American bombers and cruise missiles.



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Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has organized a vigorous research and development of ABM technology. The Soviets currently deploy new ABM missiles and radars at their ABM site encircling Moscow. Reportedly, they have constructed facilities for mass production of ABM components that would enable them to field a nationwide ABM system quickly. Much of what the Soviets do to improve their ABM defense violates the provisions of the ABM Treaty of 1972. For example, the Soviets have tested surface-to-air missiles in an ABM mode; they have tested rapid reload launchers, developed mobile radars and ABM interceptors, and deployed extensive battle management radars for nationwide ABM defense. All are prohibited by the 1972 ABM Treaty.

These developments in Soviet ABM capability make the June 1982 Soviet nuclear war exercise an especially ominous threat. The military exercise began with a simulated attack on United States early warning satellites in conjunction with multiple firings of ICBMs (to simulate a Soviet first strike against an United States nuclear forces). The Soviets then test-fired their ABM weapons against targets (simulating Soviet defense against an American second strike), and launched two SLBMs, (simulating a Soviet third strike).

In short, the United States faces an aggressive adversary that has rejected the idea of a mutual strategic balance based on secure second strike forces. Moreover, the Soviets *do* plan their nuclear strategy with offensive intent. But the United States does not—and should not. Thus, the necessity of effective American self-defense.

## III. Strategic Self-Defense, and the Goals of Arms Control

How can United States leaders ensure national security when our adversary is determined to gain nuclear superiority? In the short term, the United States can improve the survivability of our strategic deterrent forces, in particular our ICBMs and the strategic command and control systems. The present vulnerability of these two elements of defense is the most serious potential failing of our strategic forces, and seriously undermines deterrence.

In the next five years over $18 billion will be spent to provide reliable command and control over American nuclear forces in wartime conditions; more should be invested if necessary. The United States must also protect its vulnerable ICBM deterrent force, and we must upgrade the yield and accuracy of its ICBM and SLBM warheads so as to match the Soviet capability to destroy hardened military targets. As the Scowcroft Commission and military strategists in both parties have recognized, deterrence now consists in the ability to reply in kind across the full range of Soviet attacks.

These minimal measures are necessary but not sufficient. Only advanced strategic defense systems can solve the ultimate problems of nuclear security.

Certainly no strategic defense system can be perfect; leakage may be inevitable. But even a less than perfect defense would change—and change radically in the direction of peace—the present strategic equations. A defense system 90 to 95 percent effective against massive attack would be closer to 100 percent effective against accidents, acts of terror, or limited attacks. This protection alone would represent an enormous improvement upon our present vulnerability. Indeed, such a strategic defense would largely banish the fears of a nuclear war occasioned by other than a deliberate all-out attack. By comparison, an effective nuclear freeze would merely leave the Soviets, Americans, and others still in possession of all the weapons of mutual destruction.

**The emergence of a new balance, based on strategic defense, would signal the greatest practical triumph to date of arms control.**

To be sure, there would remain the dread contingency of a massive attack. Some utopian critics assume that in this case there is little to be said on behalf of an imperfect system. But a 90 to 95 percent effective defense would dramatically reduce American casualties and leave open prospects of national survival and recovery. This is still a horrible outcome to contemplate, yet it is morally and practically superior to the consequences of no defense at all. Pessimists also neglect the altered calculations an aggressor must make before striking. In the changed strategic environment of self-defense systems, a pre-emptive aggressor will not be able to hold back a substantial part of his forces when striking. In order to reach his goal the aggressor will have to let go with all that he has, since in any event at least 90 percent of his forces will be wasted with the attack. But if he lets go with *all* that he has, he will then be utterly disarmed, completely vulnerable against an adversary that still possesses immense means of retaliation.

The emergence of a new balance, based on strategic defense, would signal the greatest practical triumph to date of arms control. If both sides possessed defensive systems that were 90 to 95 percent effective, then 90 to 95 percent of offensive strategic arms would be useless. No current arms control proposals—even the most optimistic—envisage such a dramatic reduction of offensive weapons. Moreover, the beauty of this particular form of arms control is that it does not depend upon bilateral agreement and unattainable trust. It cannot be upset by dishonest measures taken by one side. Strategic self-defense is the ideal form of arms control. Indeed, strategic defense is the practical equivalent, and much more, of a nuclear freeze.

Critics insist that American deployment of strategic defenses will intensify the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, thereby heightening tensions



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between both countries. This is always possible—with or without strategic defense. Still, as past Soviet-American relations show, if there is to be an intensified arms race, better that it be a race for peace and for the means of self-defense and survival of the free world.

The Soviet Union will continue to improve both its offensive and defensive capability, no matter what the United States does. But whether Soviet leaders will *concentrate* more on offense than on defense will depend to some extent on American strategy. The prospects are good that the Soviets would try to equal the new American strategic defense effort. If so, a new and more stable balance would emerge—based on self-defense.

**Today, the Soviet Union can destroy up to 95 percent of American ICBMs in a first strike, using only a very small portion of its own ICBM force.**

Strategic defense will not make the United States and its allies secure against conventional attack. But, in this respect, we could not be more insecure today. In 1965, NATO decided not to match the Warsaw Pact in conventional force capability but instead to deter a conventional invasion on the cheap by a threat of massive American nuclear retaliation—"first use"—against Soviet cities. But the global reach of Soviet nuclear forces today has made the American pledge of "first use" an extremely risky policy for NATO. For in the absence of strategic defense, the first use pledge of the United States may now be correctly considered suicidal for America. An American strategic defense program, if unmatched by the Soviets, would certainly bolster the present American policy of "extended deterrence." But if, as is more likely, the Soviets were to match American strategic defense deployments, the American "first use" threat to use nuclear weapons against the Soviets in defense of Europe would lose much of its effectiveness. Such an outcome might be very desirable, creating for both superpowers the incentive to provide a similar shield of self-defense for their allies. It would also require our European allies to do what they should be doing already: to deploy conventional forces to match the Warsaw Pact's, hopefully at lower levels for both.

Since "first use" is now a doubtful pledge, and thus without a substantial deterrent effect, there is already a compelling incentive for the gradual development of an independent European Defense Community over the next decade. America may now reasonably insist on it; because 39 years after the end of World War II, Western Europe is richer and more populous than either the United States or the Soviet Union.

In fact, the Europeans have responded quickly and favorably to the self-defense option. In July 1983, the European ministers of NATO voted, with only one dissenting ballot, to "support urgent development and deployment" efforts to carry out a strategy of Western self-defense.

## IV. Strategic Defense Now

Strategic defense is not a quick fix solution to the problem of current American strategic nuclear inferiority. Much must now be done in the short term to improve the capability of the United States to defend itself against Soviet nuclear attack. Civil defense, for example, is not a high technology program. The United States could significantly enhance deterrence by implementing President Reagan's seven-year, $4.2 billion civil defense program. An effective defense against Soviet bombers and cruise missiles could be deployed quickly, using defense systems already in production, such as E-3 AWACs aircraft, F-15 Fighters, and Patriot surface-to-air missiles. Even a ground-based ABM system could be deployed quickly over the next five years to protect vital military targets, such as ICBM fields and command and control centers.

In the end, a comprehensive strategic defense capability will require advanced technology systems to shoot down Soviet missiles on launch, in space, and upon atmospheric reentry. A near leakproof defense probably cannot be deployed in sufficient numbers until the 1990s. However, to a great extent, an effective program could start immediately by using existing technology. An immediate program of feasible steps toward civil defense, air defense, and ABM defense could at least fulfill the oath and duty of the President of the United States to take all measures to defend and to protect the territory and safety of the United States and its citizens. Through a start-up program of strategic self-defense, we can then assess the desirability and the time needed to carry out the full program and its ultimate capabilities.

If we never take the first few steps to defend America again, a perfect, technically stunning answer will forever elude us. ☎



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# "...One of the people it's been most useful to and used by is me."

## Ronald Reagan

on Mandate for Leadership I




## The election is over but not the revolution

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# THE ATLAS OF FREEDOM: THE RIGHT TO EMIGRATE



**Nearly Universal Restrictions on Emigration**

Afghanistan
Angola
Albania
Bulgaria
Burma
China
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Ethiopia
Hungary
Iraq
Kampuchea
Laos
Mongolia
Mozambique
Namibia
North Korea
Romania
Rwanda
Seychelles
Somalia
South Yemen
Tanzania
Upper Volta
U.S.S.R.
Vietnam

**Frequent Restrictions for Political, Racial, or Ethnic Reasons**

Bangladesh
Cyprus
Guinea
Haiti
Indonesia
Iran
Kuwait
Libya
Malaysia
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Paraguay
Philippines
Poland
South Africa
South Korea
Syria
Taiwan
Turkey
Uruguay
Zambia

No map tells all.

Women cannot emigrate from Cameroon, Zaire, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Oman, without permission from their husbands.

Women cannot emigrate from Thailand unless the Department of Public Welfare certifies that they will not be used as prostitutes.



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Source: "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983", U.S. Department of State

Map by Karen Portik for *Policy Review*



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# Op Artists

## The Right Stuff
## From Will, Tyrrell, Safire, Sobran, and Raspberry

Dinesh D'Souza

Newsrooms are full of liberals, but conservative columnists now dominate the Op-Ed pages of newspapers across the country. Peter Braestrup, editor of *The Wilson Quarterly* and press critic, says that "Outside *The New Republic,* there are very few interesting liberal columnists, because for the last 15 years liberals didn't have to think to get an audience. They just pressed the right buttons—Nixon, Vietnam, Civil Rights, and so on. As a result, liberals became intellectually lazy. Their rivals, the conservatives and the neoconservatives, could not just echo the conventional wisdom. They had to fight for their beliefs, and they became good at it."

In the 1950s and 1960s, the pre-eminent syndicated columnists were liberal. They were opposed by such conservative stalwarts as David Lawrence, Holmes Alexander, Ralph de Toledano, John Chamberlain, and Russell Kirk. Then came the youthful iconoclast William F. Buckley, Jr., George Will, James Kilpatrick, and M. Stanton Evans, who gave conservative rhetoric a new glitter. Now with conservatism in the mainstream, the spotlight includes such fresher faces of right-wing polemic as R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., Jeffrey Hart, Patrick Buchanan, Evans and Novak, Warren Brookes, and Joseph Sobran. Profiled here are five writers who have recently drawn interest in Washington.

### Willfare

George Will currently has a tenuous position in the conservative movement. Yet, after Buckley, he is the columnist most identified with conservatism in the public mind. That is because of Will's omnipresence: his syndicated fare appears in more than 400 newspapers including the *Washington Post, Los Angeles Times,* and *Boston Globe;* he alternates with Meg Greenfield in *Newsweek;* his books are in all the stores; he is paraded by ABC-TV on the "Evening News" and "This Week With David Brinkley."

Will's columns espouse a peculiar brand of conservatism which does not have a large following in the Republican Party. Terry Eastland, a friend of Will and a speechwriter for Attorney General William French Smith, comments that "Will is a classical writer. The dominant theme of his writing is virtue. The dominant theme in America, and in American conservatism, is liberty." Indeed Will seems to believe that much of this country's ills are the result of *too much freedom,* which, after a certain point, becomes indistinguishable from license. As an antidote to license, Will has proposed that government attempt the moral uplift of its citizens. "It is politically risky to start using government to revise the American Way of Life," Will admitted in a 1977 column. "But it is irresponsible not to." His more recent columns have emphasized the theme of "statecraft as soulcraft," which is also the title of Will's most recent book. He chastises what he calls "*soi-disant* conservatives" for their instinctive aversion to government. "Some conservatives maintain that government is intrinsically incompetent," he told *Policy Review.* "Then they maintain that the public should entrust it with trillions of dollars for defense and maybe their sons and daughters for operations overseas." Will traces his "conservative doctrine of the welfare state" to Burke, Disraeli, and Cardinal Newman.

Will is probably the most elegant and profound conservative columnist writing today. Although he is perhaps excessively reliant on *Bartlett's Quotations,* his columns are stylishly composed and carefully organized. He focuses on "the kernel of principle," as he puts it, and not "which presidential advisers are ascending, and which are descending." He is at his best writing about U.S. foreign policy and social issues.

Will manages to put the case against the Soviet Union firmly, yet without heavy breathing. His tone is civil, even as his evidence is overwhelming. He never fails to support increased arms expenditures, and can be savagely sarcastic towards those who keep looking for smile buttons on the lapels of Soviet leaders. Commenting on President Carter's naïve response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Will urged, "Quick, find that rule book, and notify the referee. President Carter says that the Soviet invasion violates 'accepted international rules of

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behavior.'" Will's pungent anti-Communism has earned him the privilege of being viciously attacked in *The Nation, The Progressive,* and the Soviet press.

Though he keeps his personal distance from many social-issue conservatives, Will articulates their deepest concerns with power and passion. He is particularly appalled at the casual brutality with which people advocate abortion and euthanasia. When the Supreme Court refused to hear California's appeal on behalf of Philip Beckler, a 13-year-old Down's syndrome child suffering from complications resulting from a common heart defect, Will informed his readers that "Phillip will die prematurely, probably slowly and painfully, perhaps suddenly, drowning in his blood from bleeding into his lungs." He was dying because he was retarded, Will noted, "just when society is beginning to acknowledge an obligation to nurture the signficant fulfillment of even the limited potentialities of retarded citizens." After remarking that "the idea that the value of human life varies with intelligence is at war with our civilization's core belief in the intrinsic and equal value of lives," Will added a footnote about "the Down's syndrome child I know best, who watches 'Happy Days' and cheers for the Baltimore Orioles"—his own son, Jonathan Will.

Editorial editors who feature Will's columns say one of his great strengths is his range of interests. In addition to politics, he writes columns about the Chicago Cubs, hamburger chains, the space shuttle, and video games. David Broder, the political reporter, wrote that Will's most memorable columns describe his response "when he confronts popular culture—or rather, when popular culture confronts George Will." In a recent column about ice cream Will wrote, "Unfortunately my favorite delight bears the unutterable name of 'Hot Fudge Nutty Buddy,' an example of the plague of cuteness in commerce. There are some things a gentleman simply will not do, and one is announce in public a desire for 'Nutty Buddy.' So I usually settle for a plain vanilla cone." Brooding about the insidious effect of popular music on his daughter, Will declared that if this taste persisted long, "She will be sent to school at a thick-walled convent on a high mountain overlooking an inaccessible valley in a remote region of Portugal."

While conservatives acknowledge Will's depth and range, they have become increasingly suspicious of his motives. "He chooses his positions very carefully," comments columnist Joseph Sobran. Sobran and others have publicly impugned Will for maneuvering and positioning himself so that he can be applauded by the liberal establishment. In a review of Will's recent book in *National Review,* Sobran called it "a toothless, coffee-table Toryism, nicely calculated for liberal consumption."

This antipathy stems mainly from Will's ideological commitment to a paternalistic welfare state. This runs counter to the notion of limited government which is at the heart of modern American conservatism. In an assessment of Will's writing in *Commentary,* James Neuchterlein noted the irony that while praising government programs "Will overlooks the moral effects of welfare on its recipients. The evidence is strong that for a critical minority welfare erodes those qualities of self-respect and self-reliance that Will extols."

George Will

Undoubtedly most irksome to conservatives are Will's repeated calls for higher taxes and his condescending treatment of other conservatives. As William Murchison, associate editor of the *Dallas Morning News* puts it, "Will makes quite a living attacking conservatives." I visited Will to ask him about this recently. He received me in his study, where he usually works. Appropriately, there was a framed portrait of Cardinal Newman across from his desk. Will wore a plaid button-down shirt and looked well scrubbed.

He talked first about his background. He was a frustrated football player in high school, he said, after which he attended Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, where he headed "Students for Kennedy" in 1960. Then he went to Magdalen College, Oxford, to study politics, philosophy, and economics. While a student at Oxford, he flirted briefly with libertarian thinking, and paid a visit to the Berlin Wall, which fortified his anti-Communist beliefs. He then enrolled in Princeton's Ph.D. program in political science, and wrote his thesis in 1968 on "tolerance"—he was against it. Then Will taught briefly at Michigan State University and the University of Toronto, before going to work for Republican Senator Gordon Allott of Colorado. In 1972 he was made Washington editor of *National Review,* where he outraged



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conservatives by becoming, by his own description, the first journalist to call for President Nixon's impeachment. But his anti-Nixon tirades pleased Meg Greenfield of the *Washington Post,* who gave Will his current perch at the most influential newspaper in the nation's capital.

"Right-wing types have suspected me from the outset," Will said. "They don't like my argument that government should be strong but it should foster conservative values. They are hostile to the very idea of government." What values did Will want the state to foster? "Equality of opportunity," he said. "For example, we should spend more money on nutrition programs, because it is simply a fact that nutrition bears on development of the mind." Will also called for more programs to help the handicapped. I asked whether he did not believe that certain programs such as affirmative action and welfare sometimes hurt the people they were designed to help, that they often inspired sloth and undermined family cohesiveness. Will seemed uncomfortable with this. "I'm not very interested in the empirical issue of which programs work and which do not. That is for others to determine. I do think the programs that work should be continued." He conceded that such a calculus would not necessarily involve higher taxes; indeed, they could involve a tax cut.

Finally, Will said he did not mean to convey the impression that he was the only living conservative, that all his critics were ideological masqueraders. Name three conservatives whom you don't consider *soi-disant,* I asked him. Reagan, Buckley, Kristol, he shot back. "My problem with the conservative movement," Will said, "is that I don't associate enough with conservatives. I don't go to the seminars and the parties. I work at home. So I am not considered part of the team."

**Lyrical Bombardier**

Like George Will, R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., is at his best writing short, razoredged commentary. His "Continuing Crisis" column in *The American Spectator* is a classic series of bilious explosions against liberalism, pederasty, and jogging. Tyrrell's columns, which appear in some 70 newspapers including the *Washington Post,* contain such characteristic Tyrrell words as "flumdiddle," "flapdiddle," "schmoozing," and "pish-posh." In Tyrrell's universe, liberals don't speak, they "break wind." Walter Cronkite is a "warm, oval vacuum," John Steinbeck is a "deceased egghead," and Iranians are the "dirty-necked primitives of the Holy Man Khomeini."

Bad taste is an essential part of Tyrrell's writing. In a recent column on the Olympics, Tyrrell noted probable cultural difficulties for the authorities to deal with. "Gastronomes visiting us from some Asian countries may order a hot dog and expect to sink their teeth into a warm spaniel. They will be disappointed that such delicacies are taboo over here." Some Catholics were a bit unsure about Tyrrell's strategy of combating the Catholic bishops' pastoral letter on capitalism by announcing in *The American Spectator* a "Find the Fattest Bishop" contest, prize $100.

Many of Tyrrell's critics are men of puritanical bent and lugubrious disposition. They don't like Tyrrell's wacko outbursts, and would rather see him attempt 10,000 word essays with a formidable list of footnotes at the end. Others fault Tyrrell for snickering at liberal arguments without ever confronting them. "He produces a spectacular but harmless invective," according to one syndicated columnist who appears in the *Washington Times.* It has even been suggested that the *Washington Post* prints Tyrrell because he is the liberal caricature of a conservative, a token who never draws blood.

Occasionally Tyrrell can be strident. "To embrace the Democrats," he advised his readers in November 1982, "is to gargle arsenic." But to accuse Tyrrell of hyperbole is to miss the point. Of course there is excess in a passage like this: "Having listened to the liberal harangues for years, I have come to the conclusion that by 'rich' they mean anyone earning the median income for the standard family of four who has avoided a stretch in Attica." Yet implicit in this outrageousness is the insight that the Democratic Party is waging covert war against the middle-class taxpayer, not just the fat cats.

Tyrrell is often able to use self-caricature to deflate liberal indignation. "As editor of an admittedly racy review, I am often the recipient of terse letters from deans of women's colleges, those highminded patrollers of learning. 'Dear Mr. Tyrrell, The young ladies of our institutions do *not* care to receive your *American Spectator.*' I always reply amiably, 'Dear Madam, I have sent your name to the FBI.'"

Thomas Bray, editorial page editor of the *Detroit News,* says that irresponsibility is Tyrrell's main strength. "We print Will and Tyrrell because they complement each other. Will is the careful essayist. Tyrrell is the radical bomb-thrower." Yet Tyrrell is capable of moving prose on occasion. He wrote a beautiful tribute to the European *uomo de lettera* Luigi Barzini, and an emotional 1979 column, "Christmas in Cambodia," put aside the usual revelries to lament the bloody legacy of the Khmer Rouge.

I wanted to ask Tyrrell about the evident difficulty of reconciling his guffawing and name-calling with serious arguments in the same column. We dined at the New York Athletic Club with one of Tyrrell's friends, a New York attorney who narrated in excruciating detail his amorous adventures and the resulting infections. Tyrrell brushed his boyish curls with frustration. "My life is terribly boring," he said. He suggested that while everybody else was out quaffing, snorting, and wenching, he composed on his personal computer.

His life certainly wasn't dull in the late sixties when he had an uproarious time unhorsing radical enthusiasms at Indiana University. Tyrrell's answer to the New Left, a monthly called *The Alternative,* generated fits among the Hoosier intelligentsia and attracted the attention of prominent conservatives such as Irving Kristol and Bill Buckley. Kristol advised Tyrrell to distribute his ribald monthly nationally, and soon *The American Spectator* was born. Although it is still based in Bloomington, Indiana, Tyrrell has opened a New York office so that he can savor life in Manhattan and mingle with the Taki set. In his time off, he takes his family to Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, where he writes columns on the ripples of the



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water and the wiles of the fish.

"Most columnists are parasites," Tyrrell told me. "They live off the evening news and the *New York Times*. They get their opinions from cocktail parties." Tyrrell said he could not take seriously certain elite passions, such as homosexuality and feminism. "These people are ignorant of nature," he insisted. "Who can take them seriously?"

Tyrrell's new book, *The Liberal Crack-up*, carries endorsements from William Safire, William F. Buckley, Jr., Jeane Kirkpatrick, Leo Rosten, Henry Kissinger, and Malcolm Muggeridge. Tom Wolfe calls him "the funniest political essayist to come along in years." And Jack Paar says "Emmett Tyrrell is the wittiest, wickedest writer on the right around. He makes Gore Vidal on the left read like Lawrence Welk."

But Tyrrell's columns have lately been losing some of their splendid invective. One reason is that his editors at the *Washington Post* are constantly urging him to tone down a bit. Another is, ironically, the triumph of the Reagan Administration. Tyrrell cannot really bring himself to attack the man he routinely refers to as "our suave boy Ron." How could he blame "our suave boy Ron" for anything, even tax hikes or the Beirut massacre, especially given the alternative set of buffoons? Even Tyrrell acknowledges that he is best when he is in "an attack mode," as he puts it. He seems a little bewildered about being part of the majority after spending his whole life spearing the conventional wisdom. Sometimes Tyrrell renews his attacks on liberal totems, but it's no longer so sacrilegious to describe Tip O'Neill as a "dyspeptic orb."



R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

### Safire's Gems

I was not able to interview William Safire for this article. Even his secretary wouldn't talk to me over the phone. Now I can understand why Safire was so upset in a recent column that Vice President Bush would not return his phone calls.

Well, perhaps he was afraid I would tape the conversation. Or mention religion. Taping and prayer are two of Safire's greatest bugbears. He was recently apoplectic over Charles Wick's taping of private phone calls, and ludicrously suggested that the people Wick taped were "left with the feeling of the aborigine who fears that a picture taken of him steals his soul." Safire's tapilepsy dates back to Watergate, when after stoutly defending Nixon's innocence, Safire discovered to his chagrin that somebody in the Administration was taping *him*. After Watergate, Safire has been stricken with an ethics mania which is behind his prosecution of such scandals as "Koreagate," "Billygate," and "Ethicsgate."

A self-described libertarian hawk, Safire is wary of the intertwining of religion and politics. Recently he wrote a series of columns on the "Christian Republican Party," which accused "Reverend Reagan" of committing "constitutional sin" by declaring that politics and morality are inseparable. Ironically Safire's own columns about politics have a strong moralistic tone, and he is always discovering ethical inadequacy in some public official or other. It is typical of Safire to express deep concerns about the people privately taped by Charles Wick—and then print lengthy transcripts of those conversations in his columns.

But these are Safire's eccentricities, and do not do justice to his polished style and brilliant arguments in favor of reduced government and anti-Communist foreign policy. "I am a hawk," Safire says proudly. "I believe the Cold War has been going on for years." In one of his retrospective analyses of the Vietnam War, Safire noted that "The first thing that went wrong in Vietnam was we decided that there was no way to win without starting World War III." When the Cambodian holocaust erupted, Safire punctured the hushed silence at the *New York Times*. "Passive humanitarianism is not an adequate response to genocide," he opened one column



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**William Safire**

which graphically documented Communist horrors. Recently Safire has poured hot water on the nuclear freeze movement and come out in support of the President's proposed strategic defense program.

Until his recent spate of attacks on the Reagan Administration, Safire enjoyed a tremendous standing in the conservative movement even though he remained largely outside it. While George Will was suspected of choreographing his columns to the music of the liberal establishment, Safire was applauded for marching to the beat of a different drum. He even dared to criticize the magisterial *New York Times* on the pages of the *Times,* and he praised Nixon when more timorous Republicans were in retreat. On July 19, 1973 Safire called for Nixon to "reestablish the confidentiality of the presidency" by setting off "a public bonfire of the tapes on the White House lawn."

Safire started out as a reporter for the *New York Herald Tribune* in 1949, then moved to NBC radio and television. He worked as a researcher for Tex McCrary, a public relations firm, then served in the Nixon Administration where he coined the enduring phrase "nattering nabobs of negativism" for Spiro Agnew's anti-media speeches. When the *New York Times,* under criticism that all its resident columnists were liberal, looked around for a conservative token, Safire's credentials were impeccable. Besides, he was a staunch advocate of Israel and could balance the anti-Israel rantings of Anthony Lewis and others on the Op-Ed pages. Yet Safire's appointment, which *Time* magazine called a "peace offering" to the Nixon Administration, was bitterly opposed by several *Times* staffers, including David Halberstam and the leftist editorial page editor John Oakes.

"Safire is a sniper, not an artillery man," observes Peter Braestrup. Indeed, Safire's attacks, though frequently effective, are not part of a coordinated assault on a liberal policy or idea. Nor is Safire an intellectual. But he is an insistent questioner and fine reporter who breaks more stories than most other columnists. His prose is graceful, yet incredibly damaging to his targets. "I am not a hater—haters destroy themselves," Safire wrote in a recent book. "I am a relentless disliker." Targets of his attacks know he isn't kidding.

Safire's columns are always structurally imaginative. He frequently uses the question and answer format. Another favorite is his numerical column, in which he gives "five ways" the government can combat poverty, or the "ten commandments" of effective campaigning. Occasionally Safire is capable of satirical verse of a very high order, like this classic of the Watergate period:

> You will never drag down Nixon, Gunga Dean.
> Yes, it's Dean! Dean! Dean!
> Star of everybody's television screen
> You will claim that you obeyed,
> But the truth is you betrayed
> A far better man than you are, Gunga Dean.

Although Safire's columns have an influential readership in Washington, he is best known to the general public for his essays on language, which appear regularly in the *New York Times Magazine.* Safire has also authored several books on language including, most recently, his *Political Dictionary,* which includes such delicacies as "radical shiek" and the "capitalist's manifesto: laissez-faires of the world, unite! You have nothing to lose but your Keynes."

Unfortunately, Safire has recently concentrated on social issues, where his arguments are weakest. He tends to take refuge in a comfortable libertarianism that refuses to acknowledge the desperate breakdown of values in our society. "My political mindset resists the intrusion of government into the individual's moral decisions," Safire notes. This is a rather simplistic treatment of the question of whether the federal government should prohibit states and communities from passing social legislation; he also avoids the difficult issues of where to draw the line on such evils as drugs and pornography by asserting—without proof—that the slightest regulation is the prelude to a totalitarian state.

Safire also seems to have a problem positioning himself in these times of conservative ascendancy. He still manages to criticize the Reagan Administration for an insufficiently aggressive posture toward the Soviet Union. He is particularly severe on the President's Middle East policy—for example, for the failure to prevent the death of Marines in Lebanon, and for having rescued the Palestine Liberation Organization from total destruction at the hands of Israel. But once Safire was a conservative loner, a *vox clamantis in deserto;* now he finds himself part of a



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mainstream where his views are only part of a larger conservative echo. The man needs time to get over this.

### Sobran Thoughts

I have known Joseph Sobran for years. A wittier man never graced a bar stool since the days of Samuel Johnson. Tom Bethell, contributing editor of *Harper's* and a close friend of Sobran, calls him "a contemporary Chesterton." Sobran's keen sense of paradox is evident from this October 1984 column commenting on Geraldine Ferraro's charges that Reagan was a bad Christian:

> If Reagan led a life of conspicuous religious fervor, without blemish, there might be some plausibility in the idea that he was bent on enforcing conformity. But his personal style, with its mix of conventional piety and relaxed practice, is reassuring, even endearing. It makes him like most Americans. He respects certain norms, even when he doesn't live up to them. He would rather appear to be a sinner, than abolish the idea of sin.

This passage also applies to its author. Sobran, the songster of family and traditional values, has been married twice.

I found him in one of the restaurants near the *National Review* office. He was drinking some exotic brand of beer. We talked about his early years on the plains of Ypsilanti, Michigan, where he attended public schools and later Eastern Michigan University. His parents were Democrats and lapsed Catholics, "which is pretty much the same thing," Sobran said. He took Catholicism seriously after 1960, when an idealistic Catholic was elected to the White House. "Kennedy showed me that there was a certain romance about Catholicism which I thought it had lost," he says.

Sobran was hired to write for *National Review* as a result of a series of lengthy letters he sent Bill Buckley. He arrived in New York in 1971, was promoted to senior editor of the magazine in 1977, and began his syndicated column in 1979. Now he appears in 70 papers including the *Detroit Free Press,* the *Dallas Times-Herald,* and the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat.*

"I like to supply people with rebuttals to familiar arguments," Sobran told me. "Much of liberalism consists of making people ashamed of their soundest instincts." We laughed about Sobran's recent fracas with New York Governor Mario Cuomo and Mayor Edward Koch. In Sobran's column on Governor Cuomo's keynote address at the Democratic Convention he observed that "Cuomo looked and talked like one of the characters gunned down at the end of 'The Godfather.'" This provoked Mayor Koch to suggest that Sobran was the Louis Farrakhan of the right. "I actually thought Cuomo had a kind of rough glamor," Sobran grinned.



Joe Sobran

I asked him whether he believed that religion was central to the conservative philosophy. "Liberals believe in heaven on earth," he said. "Some conservatives don't believe in heaven at all. Religion is not essential to conservatism, but it is essential to me."

Recently Sobran has become interested in what he calls "the practical coincidence of interests between liberals and the Soviet Union." He does not suggest a conspiracy, but rather a "symbiosis" between the left and Communism. Liberals respond to the "mating call" of utopian rhetoric even if it brings bloody consequences, Sobran told me. He quoted Jean Francois-Revel, "They judge fascism by its record, but Communism by its promise."

William P. Cheshire, editorial page editor of the *Washington Times,* which prints Sobran regularly, says of him, "Most columnists are obsessed with day to day news. Sobran can view events with a certain detachment. He abstracts principles from commonplace events." These strengths are also his limitations. Critics charge that "six out of every five Sobran columns are about abortion." Bethell noted that Sobran does not stay well informed on a wide range of issues.

The unifying theme in Sobran's writing, however, is not abortion or the family, but socialism. "The socialist



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impulse takes aim at three institutions: the family, private property, and religion," Sobran says. "Abortion is the most gruesome example of where the socialist or leveling mindset has got us." In a brilliant essay on compassion in his book *Single Issues,* Sobran traces the advance of the state on territory previously reserved for the family:

> It is strange, at first sight, that this callousness about the unborn child should occur in a society where we are forever hectored to show compassion for others. Even as enlightened voices sternly urge us to take responsibility for unseen strangers, they soothingly release us from responsibility to our own children. If these two positions seem inconsistent, they can be politically harmonized: we can discharge the duties of compassion through politics, while the state relieves us of our nearer duties. To put it simply, we are required to love, and provide for, our neighbor, and our neighbor's neighbor, and our neighbor's neighbor's neighbor, but not our sons and daughters. This has quite literally given a new meaning to the word compassion, which now implies a strangely politicized form of love, a highly unnatural love, at the expense of more natural kinds. The duties of the taxpayer begin to look more absolute than those of the parent.

Sobran's distrust of the reigning intellectual consensus runs so deep that he has begun to challenge even the most accepted maxims. Recently some conservatives were nonplussed by his attacks on the Darwinian theory of evolution. Basically, Sobran's argument is that if evolution occurs through random mutation, why don't we see sufficient evidence of the millions of unsurviving mutations in the fossil record? "Nature didn't make men out of monkeys," Sobran asserted in a recent column. "The naturalists have made monkeys out of men."

He is a bit of a dabbler, moving from one intellectual habitat to another. For about a year he was absorbed in Shakespeare, and can not only recite entire scenes from plays, but does excellent imitations of characters in the various movie versions. His favorite author changes from year to year, but he remains devoted to Chesterton, Oakeshott, and Burke. His love for classical music seriously threatens to bankrupt him. Above all things, he believes in hell.

### Raspberry's Contradictions

William Raspberry is an important and underrated figure in American journalism. A writer who translates his conservative temperment into moderate policy proposals, he would probably cringe at being identified with the right wing. All labels elude Raspberry. Yet he is open to conservative thought in a way that few liberal writers are. "He is willing to reach out and examine fresh ideas, even when they challenge conventional nostrums," remarks Tom Bray of the *Detroit News,* which features Raspberry's columns. That's more than can be said of the self-congratulatory claque of liberal columnists.

But Bray and others complain that Raspberry can be inconsistent. He does not always follow through on the implications of his arguments. Indeed he is capable of writing a column eulogizing George Gilder or Marva Collins, and next week calling for increased funding for welfare or the National Education Association. Also, Raspberry, a man of conservative instincts, is so anxious not to be identified with the right that he takes every opportunity to denounce the Reagan Administration and conservatives.

Here are some of Raspberry's views from his columns. He appears in 150 papers including the *Boston Globe* and the *San Francisco Examiner:*

**On black opposition to Reagan's economic program:** "A sound economy would be the best thing that could happen for the whole range of disadvantaged Americans. If there was real hope that the sacrifices they are being forced to endure would fix the economy, we could put them in the category of harsh but effective medicine. But my own fear is that the Reagan economic program won't work."

**On euthanasia:** "It is impossible for me to imagine other than a life of misery for the Illinois twins, inoperably joined. On the other hand, it occurs to me that the sideshow freaks, once a standard attraction at carnivals, mostly didn't commit suicide, which says that they must not have preferred death to even a grotesque life. On what ground would we make on their behalf a decision that they themselves refuse to make?"

**On the effects of welfare:** "While we continue to press for progress for individual black workers, we had better begin to pay some attention to what is happening in American families, and to black families in particular . . . Family deterioration involves much more than income statistics. It involves education, crime and delinquency, career opportunities, ambition, social stability—indeed the future of society."

Anna Karavangelos, associate editor of the Washington Post Writer's Group, which syndicates Raspberry, says that "Bill realizes that there is truth to both sides of an issue. He is not an ideologue. He tries to apply ideas to practical situations."

Although Raspberry started out with a black audience, and wrote mainly about urban problems, he has broadened his range and his readership. Joe Sobran says, "Raspberry was probably hired by the *Post* to be black, but the real man has turned out to be much bigger than the role. He has an unaffected moral gravity about him." One of Raspberry's conservative admirers said, "The thing that comes through most from his writing is that he is a parent concerned about the society his children will inhabit."

I met Raspberry in his claustrophobic office at the *Post.* He has been a columnist for the paper since 1966, he said. He grew up in Mississippi, where he attended public school. Then he went to Indiana Central College, while working part-time for a black weekly, the *Indianapolis Recorder.* After two years in the Army, he was hired as a teletype operator at the *Post.* Soon he was promoted to reporter at the Metropolitan desk. He got his column when George Lardner, the city columnist, retired.



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"Being a family man is important to me," Raspberry told me. "For example, schools interest me in a way they would not if I were single." He said, "I take liberal or conservative positions when they make sense to me. My basic approach is to take questions one at a time. Sometimes Newt Gingrich makes sense and sometimes Benjamin Hooks makes sense."

I asked him why he continued to support welfare programs when he acknowledged their deleterious effects on their recipients. "I don't know any thoughtful person who doesn't think two contradictory things. First, that welfare programs don't work, and second, that we ought to have them." Raspberry said, "Government programs can work as a source of emergency help, but they can't graduate people out of poverty. We're uncomfortable with that because we don't see the function of welfare as making people comfortable."

He expressed ambivalence about affirmative action and busing. "Racial mixing by itself does nothing to improve the education of black kids. It is very damaging to have white and black schools side by side. It's insulting to black kids. But it's equally insulting to imply that there is something intrinsically wrong with a school because there are too many blacks in it, and so blacks have to be bused away, and whites bused in to improve the school."

Raspberry at one time seemed to be attracted to conservative black scholars Thomas Sowell and Walter Williams, but he has since pulled away. He now says, "These are interesting men who have stopped being so interesting because they have stopped trying to persuade blacks of the rightness of their views." The arguments of Sowell and Williams "hold together, but ignore real-life problems," Raspberry said. For example, "They are absolutely correct that rent control reduces the total amount of housing for blacks. They are also right that the market will eventually take care of imbalances. But the immediate effect of removing rent control would be to destroy large numbers of families."

William Raspberry

William Raspberry, a short man with greying hair and a bracelet, is honestly trying to think through the contradictions of liberalism. He will never be a Republican, because of the party's failure to work for civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s. But even if he doesn't quite see it, he is a liberal at the exit gate of liberalism. ☎



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# In the Beginning . . .

## Creationism Has No Evidence. Evolution Has Few Answers.

Rachel Flick

*It's the monkey in me that makes me want to do it.*
*It's the monkey in me that makes me want to chew it.*
*It's the monkey in me that sets me loose—*

"Monkey in Me"
by Dennis James
from the movie musical, *Starstruck*

The theory of evolution is one of the cornerstones of modern science. It is accepted by almost all scientists as the best explanation for the origin of species, in fact as the only possible reading of the evidence. Professor Francisco Ayala of the University of California at Davis, member of the drafting committee of *Science and Creation: A View from the National Academy of Sciences*, says, "Scientists do not bother, any more, to prove that the earth is round, or to prove evolution."

This consensus, though, is not shared by a number of scientists who are also fundamentalist Christians. These "creation scientists" believe that species were created just as the Bible says they were. Although the literal reading of the Bible is an article of fundamentalist faith, in their stand against evolution, creationists say that they no longer rely on biblical authority alone. They claim, rather, to have enough scientific evidence of their position that they no longer need Scripture to make their case.

Evolution is consistent with the fossil evidence in a way that creationism is clearly not. There are enough weaknesses in the theory of evolution, however, to keep the dispute alive. For one thing, we have never seen evolution happen, and without this "hardest" of all imaginable proof, people can continue to doubt. A more serious weakness is in our understanding of how evolution happens, even if we accept that it does. The evolutionary mechanism remains largely mysterious.

Evolution is the theory that species change over time. It holds that new species arise out of old species, over the course of many generations, by mutation and a controversial process called "natural selection." Evolution maintains that life emerged from non-life by naturalistic processes. The earliest form of life, it explains, was simple. By natural selection, this simple form was wrought into the present variety of complex forms. All organisms that now exist, from fungi to lions and tigers and bears, are children of the original, primal amoeba. And man and the apes, evolution teaches, are close cousins—descendents of a still nearer common ancestor.

"Creation science," on the other hand, teaches that mutation and natural selection could not have fashioned all of life from a single organism, and that, in fact, species can only change at all within fixed limits. It does not believe that man and the apes have a common ancestor. Creationism teaches that the universe, energy, and all of the forms of life that have ever lived were created suddenly and essentially simultaneously.

### Fossil Feud

Both theories rely mainly on the same incomplete body of evidence, the fossil record. To say that few organisms are fossilized is an understatement on the order of saying that little of a book remains, when fragments from a few of its letters are all that is left of each chapter. Yet many years' labor, a few good finds, and a few scattered regions where the fossil text is particularly clear, combine to form a complete enough picture for each side to make its case and, eventually, for a consensus to have emerged on the basic questions.

And that consensus is pretty clearly evolutionary; the fossil record establishes that species were not created simultaneously. Fossils are laid down in strata of earth. The strata on the bottom and the fossils within them are assumed to have been laid down earlier—and therefore to be older—than the strata and fossils on top of them. Fossils of some species appear all the way through the record, from the earliest stratum to the latest. Other species do not show up until later on. In general, complex life shows up later than simple life. This evidence argues powerfully against simultaneous creation.

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

The origin of species?

Some creationists dispute that the record necessarily argues any such thing. For one thing, they disagree that the strata should be read as a time sequence. They offer an alternative explanation for the appearance of different fossils in different layers of the earth. First, they suggest that the strata result from a huge flood, perhaps the Noachian flood. As the waters rose, the creationists say, the various creatures settled out at different levels depending on their differing hydrodynamic qualities (with the denser or less mobile ones falling) or on their differing intelligence (with the smarter ones swimming to the top, the better to survive the rising flood). Thus, the strata reveal not that different organisms lived at different times, but that some organisms lived at the bottom of the ocean and others at the top.

Evolutionist Stephen Jay Gould of Harvard University spells out the insufficiency of this argument: there are organisms appearing in different strata that do not, he reports, differ either hydrodynamically or in intelligence. For example, different kinds of clams appear in each stratum, forming a changing "column" of clams all the way up. Each species of clam is hydrodynamically and mentally identical to every other, yet each appears in one specific part of the column and nowhere else. Change in clams over time is simply the most plausible explanation for their stratification, Mr. Gould concludes.

Creationists also find grist for their mill in the sudden appearance of many complex forms of life in the Cambrian period, 500 to 600 million years ago. Duane T. Gish, a creationist and biochemist, who has done post-doctoral work with Nobel Prize winners at Cornell University and the University of California, Berkeley, writes:

> The oldest rocks in which indisputable fossils are found are those of the Cambrian period. In these sedimentary deposits are found billions and billions of fossils of highly complex forms of life. . . . What do we find in rocks older than the Cambrians? Not a single, indisputable multicellular fossil has ever been found in pre-Cambrian rocks.

Again, evolutionists like Mr. Gould simply dispute this claim. Before the Cambrian period, Mr. Gould explains, organisms reproduced asexually. Asexual reproduction works with a relatively narrow gene pool, and so affords but little opportunity for evolutionary change. Sexual reproduction apparently began in the Cambrian period, which was consequently the occasion for a great flowering of new life forms. Mr. Gould points out that even though the pre-Cambrian period was relatively simple, about thirty years ago it was discovered that life in fact did exist in that era, and that since this discovery, an extensive record of both single-cellular and multi-cellular pre-Cambrian life forms, from every continent of the earth, has been assembled.



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### Missing Link

The last large area in which creationists dispute the evolutionary reading of the fossil record is the matter of transitional forms. Evolutionists think they know which species evolved into which, but it has always been difficult to find fossils of the intermediate organisms—hard evidence of a species in transition. It is believed, for example, that reptiles evolved into birds, but it is hard to find an actual specimen from the half-reptile/half-bird stage through which these creatures must have passed.

Creationists believe that such specimens are hard to find because the transitions never occurred. They systematically try to demonstrate how implausible the whole notion of transition is. For instance, they study fossilized reptile jaws and review the possible sequences of changes by which they could have become bird jaws, to show that each of these scenarios is too unlikely to have happened.

The creationist position is that the living world is basically static. The theory maintains that there is change "only within the fixed limits of originally created kinds." As Henry M. Morris and Martin E. Clark write in *The Bible Has the Answer,* "The actual processes of nature as they occur today are conservative and decay processes, rather than creative and developmental." Presumably, species can become extinct, in this theory. But Morris and Clark write:

> There are many varieties of dogs and many varieties of cats, but never any kind of new animal in between a dog and a cat! . . . The same great 'gaps' exist between basic kinds in the fossil world that exist in the modern world. There are new varieties of dogs and new varieties of cats found in the fossil world, but still nothing between a dog and a cat!

Evolutionists are relatively untroubled by the admitted scarcity of transitional forms. For one thing, they do have a few such specimens, such as the Archaeopteryx displayed at the Smithsonian Institution, intermediate between the dinosaurs and the birds. And for another, they are not all that surprised that these are rare. It has been estimated that the transition from one species to another may take as little as 10,000 years. As 10,000 years are represented by only a single fossil stratum, some evolutionists explain, one can hardly expect a long sequence of transitional deposits.

### Seeing is Believing

The most persuasive imaginable proof of evolution would be seeing it happen, either in life or in the laboratory. But proof still eludes us. We have yet to see a new species emerge through evolution, even from species such as fruit flies, where thousands of generations have turned over in laboratory experiments. We have seen, it is true, the selective dying out that might be called the flip-side of the evolutionary process. For example, we have observed that when air pollution darkens a city's surfaces a population of both brown and white moths becomes a population of brown moths only, because predators find it easier to pick off the lighter ones. But we have not seen evolution create a species that had never before existed.

Nor—and some say this is the crux of the debate—are we precisely sure how speciation occurs. There is a wide scientific consensus that species evolve from each other, but the actual mechanism remains unknown.

These days, the controversy over the mechanism tends to center around a new theory called punctuated equilibrium. "Punk eke," as it is jazzily called, challenges Darwin's idea about the rate at which species change, in a way that, among other things, vastly alters the "feel" of the evolutionary process.

Basically, Darwin believed that a species changes gradually, at a relatively constant rate, by a series of imperceptibly tiny steps. The direction of its evolution is toward adaptation to the environment: as the environment changes so does the species. And Darwin thought that as environmental conditions are always slowly changing, most species, too, are changing all the time.

Darwin believed that nature was characterized by *plenitude.* He saw no environmental niches where species might be and weren't. Rather, he saw "a force like a hundred thousand wedges trying to force every kind of adapted structure into the gaps in the economy of nature, or rather forming the gaps by thrusting out the weaker ones." If some particular type of species didn't exist, there was a reason why. Darwin also thought nature was *balanced,* with every living kind constantly adjusting itself toward stable relations with every other living kind.

Punctuated equilibrium, on the other hand, maintains that species change in a burst of activity when a new one branches off from its parent species. This usually occurs when a seed population happens into a small, isolated, relatively safe environment, such as a lake or island. Once the new species has spun off from its parent type—a process called "speciation"—it tends to stop evolving. At some point, a new species might branch off from it. Stability, not change, is the norm, and evolution is full of niches and gaps where speciation might have occurred but chanced not to. To borrow the words of Steven Stanley, one of its principal exponents, punk eke implies "that there is not universally present on earth a tightly integrated balance of nature."

More interesting, though, than the particular disagreement between the Darwinian gradualists and the punctuated equilibriumists, is the total impossibility of ever resolving that disagreement. The futility of any effort to settle the differences between the two positions exposes an essential weakness at the center of each. That weakness is in the idea that Darwin dubbed "natural selection."

### Unnatural Selection

Every evolutionary theory, including both gradualism and punk eke, is some variation on the concept of natural selection. The trouble with natural selection, though—with any version of it—is that it doesn't tell you very much.

Natural selection can be summarized in the maxim "the survival of the fittest," which means that the organisms best suited to live and reproduce in any particular environment are the ones that take hold there and populate it. The problem with the survival of the fittest, though, is that you cannot know, in advance, which traits



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will improve a species' chances of surviving and reproducing—which will make it more "fit"—and which will not. You have to wait and see how every constellation of traits works out in actuality. This raises the question whether "the fit" are really only definable as "those who survive," making natural selection the theory of "the survival of those who survive"—a tautological and unusable idea.

The problem with natural selection is that every imaginable circumstance confirms it, including circumstances that contradict each other. Natural selection is utterly insusceptible of disproof—making it, by logical extension, never really provable either. If a species changes before our very eyes, the theory lets us assume the new kind is more fit than the old, and we can say "the fit are surviving." Similarly, if the species does not evolve, we can assume this means it is perfectly fit as it is, and we can still say "the fit are surviving." You can imagine no pattern of species change or non-change that would enable you to say "the less fit are surviving; the theory is disproven." As nothing can be true under any circumstances and still mean something, this makes natural selection an empty assertion.



"VERY WELL THEN, HANDS UP ALL THOSE WHO PROPOSE TO BECOME BIRDS."

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It is because of this weakness in the natural selection idea that disputes like the one between the gradualists and the punctualists are irresolvable. A passage in an essay by Mr. Stanley illustrates the chimerical quality of the punk eke debate. The traditional Darwinians, Mr. Stanley writes, claim that if a species is stable, that is only because it is either very well specialized or very broadly adapted, and not in need of change. It is not because the normal condition for a species is stability. Mr. Stanley responds, "There is no factual support for either of these allegations." He illustrates with some species that seem to make his case. What he cannot do, though, is disprove what the traditionalists are saying. Because all evolutionary statements are irrefutably logical, there can be "no factual support" for any one of them over any other.

The impossibility of pinning down natural selection perhaps explains a remark made at a recent seminar on evolution that was held at the Resident Associates program of the Smithsonian Institution. After a minute or two of persistent questioning on an evolutionary fine point, Joel Cracraft, associate professor of anatomy at the University of Illinois, exclaimed: "Look! There are probably 50 people in this room who call themselves evolutionists, and if you asked each one of them what evolution is, you'd probably get 50 different answers."

It would probably overstate the case to say—as some do—that natural selection is a pure tautology. We can't know which traits are fittest until we see what survives, but there might still be such a thing as objective fitness, even before nature does the weeding out.

But the tautological quality of natural selection does deny evolutionists any predictive powers. Dr. Leon Kass of the University of Chicago explains that the problem with natural selection is not so much that there is no truth to it, but that it "forces us into the retrospective. It is virtually impossible," he says, "to discuss the fitness of an organism prospectively." Natural selection, says Dr. Kass, is "sometimes a name for our ignorance."

Evolution is the best explanation for the origin of species, yet it leaves unanswered many questions. For instance, though evolution tells us that life arose from a certain combination of elements under certain conditions, it leaves us to wonder why these circumstances produce consciousness and others do not. It is hardly surprising that a theory that raises mysteries as great as this one continues to be embattled.

If improperly pursued, though, the study of evolution can be more seriously deficient even than this. Evolution is perhaps the most essential of all inquiries, for in seeking to discover where we are from, it also seeks to tell us, in one way, what we are. Yet though it may tell us what we are, it has no obvious lesson about what we are for. It is arguably dangerous for any discipline to expose a subject so fundamental as the origins of life without at all addressing—while even appearing, sometimes, to dismiss—this larger and more pressing question.

Just because evolutionists haven't done enough with this problem doesn't mean they cannot. That the positive moral lessons of the development of species are subtle and have been too little discussed does not mean they are not present and important. If we hope ever to make peace with evolution, the discipline, such as it is, must now turn its efforts in this direction. It is time to consider not only our origins, but also what our progress from them has meant.



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# CAN-DO GOVERNMENT

## Three Reagan Appointees Who Made a Difference

WILLIAM KRISTOL

William J. Bennett, James C. Miller III, and Thomas W. Pauken have defied the conventional wisdom about institutional paralysis in Washington. Neither Tip O'Neill nor career bureaucrats nor the *Washington Post* stopped these three Reagan appointees from translating their president's mandate into fundamental policy changes at the agencies they lead.

When Mr. Bennett took over the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) at the end of 1981, the agency was a roaring success by Washington standards: its budget had grown even faster than the norm during the 1970s. Unfortunately, there was no evidence that the humanities were better off as a result of these unfocused dollops of Federal spending. If anything, the NEH was aiding and abetting the shallowest and trendiest sorts of projects, those least likely to be of enduring value.

Three years later, the institution has been transformed. Its budget has been cut in real terms by 15 percent. The Division of Special Programs, which gave grants to such noted bastions of the humanities as labor unions and the National Organization for Women, has been eliminated. There is a new focus on restoring the vitality of core humanities disciplines: new guidelines for education grants promote basic courses in the humanities, and a successful new program provides summer seminars for secondary school teachers on great books or themes in the humanities.

Mr. Bennett has also played a role beyond the direct effect of NEH programs in reframing the public debate on education and the humanities toward a concern with excellence and with fundamentals. For example, his recent public request for lists of 10 works in the humanities that every high school student should read, and his argument that the knowledge of such works is more important than acquaintance with the latest trends, has strengthened the hand of "back-to-basics"-minded parents, teachers, and school board members throughout the nation.

If the NEH was drifting before Mr. Bennett took over, the Federal Trade Commission was self-destructing. Under the leadership of Naderite Michael Pertschuk, the FTC had become notorious as the "National Nanny" for its campaign against "unfair" advertising on children's TV programs; by 1981, when James C. Miller III replaced Mr. Pertschuk as Chairman, Congress had reserved for itself a legislative veto on all new FTC regulations, and had cut back on the agency's authority in various ways. In this respect, one might say that some of the Reagan Administration's work had already been done for it. But Mr. Miller was not content to preside over a relatively harmless FTC. He has moved aggressively to transform the FTC into an agency that promotes the free market by moving against government-created restrictions on competition, such as municipal taxi-licensing, and by speaking out for deregulation and free trade within the Federal government. More important, he has made the FTC an example of rulemaking based on serious economic analysis. No longer does a subjective judgment that certain business practices are "unfair or deceptive" justify government intervention and rulemaking; now the FTC requires solid evidence that consumers are actually harmed, and that the proposed remedy would improve the situation. Not only has this resulted in fewer but better cases being brought by the Commission, and in more emphasis on voluntary compliance than on rulemaking, it also has elevated the level of public understanding about the workings of the market, and the effects of government intervention on markets.

### Opening New Vistas

Another dramatic turnaround was engineered by Thomas W. Pauken at ACTION, the Federal volunteer agency. Mr. Pauken succeeded anti-war activist Sam Brown as director of ACTION; the director of VISTA, ACTION's most prominent component, had been Marge Tabankin, whose claim to fame was a comradely visit to Hanoi in 1972. Under these two, as one might expect, a good chunk of Federal volunteer funds were going to various New Left community organizing and advocacy organizations. Mr. Pauken has failed in his efforts to

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persuade Congress to abolish VISTA; but he has succeeded in reorienting a considerably smaller VISTA, and ACTION as a whole, away from left-wing politics.

Today ACTION focuses on voluntarism and self-help. A drug prevention program helps to enlist corporate leaders and money in supporting local parents' drug awareness efforts. In the Vietnam Veterans Leadership Program, veterans who have successfully re-established themselves in civilian life volunteer to help other veterans with problems stemming from their war experience. Mr. Pauken has not had the impact on the public debate in his field that Messrs. Bennett and Miller have had in theirs; but that is not due to any shortage of efforts on his part to articulate a theme of "voluntarism" as an alternative to liberal, dependency-creating social welfare policies. Rather, his lonely voice has been drowned out by others within the Administration determined to prove that the Reagan Administration is even more "generous" than its predecessors.



Bennett's Basics

### Governing Strategically

To the degree they have governed successfully, Messrs. Bennett, Miller, and Pauken all emphasize, it is because they have tried to govern strategically. This means first of all having certain fundamental objectives; as Mr. Pauken puts it, "You've got to have a strategy, and that means an agenda." This may seem too obvious to be worth saying; but few Reagan appointees have had a vision of what their agency should be doing, or have thought seriously about how to get there. Far more common is the simple desire to cut back on certain activities or the limited ambition to "manage" one's agency or department well.

All three of our political appointees distinguish their approach from either of these more common alternatives. Governing strategically is different from "good management," for example, because setting as one's goal "good management" means making no serious change in the direction of the agency. Furthermore, the attempt to "manage" non-controversially usually fails even on its own terms. According to John Agresto, Mr. Bennett's deputy, "It's those who try to make the least waves who get into the most trouble." They end up reacting to developments shaped by others, and fighting on others' terrain, at someone else's chosen time and place. And they end up being judged by criteria set by others.

The political appointee who tries to govern strategically, by contrast, not only has a substantive agenda; he articulates it clearly and publicly. Mr. Bennett offers this "first law" for political appointees: "Before someone else tells the world what you're doing, what you're about, get the bull by the horns and tell everyone—loudly and clearly and repeatedly—what it is you intend to do, and why you're doing it. You need, first and foremost, to articulate a vision of what the agency should be." This is because in politics, unlike football, there is no referee who makes sure you have a turn on offense. "If you don't act as if you had the ball, if you don't put yourself on the offensive, setting the terms of debate around your agency, then you're on the defensive, and that's no place to be."

One implication of this perspective is that the political executive ought not to be afraid of publicity—or controversy. Mr. Bennett does not mind being called "the outspoken chairman" of the NEH; Mr. Miller does not hesitate to say, "I don't make any bones about it—there's been a change of emphasis and philosophy at the Federal Trade Commission"; and Mr. Pauken does not worry when it is said that he "has made his share of enemies" while transforming ACTION. All three regard publicity, and controversy, more as a tool than as a threat—but only because they have attended to framing the terms of debate in which the controversy will be reported. This, in turn, requires that the appointee have what Mr. Miller calls an "intellectual framework" that governs his actions within his agency but that also provides a basis for explaining and defending them. As Mr. Miller puts it, "Loyalty and good instincts are not enough. Without an intellectual framework either you get captured and don't get much done—or you get in a lot of trouble."

It is this framework that seems to distinguish Mr. Miller from, say, Anne Burford, President Reagan's first administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. As one sympathetic Administration official explains, "She knew she was supposed to change things, to be more pro-business, but she didn't have ideas of her own. So she would ask the bureaucracy for options and then choose the most pro-business one that was given her. She wasn't able to redefine the agenda; and in the end the



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**It's Miller time at the FTC**

bureaucracy and the media destroyed her." In reaction to Mrs. Burford's fate, many appointees who would have to be judged loyal Reaganites ran for cover: better to go native than to be eaten by them.

Messrs. Bennett, Miller, and Pauken avoided both these fates. All three wanted to cut back on certain activities of their agencies, but all found, in Mr. Pauken's words, that "you can't beat something with nothing." Having "something" does not necessarily mean having initiatives of one's own to propose, though that may help; it does mean articulating clearly and publicly a new understanding of the mission, a new governing philosophy of one's agency. Only by doing this does the political executive give himself a fighting chance not to be judged by the standard of whether he is liked by the relevant interest group network in Washington, or by the standard of whether what he does corresponds to the conventional (liberal) wisdom.

**Taming The Press**

Is the press sufficiently open-minded to permit a successful reframing of the debate? Mr. Miller comments ruefully that reporters prove the dictum that "A little knowledge is a dangerous thing." But he agrees with Mr. Bennett that, at least in the case of the print media, the conservative political executive will on the whole be treated fairly if he can make a coherent and credible case. And he increases his chances of being treated well if he remembers that the press wants news—which means interesting stories. Mr. Bennett saw that asking for lists of books that every high school student should have read would be an interesting story; and the coverage of that story did as much to further his agenda of fostering a kind of back-to-basics movement in the humanities as any of the NEH's grants or any of his formal speeches.

Of course, the only thing the press likes more than an interesting story is a scandal. This means, Mr. Pauken says, that conservatives sometimes have to resist the temptation to have their offices redecorated. It also means that they have to ensure that there is no disjunction between what is said internally and what is said externally. Since everything in Washington will eventually come out, and since the press loves to think of itself as "exposing" the nasty truth beneath the high-toned rhetoric, honesty does turn out to be, to a surprising degree, the best policy. Messrs. Bennett, Miller, and Pauken are all known for their candor, and they all recommend a policy of clearly proclaiming one's purpose, and then making operations conform to the statement of purpose. As Mr. Bennett notes, Reagan appointees do have the advantage that the public tends to agree with their purposes; therefore they can usually survive attacks on their statements of purpose, and on actions taken in accord with such statements. They do get in trouble when they are timid about publicly proclaiming their intentions, and then the press can expose a disjunction between stated policy and actual policy.

**Motivating Civil Servants**

One great advantage of redefining the terms of public debate is the effect this has within the agency. Mr. Bennett says that the best way to get NEH employees to work implementing a new idea is to announce to the press in advance that this is what the Endowment is doing. Professionalism and pride that their agency is doing something newsworthy may lead civil servants to cooperate, even if they disagree with much of the political appointee's program. By instituting new programs in line with a mission that has been reasonably articulated, and by giving career employees opportunities to help make these programs successes, Mr. Bennett has found it possible to marshal cooperation and even support from the civil service. Mr. Bennett also, to be sure, took advantage of the fact that though career civil servants are very hard to fire, they are easy to transfer at the same grade level; he used this mechanism to break up old loyalties and vested interests. But on the whole Mr. Bennett has found the civil service so "governable" that he has brought in only five or six political appointees to join a professional staff of about 250.

More than Mr. Bennett, Mr. Miller brought aboard his own team of top appointees at the beginning, people who shared the same general point of view and who were committed to his program. But he, too, says he was pleasantly surprised by how unresistant the career employees were: "I thought 80 percent of the career staff would be ideologically opposed; in fact the number was more like 20 percent." And though he has been tough in dealing with civil servants when necessary, Mr. Miller says he is struck by how useful it is to spend time, at brown bag lunches and seminars, working to convince the career staff that his policies are intellectually correct—that they really will help consumers more over the long run. Miller also notes that he stood on principle against efforts of many, including Republicans, in Congress to strip the FTC of the authority to enforce the



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Thomas Pauken (left) with Vietnam veteran.

antitrust and consumer protection laws against the learned professions and city governments. His opposition, he says, was very important in winning a hearing for himself, and building support within the Commission.

Mr. Pauken inherited a group of career employees who were more ideological, and less professional, than either of the others. He therefore had to bring more political appointees into key line positions, using "Schedule B"—a civil service shortcut for hiring people with special skills—to bring in loyalists, and had to do more in the way of transferring and even firing civil servants in order to establish control over the agency. As if this were not enough, Mr. Pauken also had to fight hard with the White House to resist ACTION's being used as a "dumping ground" for loyal Reaganites, regardless of background or qualifications. Yet in the end, by sticking to his guns Mr. Pauken was able to hire a remarkable crew of associates, many of whom had little or no government experience and little in the way of political connections, almost all of whom have since moved onward and upward in the Reagan Administration. By spending his first few months establishing internal control, rather than setting out on speaking tours as suggested by the career staff, he was also able to find out which career employees were willing to work with him, and which could not. Once most of the career civil servants saw, Pauken says, that he was not simply there to trash the agency, most came around, and "a good working relationship" now exists.

Indeed, as one of Mr. Pauken's former deputies points out, it may well be that activists like Messrs. Bennett, Miller, and Pauken get more cooperation from the civil service than would a "good manager." Civil servants are paid to manage, and they resent the claim by businessmen that they are going to come in and, for the first time, impose sound management practices. As long as the political appointee gives civil servants a chance to participate in implementing his program, most of them will be reasonably hospitable to the efforts of the political appointee to change the agenda of the agency. After all, even civil servants will admit, that is what we have political appointees for.

### Candor, Cleverness, and Congress

Getting control of the agency requires what Mr. Bennett calls the "will to administer"—the willingness to pay attention to detail, to personnel, to all of the boring chores that translate broad policies into real programs. But even a combination of the broad vision and the will to administer would be insufficient if Congress made the successful governance of an executive agency impossible. Mr. Pauken's efforts to kill VISTA, Mr. Bennett's attempt to cut the budget further and to shift more funds from media programs to educational ones, and Mr. Miller's proposal to change the FTC's enabling legislation have all been thwarted by Congress. But all have nonetheless been successful in generally reshaping their agencies in accord with their new agendas. How?

Here again all three emphasize the importance of being able and willing to make a case and defend it, both in general terms and in its concrete implications. Most Congressmen are not spoiling for a fight with an articulate and confident defender of a particular vision of an agency. Of course that vision must fall within the legislative mandate, but most legislative mandates are sufficiently broad that executive officials have room to maneuver. Thus when Mr. Miller decided that Congress could not be persuaded to narrow the FTC's authority to police



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"deceptive" trade practices, the Commission was able to issue a policy protocol on deception administratively. And though Congress has saved VISTA, Mr. Pauken has succeeded in changing its character.

These three men also consistently sing the praises of candor and straightforwardness. Mr. Bennett stresses in particular the inadvisability of putting oneself in the situation of making deals with particular Congressmen, citing Senator Jacob Javits's admonition that "if you dance with one, you have to dance with everybody," and your freedom of action is lost. Thus when one Congressman asked Mr. Bennett to ensure that a particular applicant receive a grant, Mr. Bennett responded that he would be happy to oblige—and would publicly announce that this applicant's proposal had not been judged worthy, but that he was nonetheless receiving support because of the intervention of Congressman X. Mr. Miller tells a similar story of more gently rebuffing an attempt to sway his vote on a case; and both say they have not been bothered again.

Of course, candor does not preclude a degree of cleverness in dealing with Congress. When Mr. Bennett refused to submit affirmative action goals to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, he came under fire from Representative Cardiss Collins, chair of the House subcommittee that monitors "equal opportunity" practices in the Federal government. Representative Collins demanded a list of the race and sex of all NEH panelists. Mr. Bennett responded that the NEH did not keep records of this; but wary of the trap of seeming to be "obstructionist," he sent all panelists a letter explaining Representative Collins's demand, and inviting them—as a matter of choice—to identify their race and sex. Mr. Bennett thus brought home his point about the indignity of quotas, and rallied political support behind him, while complying with the Congresswoman's request. But the key here, as in other areas, was the willingness to go public in defense of one's principles.

In the course of berating Mr. Bennett for his stand on quotas, Representative Collins threatened to cut the NEH's budget. But in this respect, as Mr. Bennett points out, most conservative political appointees have a peculiar advantage in dealing with Congress: they often want lower budgets than Congress has given them. The reason most political appointees are captured by congressional committees is that they are first captured by their own agencies; those who view their job as moving their agency toward certain policy goals, rather than as increasing their agency's budget, can resist congressional pressure much more easily.

But resisting all of the pressures for accomodation is not easy. These men happen to have strong beliefs and forceful character; without these they would not have set out to transform their agencies in the first place. But though each of them is too loyal to complain about it, one learns from talking to others that in its first term at least, the Reagan Administration did little to support or reward the attempt by some of its appointees to take seriously the job of carrying through the President's program. The chances of more such appointees being willing to resist all the pressures in the second term would seem to depend on a White House commitment both to recruiting such individuals and to supporting them.

"An agency can be run effectively with a conservative philosophy," says Thomas Pauken. This claim must be vindicated before the American people will be willing to give that philosophy a hearing for more fundamental changes. ☎



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
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The Corporate Social Responsibility Debate
by Douglas J. Den Uyl
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


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# The World According to Kirkpatrick

## Is Ronald Reagan Listening?

Adam Wolfson

When Jeane Jordan was 20 and a student at Barnard College, her father talked to her about the young men she was dating. One of her suitors was Catholic, the other Jewish, and her father, a Protestant from Texas, said he would be happy to welcome either as a son-in-law. "But daughter," he warned, "don't you dare bring home a Republican!"

A native of Duncan, Oklahoma, Miss Jordan was born into the Democratic Party. "My grandparents, parents, aunts, uncles were all Democrats," she says. And she did not let her family down. She went on to graduate work in political science at Columbia University, and in 1955 she married Evron Kirkpatrick, a close friend and adviser of that quintessential liberal Democrat, Senator Hubert Humphrey. "I married into Humphrey circles," Mrs. Kirkpatrick later told a reporter, and she has actively involved herself in the Democratic Party ever since: as a founder of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, a Scoop Jackson delegate in 1976, and a participant on the Democratic National Convention's National Commission on Party Structure and Presidential Nomination (1975–78). In her youth she was a great admirer of Harry Truman, who is still her favorite American President.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick's foreign policy address before the Republican convention last summer was therefore an extraordinary political event. Here was a Humphrey-Truman Democrat, enthusiastically greeted by a floor demonstration lasting several minutes, cataloguing how the "San Francisco Democrats" had betrayed her political heritage. A generation ago, Democratic politicians urged Americans to "ask what you can do for your country." Now, she thundered, they blame America first. There was no better symbol of the profound changes in the foreign policy of the Democratic Party since the days of Truman and Kennedy and Humphrey, and of the eagerness of the Republican Party—and particularly conservatives—to welcome disaffected Democrats into the fold.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick's appearance was also an important symbol of another sort. Here was the most prominent woman in the Reagan Administration—the ambassador to the United Nations—giving a major address on world affairs that highlighted, by contrast, the inexperience and naivete of Geraldine Ferraro. What better way to demonstrate which party takes women more seriously?

But what is astonishing, and dismaying, is that Mrs. Kirkpatrick was very nearly prevented by Reagan campaign officials from speaking for more than a few minutes at the convention. She faced similar resistance throughout Reagan's first term. When William Clark moved to the Department of the Interior in 1983, her bid for the post of National Security Adviser was defeated, reportedly as a result of the strenuous opposition of Secretary of State George Shultz and White House Chief of Staff James Baker. According to a close friend of hers, only a last minute maneuver by Mrs. Kirkpatrick enabled her to brief President Reagan before his television debate on foreign policy. Though she has not yet resigned from her position at the U.N. it is clear that only a second term position with greater access to the president will convince Mrs. Kirkpatrick to remain in the Reagan Administration.

For conservatives, who would have liked to have seen Mrs. Kirkpatrick as National Security Adviser or even Secretary of State, her departure would be a terrible loss. Richard Viguerie, publisher of *Conservative Digest,* has said that Mrs. Kirkpatrick is "second only to the President himself in giving the Administration a sense of purpose and direction." Lewis Lehrman, chairman of the grass roots organization Citizens for America, says: "She is President Reagan's strongest and most passionate voice on behalf of freedom in this hemisphere and throughout the world."

Over the past four years, she has forcefully articulated a vision of America's unique mission in the world and she has unapologetically condemned Soviet imperialism. In the process she has reshaped the basic assumptions of America's foreign policy.

### A Cold Warrior

Kirkpatrick argues without apologies that a strong American defense is morally justifiable and, moreover, morally necessary. Unlike the liberal left, she begins with

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Drawing by Bill Bramhall for *Policy Review*.



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the conviction that America is a good society. She locates America in the Western liberal democratic tradition emphasizing freedom, liberty, and respect for the individual, as opposed to all forms of tyranny which seek to subordinate the rights of the individual to the group. To Mrs. Kirkpatrick, the United States is not merely part of this democratic tradition—it is its heir, its primary bearer in an otherwise tyrannical world. This she explains,

> enables us to understand that it is morally legitimate to be concerned about the strength of the United States; that it is a moral imperative to interpret substantive threats to our national interest and security as threats to our shared civilization and our most fundamental values.

Critics have charged that Mrs. Kirkpatrick believes all means are justified in the defense of American interests. But she denies this. She told *Policy Review* that just as American interests are the product of the values of our liberal democracy, so our means must also be "consistent with those values and morals that we seek to protect."

Mrs. Kirkpatrick is an unrepentant cold warrior. She has written that the Soviet Union is motivated by a "strategy of domination" that "derives from a tradition of Oriental despotism, from czarist synthesis of economic, social, and bureaucratic state power . . . the consequence is tyranny."

"From the fall of Saigon in 1975 until January 1981," Mrs. Kirkpatrick declared at the Republican National Convention, "Soviet influence expanded dramatically—into Laos, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen, Libya, Syria, Aden, Congo, Madagascar, Seychelles, and Grenada." She likens the refusal of the West to recognize and respond to this threat to "those famous monkeys who hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil." Although one faces intellectual ostracism for uttering the words "Cold War," Mrs. Kirkpatrick in a celebrated interview with George Urban in *Encounter* avoids all euphemisms:

> We are unfortunately not fully at peace with the Soviet Union. We are engaged in a serious and potentially deadly competition that is not a shooting war. That is all. 'Cold War' strikes me as a highly adequate description.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick has popularized the distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian dictatorships. In a 1979 *Commentary* article, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," she wrote that "traditional authoritarian governments are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies, that they are more susceptible of liberalization and that they are more compatible with U.S. interests." Yet she denies the charge that this is a rationalization for U.S. support of right-wing dictatorships. " 'Dictatorships and Double Standards' was not about whom the United States should align itself with," she says, but about how one builds democracy, and the danger of destabilizing governments—as she contends Jimmy Carter did in Iran and Nicaragua.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick argues that the United States should cooperate with other countries "on the basis of enduring values and contemporary strategic needs." Skeptical that building democracy can be a workable foreign policy goal, she says in reference to the Philippines today, "It is certainly not a time to destabilize Marcos. The first thing we should think about with the Philippines is our own national security."

Mrs. Kirkpatrick's most controversial position has been her defense of the use of U.S. power in Central America and the Caribbean. She does not necessarily favor the sending of U.S. troops (see the symposium on the Soviet conflict in this issue) but she believes the United States must provide economic and military aid to counter an imminent threat to our security and to our values from that region.

Central America and the Caribbean, she believes, are vital to our own immediate defense and "therefore, to the defense of Western civilization." The United States cannot continue to play a major role in the defense of the free world if we face security threats on our borders.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick does not attribute the turmoil in Central America to economic or social inequities. On the contrary, she argues, the peoples of that region were enjoying remarkable economic progress until the area was ravaged by war. Poverty does not start revolution, revolutionaries do, and in Central America, she maintains, the upheaval was started by Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries trained and financed by Cuba and the Soviet Union. In her view, the people of the Caribbean and Central America "have become deeply involved in a struggle between—let us not be afraid to say it—democracy and totalitarianism, between the free world and the only empire in the contemporary world."

Critics have pointed out that Somoza and Marcos are hardly examples of supporters of the free world. Mrs. Kirkpatrick responds that "no matter how miserable the people of the region have been under their traditional governments, they will be more miserable under Communist governments." But "That does not mean . . . that I am supporting moderately repressive regimes in Central America or anyplace else. It does mean, however, that morally responsible people recognize that there are degrees of evil."

**Sisyphus at the U.N.**

Mrs. Kirkpatrick has found her post at the U.N. anything but easy: defending American interests and Western values against relentless attack, fighting to prevent the expulsion of Israel, and denouncing the United Nations' hypocritical fixation on South Africa. Her frequently harsh criticism of the U.N. has led many commentators to conclude that she favors U.S. withdrawal. In fact, the opposite is true. Mrs. Kirkpatrick takes the U.N., its functions, its representatives, and its edicts, no matter how outlandish, with the utmost seriousness. "It is not enlightened or generous or responsible for the United States to be indifferent to what transpires in great international fora," she explains. "It is our duty to try in all appropriate ways to strengthen freedom and human rights and to promote the values of the U.N. Charter—the reason for our initial sponsorship of, and present


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membership in, the United Nations." Her belief in the importance of the world body is reflected by her personal commitment. The average tenure of U.S. permanent representatives to the U.N. has been 18 months; Mrs. Kirkpatrick has stayed four years.

**"At the U.N. the United States could be isolated and humiliated at will . . . we smiled and other nations kicked us in the teeth."**

Mrs. Kirkpatrick believes that our isolation at the U.N. "is above all a political failure, a failure to defend our democratic values, and a failure to defend ourselves." She recalls that when she first arrived at the U.N. in 1981, "The United States could be isolated and humiliated at will . . . we smiled and other nations kicked us in the teeth." Mrs. Kirkpatrick has reversed this trend by making it clear that the United States takes the U.N. seriously. For example, each summer before the General Assembly went into session, she and her team at the U.N. let every nation know what issues and votes the United States considered crucial to its interests.

Nor has she been afraid to defend the United States or its interests against attack. She described a speech by the Foreign Minister from Ethiopia as "an extreme example of what is known as the Orwellian inversion of the truth." She declared that what the government of Nicaragua really wants is not democracy but "the right of repression of its own people with impunity and with immunity from any consequences thereof." And she noted of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that "The effort to subjugate the Afghan people and to impose upon them a form of alien and totalitarian rule has been marked by a degree of violence against the population that is exceeded in the recent past only by the terrible tragedy in Cambodia."

Mrs. Kirkpatrick also encouraged the U.S. Congress to require the State Department to provide annual reviews of voting patterns at the U.N. Congress is now aware, for example, that over 60 nations receiving U.S. aid (including Egypt, India, Greece, Spain, and Pakistan) voted to condemn the U.S. rescue mission in Grenada.

Her impact in the U.N. has been significant, but whether it will last beyond her tenure is uncertain. Since her arrival, the effort to expel Israel from the U.N. has lost steam, Cuba's decade-long effort to list Puerto Rico as a colony of the U.S. has decisively failed, and in the past year the Soviet Union has been forced to use its veto in the Security Council as often as the United States. "We are not a power," concludes Mrs. Kirkpatrick, "but now we get taken into account." Most important, Mrs. Kirkpatrick has shown that the United States can succeed in the U.N., if we are willing to defend ourselves and our values.

**Democrat for Life?**

Mrs. Kirkpatrick finds herself at odds with the "San Francisco Democrats" on foreign and domestic policy issues. A fierce anti-Communist, she finds the isolationist and accommodationist policies of today's liberals unacceptable. As she declared at the Republican National Convention this summer:

> When the San Francisco Democrats treat foreign affairs as an afterthought, as they did, they behaved less like a dove or a hawk than like an ostrich—convinced it could shut out the world by hiding its head in the sand.

Her philosophic differences with the Democrats on domestic issues are also profound. She generally opposes the use of government power to effect social change. In an article, "Why We Don't Become Republicans," published in *Commonsense,* she contrasts her traditional liberalism with the philosophy of the "new liberals."

> Traditional liberals see it (government power), as an unwarranted use of regulatory power which progressively narrows the scope of individual freedom, undermines the society's most basic values, and intrudes government's heavy hand into many subjects remote from its appropriate concern—from school busing to boys' choirs; from hiring and firing to football.

Looking back at Reagan's domestic record over the past four years, Mrs. Kirkpatrick says she is completely comfortable with it. On abortion, she says, "I do not think that abortion is the worst evil imaginable, but the opposite of that is also true; I do not believe that abortion should be publicly advanced or casually available; abortion is always tragic." On ERA, Mrs. Kirkpatrick believes it is a means to an end of which she approves, but not the only, and certainly not the best means available. And on the issue of raising taxes she takes the "death and taxes" view that they are a necessary evil.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick does harbor some lingering doubts about Republicans. She is primarily concerned that Republicans have no vision of the public good. She believes that "The burden of libertarianism that has been associated with the Republican Party is not articulated in a way that expresses even a minimal concern for the whole." On the other hand, the past four years have undoubtedly diminished some of her doubts. She mentions Ronald Reagan, George Will, and Irving Kristol as persons who have made great progress in expressing a broader vision of the public good.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick, if she returns to private life, will write a book on her often raucous experiences at the U.N., and then return to teaching at Georgetown University. Political observers agree, however, that Mrs. Kirkpatrick is no flash in the pan and will continue to play a prominent role in Republican politics. In a recent television interview, Congressman Jack Kemp was asked how he would feel about having Mrs. Kirkpatrick as *his* running mate in 1988. "I would be honored," he replied, "to serve on *her* ticket."



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# Capitol Punishment

## How to Survive A Senate Confirmation Hearing

Charlotte Hays

"The thing you've got to remember about Washington," says veteran lobbyist Tom Korologos, "is that it's a lot like Salem—they love a lynching." Increasingly they love confirmation hearings in the U.S. Senate.

Once upon a time, these hearings were humdrum affairs. No longer. Confirmation hearings for some of Ronald Reagan's first term appointees were more like inquisitions than Capitol Hill proceedings. Ernest Lefever, Reagan's ill-fated nominee for the State Department's human rights slot, defended himself against accusations of racism made by his own brother. Attorney General-designate Edwin Meese saw the minute details of his finances aired publicly. When Leslie Lenkowsky was fighting to be confirmed as deputy director of the United States Information Agency (USIA), he attracted so much hostile press that his wife was brusquely asked by the administrator of a school for dyslexic children, "Why should we admit your son? Are you going to be around in September?"

A staff member for a Democratic senator intimately involved in several confirmation battles of the last four years, blames the controversy on the quality of Ronald Reagan's nominees. But clearly something else is at work here. A Common Cause study of confirmation hearings during Jimmy Carter's Administration was aptly headlined "The Senate Rubberstamp Machine." Bert Lance was confirmed as Director of the Office of Management and Budget but later resigned when he was accused of conflicts of interest. He was later cleared of any legal wrongdoing, but had he received the scrutiny accorded Reagan appointees, he might never have made it to OMB.

The U.S. Senate enjoys the privilege of giving "advice and consent" to presidential appointments. But until recently, it acted on the presumption that a U.S. president is entitled to his men. Confirmation hearings were deadly dull. Since 1789, only six Cabinet nominees have failed to get the Senate's nod, and in-depth probes of candidates for lesser offices have also been rare. The sea change in the Senate's attitude is, like so much else in public life, a legacy of the Nixon years.

Appointments to the Supreme Court, unlike other cases, always attracted a great deal of attention. But Nixon's 1969 choice of Judge Clement F. Haynesworth, a courtly strict constructionist, met an unprecedented storm of opposition. Civil rights activists and officials from the AFL-CIO lined up to fight Judge Haynesworth's confirmation. A fairly insignificant conflict of interest finally tipped the scales: Judge Haynesworth had once written an opinion favorable to a large corporation that did business with a vending machine firm in which he held stock. Many legal scholars have lamented his defeat.

It was the Senate Commerce Committee under Chairman Warren G. Magnuson that developed the confirmation hearing as an art form. After Nixon's landslide reelection in 1972, Democrats on the committee feared that he would appoint anti-regulatory businessmen to fill vacancies on regulatory agencies. Several months before Nixon's second term, the committee staff heard that Nixon intended to appoint Robert Morris, a San Francisco oil and gas lawyer, to the Federal Power Commission.

Led by Chief Counsel Michael Pertschuk, later head of the Federal Trade Commission, the staff set about subverting Mr. Morris's chances. They composed a list of policy-related questions for Mr. Morris to answer. A reply on the deregulation of natural gas cost him the support of crucial conservative senators, and he was voted down—the first rejection of a regulatory appointment since 1950. From then on, all regulatory nominees were required to fill out complicated questionnaires about substantive issues. They had to submit public financial disclosures, and professional investigators would go over their records with a fine-toothed comb.

Some of Jimmy Carter's nominees were roughed up on Capitol Hill, for instance disarmer Paul Warnke and Attorney General Griffin Bell, but they mostly escaped with their reputations intact. When President Reagan threatened radical changes in the course of government, his opponents picked up the gauntlet. They decided to knock down, or at least bully, any vulnerable appointees who came their way.

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Charlotte Hays *is a freelance writer living in Washington.*



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


"I'll say this for Adelman; he has a good strong head on his shoulders!"

Although the real battles of confirmation hearings are conducted over policy or ideology, senators generally prefer to attack on points of character. The reason is obvious: vetoing an apparently unsuitable person looks better than refusing a duly elected Chief Executive the right to choose his government. Senate staffers used Leslie Lenkowsky's hearings, for instance, to criticize policy and management changes at the USIA. The spotlight, however, was focused on charges that Mr. Lenkowsky was not telling the full truth about a procedural matter. When Kenneth Adelman was picked for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a massive forum on Reagan's nuclear policy. But much of the time was taken up with such matters as whether Mr. Adelman had flouted Zaire's export rules to acquire his collection of African art.

### Hidden Hazards

Can a nominee predict if he'll stir up a controversy? "What you look for is not the number of people against you, but their intensity and passion," suggested Larry Smith, who became a connoisseur of confirmation hearings during 14 years as an administrative aide to Senators Gary Hart and John Stennis. (He is now a fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.) Ernest Lefever, archfoe of the reigning human rights dogma, was bound to cause a tempest. Rights activists testified against him at the hearings, including Argentine torture victim Jacobo Timerman, who showed up waving a copy of his book *Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number*. A newspaper bulletin captured the charged atmosphere: "Rights Victim is Potent Presence As Senators Assess Reagan Choice."

The Lefever nomination points up another rule: a potential dismantler of an agency simply will not receive the approbation of the U.S. Senate. In an article published in *Policy Review* in 1978, "The Trivialization of Human Rights," Mr. Lefever urged Americans to "recognize the political and moral limits of promoting particular reforms in other societies." At his confirmation hearings, Mr. Lefever admitted he had "goofed" when he earlier urged Congress to abolish human rights statutes. But his opponents were relentless. Although ideology was the issue, he was attacked with a touchy question about contributions from the Nestlé Company to the Ethics and Public Policy Center, Mr. Lefever's Washington think-tank.

A delay in the hearings is a signal to the sharks that there's a scent of blood on a nominee. "Once you start having your knees knocked together," says Kenneth Adelman, "you are giving everybody who's against you all kinds of incentives." An originally friendly senator can be peeled off, as Charles Percy reportedly was during Mr. Lenkowsky's ordeal.

A nominee can't do that much to push his cause during a hearing, but one thing he can and must do is to display his political allies as prominently as possible. "When it was just me and [W. Scott] Thompson testifying on the first day," Mr. Lenkowsky ruefully recalled, "I didn't have a single friendly senator in the room." (Mr. Thompson is the former USIA official who alleged that Mr. Lenkowsky had lied to the Senate about his role in drawing up a speakers' blacklist. Mr. Lenkowsky strongly denies the charge.) Mr. Adelman says that one fervent champion is better than 10 lukewarm senators; his prospects brightened considerably after Rudy Boschwitz, originally hostile, rallied to his banner.



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"A nomination will not go through unless the nominee has the support of the ranking member of the president's party," contends Mr. Lefever, whose sponsor was S.I. Hayakawa, hardly a Senate powerhouse. A number of Republicans ran into trouble because Republican senators simply didn't stick to the President's men, the egregious example being Charles Percy, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. (Senator Percy opposed Messrs. Lenkowsky and Lefever but went along with Mr. Adelman.)

A nomination is practically assured if the White House puts its own prestige on the line. Kenneth Adelman's ultimate weapon was Ronald Reagan. Reagan engaged in extensive arm-twisting on Mr. Adelman's behalf. "When Senators picked up the phone," an ACDA official says, "the old man was on the other end." A former White House counsel avers, "If I knew what makes the White House decide when to fight like a wolverine, I'd be a rich consultant." A defeat in Mr. Adelman's case, all agree, would have made Reagan look weak.

Another source of potential problems can be the nominee's own words. When Senator Claiborne Pell asked Mr. Adelman if nuclear war could be contained, Mr. Adelman replied that he didn't know. As true as the answer was, it didn't come across quite right on the evening news. In retrospect, Mr. Adelman wishes he'd simply avoided the issues and spoken emotionally about his fear of nuclear holocaust. "Don't study gobs of information," he teasingly advises a hypothetical nominee, "because it's all emoting, how sincere you are. If you're going to be Secretary of the Interior, you should talk about how much you like little mooses."

Tom Korologos, who was Senate liaison for Presidents Nixon and Ford and director of congressional relations for the Reagan transition team, (he is now vice president of Timmons & Company), offers another rubric: never, *never* take an interim appointment. "I tell all my appointees," he says, "don't set foot inside the building until you're confirmed. It's an insult to the senators if you start measuring the desk." The senators own the nominee until he's safely confirmed; a certain amount of kowtowing is expected. Mr. Korologos once ordered a finicky nominee who balked at a southern senator's breakfast fare: "Eat the grits if you want to be confirmed."

Aside from considerations of etiquette, an appointee who violates this rule is likely to rack up a performance record that will be used against him. Mr. Lenkowsky, for instance, as Acting Deputy Director of the USIA, became embroiled in a sticky dispute about his involvement in what came to be called a blacklist. It was a list of speakers no longer eligible to be sent abroad on the USIA speakers' program. Mr. Lenkowsky wittily attributed the list to the efforts of "mindless gnomes" in the bureaucracy during an interview with columnist James J. Kilpatrick. Very funny, but Mr. Korologos thinks the quip inspired peeved bureaucrats to cooperate in Mr. Lenkowsky's downfall.

**Beating the System**

Is the process getting out of hand? "I tell my nominees," says Mr. Korologos, "that the Constitution stops at the door of the hearing room. It's not a fair and equal confrontation. The deck is stacked." Unlike a defendant in a court of law, a presidential nominee isn't guaranteed any Miranda rule or Fifth Amendment rights. There are growing worries that genuinely talented people will hesitate to come forward for government jobs.

The major battles of the next four years will come when Reagan tries to win confirmation for his Supreme Court choices. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was treated with kid gloves; gender was her ace in the hole. But future nominees won't have it as easy as Justice O'Connor did, or to cite another case, Justice Lewis Powell in 1970. "Judge," a senator is reported to have told him, "we're not going to confirm you because we like you. We're going to confirm you because you're old." ☎



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# BUREAUCRACY vs. ENVIRONMENT




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*Foreword by PAUL W. MacAVOY*

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


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# Shall I Compare Thee to a Plumber's Pay?

## Comparable Worth Collapses

Phyllis Schlafly

"Comparable worth" is one of the few new ideas the liberals have come up with in the last several years. But just because it is a new idea doesn't mean it has merit.

The advocates of comparable worth want to throw out the system of wage setting that has produced the highest wages for the most people of any economic system in the history of the world. They want to replace it with a totally untried system under which they would set wages for everyone according to their notions of "pay equity." The fact that pay equity can be defined according to any standard one chooses apparently doesn't matter, since the comparable worth advocates plan on using their political muscle and litigating lawyers to establish their definition at any cost.

The term "comparable worth" is based on the notion that wages should not be fixed by the marketplace, but by a point system based on (1) a subjective evaluation of job worth plus (2) a comparison of different kinds of jobs held mostly by women with jobs held mostly by men, and then (3) using litigation or legislation to mandate the system.

Since it is unlikely that people will agree on allocations of specific numerical points for such imprecise factors as "accountability" and "mental demands," the bottom line is that wages would be fixed by judges or bureaucrats. It's hard to conceive of a more radical attack on the private enterprise system.

Comparable worth is deceptively dangerous because it is packaged as "women's rights." Interviews with many congressmen and state legislators confirm that they signed on as co-sponsors of comparable worth bills after being intimidated by such questions as "Aren't you for pay equity for women?" and "Don't you support equal pay for women? Then sign here." Few legislators gave what would have been the appropriate retort, "I support equal pay for equal work but I do not support equal pay for UNequal work."

Comparable worth bills were introduced into Congress and some two dozen state legislatures during 1983 and 1984. Some bills sought to impose the comparable worth concept on private industry; others limited their effect to public employees, but their advocates readily admitted that this was only the first step toward regulating the entire wage system. The essential component of all these bills was to order a study of salaries and wages, something which sounds harmless because ordering a study is a traditional technique by which legislators dispose of controversial items.

### Washington's Billion-Dollar Boondoggle

Then a blockbuster hit business, legal, and political circles on December 14, 1983. U.S. District Judge Jack E. Tanner in Tacoma, Washington, handed down a 42-page decision endorsing a "comparable worth compensation system." Washington State's Assistant Attorney General, Clark Davis, commented that this ruling would "jeopardize the pay scale of every employer in the country." From his work on the case, Mr. Davis was well aware that the strategy of the comparable worth advocates is "public employers today, private industry tomorrow."

Judge Tanner decided for the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and against the State of Washington based on a job evaluation study which had assigned points to all Washington State employees. The study concluded that (female) laundry workers should be paid equally with (male) truck drivers because they were assigned the same number of points; and that, based on points, (female) librarians should be paid about twice as much as (male) carpenters and chemists. The cost to Washington State taxpayers to implement the study's recommendations under the court's decision is estimated to be $1 billion.

The lesson of the Washington State case is mind-boggling: it is that the conclusions of the evaluators are binding on the employer. Judge Tanner bluntly told Washington State: By ordering the study, the state "knew its employees would be entitled to pay commensurate with their evaluated worth. Any other conclusion defies reason."

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Phyllis Schlafly, *founder and president of Eagle Forum, is the editor of* Equal Pay for UNequal Work, *and author of* A Choice, Not an Echo.



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The lesson of the *AFSCME v. State of Washington* decision was not lost on cost-conscious legislators and governors in other states. The most effective argument to defeat comparable worth bills became, "If you commission a study, you are buying a lawsuit." This threat helped to defeat a bill for a $400,000 study of wage equity in the Illinois Legislature. Missouri legislators defeated a bill that would have required the state to make a three-year job evaluation and then equalize salaries for "comparable" jobs.

In some states, a comparable worth bill was already on the governor's desk before the lesson of the Washington State case was fully understood. Iowa Governor Terry Branstad used his line-item veto to mitigate the impact of the bill by keeping the authority to handle all complaints in the executive branch; and California Governor George Deukmejian vetoed a $76 million allocation for comparable worth adjustments to equalize salaries of women and men. Later he vetoed a bill to establish a commission to make a study on pay equity. Those who successfully urged this veto pointed out that, since public salaries have a big impact on private salaries, comparable worth would give California an uncompetitive business climate.

UPI/Bettmann Archive

Comparable Worthniks want to lower her pay.

### Illinois Nurses Its Wounds

The truth of the perception that "if the legislature commissions a study, it is buying a lawsuit" is indicated by the Illinois experience. First, the Illinois Legislature was sweet-talked into giving an extra $10,000 to the feminist dominated Commission on the Status of Women for the purpose of a token study on job discrimination among state employees. The study was controlled by comparable worth advocates, carried out under their terms, with personnel of their choosing. Predictably, the study reported that nurses were paid less than men in jobs to which the evaluators had assigned the same number of points.

A few days after the study was completed, the Illinois Nurses Association filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. As soon as the prescribed waiting period expired, the case moved into the courts; the State of Illinois is now defending itself against this action. Dozens of cases are now pending with the EEOC all over the country, ready to move into court when the waiting period expires.

In Congress, a comparable worth bill for Federal employees breezed through the House by a large majority, but was defeated in the Senate in October 1984. The chief argument which derailed the comparable worth express train was the adverse effect it would have on blue-collar workers. Comparable worth sponsor Mary Rose Oakar (D-OH), whose district is blue-collar Cleveland, became very defensive on this point and amended her bill to stipulate that no wages could be reduced in order to achieve comparable worth.

That begs the question, as the Senate realized. Comparable worth rests on the theory that women have been channeled into certain occupations (e.g., clerical and nursing), and then paid less than men in jobs which allegedly have comparable worth. The men's jobs with which the women's jobs are compared are always blue-collar jobs, e.g., trucking, firefighting, police work, carpentry, and building maintenance.

### Comparable Statistics Prove Pay Equity

If "equity" requires an equalizing of wages for, say, stenographers and truck drivers, and the company product must be sold for $X, or the Federal or state budget must be held at $X to avoid raising taxes, then inevitably the truck driver will have to forgo his raise so that the stenographer can be given comparable pay. The Office of Personnel Management pointed out that this would be the result if comparable worth legislation forced the integration of white-collar and blue-collar pay scales. Faced with the uncertainties



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of cost as well as of fairness, the U.S. Senate fortunately decided not to open up this particular Pandora's box.

Opponents of comparable worth, in Congress as well as in California, have also successfully punctured the principal myth which has given momentum to the concept: the notion that women are paid only 59 percent of what men are paid. The 59 cents figure is the average wage of all working women compared to the average wage of all working men. That tells you as much about sex discrimination as the statistic that the average temperature in the United States is 66 degrees tells you about whether to wear a coat in Chicago today.

Comparable worth opponents have presented massive evidence from academic research to prove that the pay differential between all men and all women is not due to discrimination but to a variety of other factors. For example, women in full-time employment work an average of 36 hours per week, while men work an average of 44 hours per week. The average woman has been on her present job only half as long as the average man, and she is 11 times more apt to leave.

Furthermore, the occupational injury and accident rate for women is about half that of men, according to OSHA, because the more dangerous industries, such as mining and construction, are predominantly male. Industries with a high level of accidents pay weekly wages 13.6 percent higher than risk-free industries, accounting for 6 to 7 percent of the earnings gap between men and women. These are only some of the reasons explaining and justifying the wage differential between men and women.

Many scholars, including Michael Levin, Michael Finn, and Walter Williams, believe that the principal reason for the wage gap between men and women is marriage, which has a huge effect on women's performance in the paid labor force. Professor Solomon Polachek of the State University of New York found that married women, on the average, spend only 35 percent of their potential working years in the labor market. Women who have never married, on the other hand, spend 89 percent of their working years in the labor market if they are college graduates and 67 percent if they are high school graduates.

**The End Is Near**

Though *AFSCME v. State of Washington* continues to make its way toward the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in July 1984 dealt a major blow to comparable worth. In *Spaulding v. State of Washington,* this court affirmed the dismissal of a comparable worth lawsuit filed by faculty of the University of Washington School of Nursing who were paid less than the faculty at other University schools. Ruling that women could sue only if they presented evidence showing that the wage disparity was caused by intentional sex discrimination, the court warned that the untried comparable worth theory "would plunge us into uncharted and treacherous areas."

The comparable worth bandwagon may now be coming to a halt. Business groups and organizations supporting traditional private enterprise values are providing the research, legislative analyses, and political support needed by congressmen and legislators, as well as filing *amicus curiae* briefs to support state governments already in litigation. Such groups still have to play catch-up for another year because the interest groups seeking comparable worth have been grinding out their materials for a decade.

The concept of comparable worth would lead us away from our record of proven economic success toward a system of government wage control based on subjective evaluations made by bureaucrats, judges, or job evaluators. Fortunately, such high tax, more government proposals are the wave of the past. ☎



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# Sale of the Century

## Britain's Privatization Bonanza

Madsen Pirie

In 1979, Britain had the largest public sector of any advanced country in the world. By 1995, predicts Norman Tebbitt, Minister for Trade and Industry, it will have the smallest.

It was possible, in the Britain of 1979, to go through one's life scarcely encountering the private sector of the economy at all. Much of the industry and most of the utilities and services were dominated by the state's near monopoly of supply. Routine requirements such as public transport, health, electricity and gas supplies, mail delivery, and telephones were all effective national monopolies. State industries ranged from aircraft manufacture and shipbuilding to automobile assembly and North Sea oil; the state also ran a curious range of activities from hotels to English Channel ferryboat services.

The scale of the Thatcher achievement is such that in every single one of those areas, and in many more besides, the state has been pushed back. In all of them there are now private alternatives. Some have been converted into private companies, others opened up to competition. And the pace of change is accelerating.

No nation has retreated so dramatically from government control of the economy since William Pitt began to unravel the cumbersome trappings of the 18th century British state. Under the influence of Adam Smith, among others, successive British governments led a 50-year retreat from state control, culminating in the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1845. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is leading a comparable retreat today.

Mrs. Thatcher's election manifesto of 1979 was not about privatization. Instead, she stressed holding down spending, cutting wasteful and unnecessary programs, and reducing the burden of government. A few months in office showed her that this would not be easy, and that transferring government programs into the private sector was a reasonable alternative.

There has been no single strategy for achieving this. Companies such as Amersham (a radionics company), Cable and Wireless (a telecommunications equipment firm), and British Aerospace were sold off one at a time. Some of the more difficult state enterprises, which had become heavily overmanned and lossmaking, like British Airways, were placed under a management regime designed to prepare them for privatization at a later date. Others, such as the National Freight Corporation, were sold to their employees. Some were sold privately to interested buyers, some openly on the stock exchange. Some, like Hoverspeed, were even given away. As the government gathered experience, the list grew until the sales were a regular weekly story, and it became apparent that every state operation was a candidate for sale.

### Private Blessings

Privatization has not been limited to industry. By enacting into law a "right-to-buy," the government gave tenants the opportunity to buy their publicly-owned housing. To counter the attraction of subsidized rents, purchasers were offered huge discounts, ranging from a third to a half off the market value. 600,000 applications were being processed by the 1983 election, fully 10 percent of the total, and many more applications are still being processed. An added bonus for the government was the propensity of the new owners to express their status by changing their voting habits. As recipients of rent subsidy they had overwhelmingly voted for the Labor Party; as home-owners they found the Conservative Party philosophy more to their taste.

A similar mix of caution and imagination heralded the spread of private medicine as an alternative to the National Health Service. By allowing certain classes of medical insurance premiums to be tax-deductible, the government made private medicine cheaper. The result has been that more and more people have chosen to go private, among them almost 700,000 labor unionists. Some of the pressure has been taken off the NHS, and the government has the option of extending the incentives whenever it chooses. The same technique was used to foster alternative pension plans. Through generous tax concessions, the government encouraged people to opt out of the state earnings-related pension system. Over half the work force has done so.

Madsen Pirie *is President of the Adam Smith Institute in London.*



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Privatization has also made substantial inroads with respect to the services provided by local and regional governments. Garbage collection in Southend was the first service to be privatized, followed closely by streetcleaning and the maintenance of public parks in the London borough of Wandsworth. The pattern has now spread to include professional services such as those of architects and lawyers. A British city privatizes a service somewhere every working day.

**A Gradual Revolution**

Contracting out services to private businesses has had a major impact on ancillary hospital services and on the provision of meals for schoolchildren. The usual lurid horror warnings have proliferated from enemies of the private sector, of course, but it was in the hospitals still with state-run services that deaths from food poisoning occurred; while the delighted children in a *Times* photograph praised their new airline-style meals and displayed no obvious cases of malnutrition.

The gradual privatization approach has been used in some cases to permit the growth of alternative and equivalent services by repealing a monopoly. In long distance bus transport, this was used with spectacular effect. Within days of the repeal of the National Bus monopoly, bus fares between cities had plunged by as much as two-thirds under the impact of competition. The new operators introduced higher standards of service, with more comfortable seats and video films en route. Over a few months, an alternative bus network had firmly established itself. The effect on the National Bus company was remarkable. Forced to cut fares and copy the service innovations, for the first time in many years it turned a profit. The National Bus Company is now a candidate for privatization. The postal, electricity, gas, and telephone equipment monopolies have also been repealed or scaled back.

As the Thatcher government has progressed, it has gained both confidence and expertise. Its success in effectively limiting the size and scope of government—to popular enthusiasm—could well prove to be its most enduring accomplishment. There is now general support in Britain for further privatization, and a widespread assumption that those areas remaining in the public sector will be prepared for transfer to the private side of the economy. This is, for the most part, a justified assumption.

This gradual approach has completely won over the British public. A large-scale drive might have failed by generating all of the opposition at once, but the piece-by-piece approach has been hard to resist. By not threatening the prevailing system with a frontal assault, the Thatcher government minimized the hostility from groups which saw themselves as beneficiaries of the status quo; instead, they were presented with extra choices.

Workers in state industries, for example, always received preferential stock options. In the case of employee buyouts, they actually became the new owners. When shares were sold publicly, it was always done in such a way as to make ownership as widespread as possible. Instead of a few rich stockholders gaining an advantage, large numbers of ordinary people received a stake in the new company, and formed a group to oppose subsequent expropriation. Even when state firms were being made ready for eventual privatization, the most generous layoff terms were used to secure the support of the labor force to the changes.

The basic tactic of privatization has been to let the free decisions of individuals build to make the new reality. The public at large enjoys both the new choices and the new standards of service. They do not want to return to the shoddy, second-rate service the state provided. They like the new buses and the new English Channel ferries. They enjoy the advantages of private health care. They like to have their garbage collected quietly, cleanly, and efficiently, instead of being spilled all over the street. They like owning their own homes.

**A British city privatizes a service somewhere every working day.**

There are two implications to all of this. First, privatization is here to stay, and there will be more of it. By adopting the gradual, cumulative strategy, the Thatcher government has built momentum. After Telecom will come British Airways, then the airports. After that there will be further chunks of Leyland, the state car industry, and further sections of British Steel. Down the road, major privatization of electricity, gas, and water is likely. While all this is going on, there will be ever greater use of contractors to perform state services, and ever larger numbers of people choosing to opt out of state services and go private instead.

Second, the policy of privatization has led to the buildup of groups with a vested interest in the new order who will oppose any attempt to reverse it. Renationalization of the former state industries, for example, would be bitterly opposed by the shareowning public, and the workers who make profits owning and running their own industries are not likely to let them go easily.

The privatization program has produced a remarkable economic turnaround for Britain. In 1979 people talked of the "British Disease." Not any more. A nation dominated by the ailing giants of the public sector has been transformed in a few short years.

The private concerns which are replacing the nationalized sector have managed to combine profitability with higher standards. The result is that Britain is competitive again, even if the recovery has not yet translated itself into jobs: decades of socialism take time to recover from. However, productivity is up, and so is confidence in the private sector. The sale of Telecom not only created in one move Britain's largest private company and biggest private employer; it also attracted record numbers of the general public anxious to invest. Historians speak of Germany's "economic miracle" of the 1940s. Privatization has insured that in the future they must also talk of the British miracle of the 1980s.



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


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# Top Choppers

## Leonardo Would Have Been Proud

Mark Huber

Anyone who has seen the spectacular airborne scenes of helicopter assualts in *Apocalypse Now* will remember the nimble, rotored craft swooping low over the Vietnamese countryside, retrieving wounded troops, and pummeling the enemy with machine gun and rocket fire.

The helicopter has become the most versatile machine in America's military arsenal. It can evacuate the injured. It can move troops swiftly through the jungle. Armed with missiles, it can destroy tanks, airplanes, ships, and other helicopters. An array of electronic sensors turns it into a powerful surveillance tool on land and at sea. It has changed forever the way America fights in battle.

The helicopter is a new weapon based on an old idea. Leonardo da Vinci invented the helical air screw almost 500 years ago, but without a power source, his device remained a curiosity. The first workable helicopter, designed for civilian transportation, took to the skies in the early 1930s. In 1942, the U.S. Army Air Corps, forerunner of the Air Force, successfully test fired a 20-millimeter cannon from a Sikorsky R-4, an awkward, fragile, and underpowered contraption. Yet the Air Corps did not rush the helicopter into production. If it had, thousands of American lives might have been saved in World War II.

### Proving Itself Under Fire

During the Korean War, American helicopters flew scouting missions and, more importantly, rescued over 25,000 wounded personnel. It was left to the French to show the world the value of helicopters as airborne assault vehicles. During the Algerian wars of 1954 to 1958, the French mounted machine guns, rocket pods, and missile launchers on civilian Alouette helicopters. It was a powerful attack weapon.

In 1962, Bell Helicopter introduced the UH-1 "Huey" utility helicopter. Powered by a revolutionary turbine engine, the Huey could carry more weight over greater distances under more conditions than its piston-powered predecessors. The U.S. Army bought thousands of UH-1 series helicopters from Bell in the 1960s. Most of them ended up in Vietnam.

Vietnam—humid, hot, lush, and mountainous—was an infantry general's nightmare. The elephant grass grew 10 feet tall. Stagnant swamps and rice paddies swallowed up men and equipment. Mosquitoes and poisonous snakes infested the jungles. How to conduct an infantry war in Vietnam? Helicopters.

The Huey was outfitted with a limited amount of armor plating, to protect the two pilots, and a pair of door-mounted machine guns. With a crew of four, it could transport a half-dozen troops into the middle of battle, withdraw, and return to claim them after the smoke had cleared. It could also evacuate the wounded promptly, as in Korea. Friendly forces could now be inserted in front, behind, and around enemy lines without a long march and much warning. There was only one problem: the Huey proved susceptible to the enemy's light arms fire. Fueled by highly flammable kerosene, early Hueys also had a large number of lightweight magnesium components. Anyone who remembers holding a magnesium strip over a Bunsen burner in high school chemistry can guess the rest. Downed ships often burned quickly. Other Hueys attempted to minimize the troop carriers' vulnerability. Called "gunships," they were equipped much like the French Alouettes in Algeria with forward-mounted machine guns and rocket pods. The gunships laid down a pattern of cover fire while their troop-carrying counterparts deployed and evacuated troops from the battlefield. Also in response to this threat, Bell developed the Cobra gunship, a streamlined, two-man helicopter derived from Huey technology. The Cobra would later evolve into the Army's chief tank-buster, an anti-armor attack helicopter.

### Carter's Chopper

Considering the threat, terrain, and weather, helicopters were remarkably effective in Vietnam. Only one helicopter was hit by enemy fire for every 275 combat hours flown. Of those hit, only one went down every 4,494 flight hours. During one of the war's heaviest North Vietnamese assaults, in early 1971, Hueys flew 42,800 sorties. Only 107 ships were lost. More than

Mark Huber *is a Washington-based writer.*



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50,000 Americans gave their lives in Vietnam, but without helicopters the casualty figures would have been much higher.

Yet helicopters are not perfect for every mission. Just ask Jimmy Carter. His already bleak chances for reelection crashed and burned in the Iranian desert on April 24, 1980. The idea was to fly 8 CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters off the aircraft carrier *Nimitz;* land them, undetected, in the middle of Iran at a staging area called "Desert One"; refuel them from waiting U.S. transport aircraft sent in from Egypt; then fly into Teheran and rescue the American diplomats held hostage by the fanatical followers of Ayatollah Khomeini. It didn't work. One CH-53 developed problems and had to return to the *Nimitz.* Another went down in the desert. Of the six helicopters that reached Desert One, one was grounded by hydraulic problems, and another collided with a transport plane and burned. Eight Americans died. The mission was aborted.

The CH-53 is America's most powerful helicopter. It can lift 16 tons at sea level, refuel in midair, and carry 35 combat-loaded troops and a crew of three. But it's still a helicopter, subject to the same limitations that separate rotorcraft from winged aircraft: slower speed (a maximum of 200 miles per hour), shorter range, and increased maintenance requirements. For the Iran mission, the CH-53s would have had to fly more than seven times their normal range, placing an enormous stress on both man and machine. The fact that the mission failed is no discredit to the CH-53 or helicopters in general. The machines are not designed for such applications. Military planners involved should have known better. They didn't.

### Ready for Action

One of the best ways to test American weapons under battlefield conditions is to give them to Israel. Helicopters are no exception. During the 1982 Lebanon conflict, Israeli defense forces flew light American attack helicopters against Soviet tanks piloted by Syria and the PLO. Using the Defender, a Hughes civilian model modestly modified and equipped with the TOW (tube-launched, optically-sighted, wire-guided) anti-tank missile, Israel littered the Beirut-Damascus highway with the burned-out hulks of Soviet T-62 tanks. Observers report that the PLO's T-34 Soviet-made tanks were actually lifted into the air after being nailed with TOW.

American military helicopters again proved their worth during the October 1983 liberation of Grenada. Some 107 helicopters participated in the mission. Under heavy fire from Cuban "construction workers," only four helicopters were lost. Grenada provided the first combat test for the Army's new Blackhawk helicopter, the successor to the Bell UH-1 series models that flew in Vietnam. Based on the Grenada experience, the Blackhawk would have reduced Huey losses by 85 precent.

Helicopters also perform a variety of vital missions at sea: search and rescue, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface ship targeting, and minesweeping. The Navy has put helicopters on frigates, cruisers, destroyers, and battleships in addition to aircraft carriers and amphibious ships. Ship-based helicopters, equipped with a variety of sensing devices, can fly up to 100 miles off ship, remain on station, and return. While on station, it can also dump a weapon, usually a torpedo, on the enemy ship. Data relayed from the helicopter enables Navy vessels to accurately target enemy craft out of shipboard sensor range and stay out of the range of hostile ships as well.

### Heli-Copying

As to the Soviets' helicopter technology, they make theirs the old fashioned way: they steal it.

In 1969, the U.S. Army cancelled its Cheyenne anti-tank helicopter program. The Cheyenne flew over 250 miles per hour and had a host of other advances including terrain-following radar, day and night sensors, all-



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weather capability, a large cannon, and the TOW anti-tank missile. Some say the Cheyenne was too technologically advanced to function; others say it lost to bitter political infighting on Capitol Hill. No matter; the Soviets knew a good thing when they saw it. Many of the Cheyenne's attributes were incorporated into their Mi-24 HIND-series attack helicopters. The HIND is one of the most advanced helicopters to ever take to the sky. Each one carries enough weapons to suppress a small African country. It also carries up to 12 combat troops. And because it is pressurized, the HIND can function in nuclear, chemical, or biological warfare environments. The HIND is powerful, large, and fast. A 12.7 millimeter gun is mounted in the nose. Side fuselage pylons hold 57 millimeter rockets and anti-tank missiles. Over 2,000 HINDS have been depolyed worldwide. Cubans have reportedly piloted them in Nicaragua. Of even greater concern, up to 1,000 HINDs nest in the Warsaw Pact. Currently, HINDs are mowing down the mujaheddin in Afghanistan.

Other mainstays of the Soviet helicopter force include the HIP. Equipped with weapons similar to the HIND, the somewhat slower HIP can accommodate 26 combat troops. The Soviets also fly the world's largest helicopter, the HALO, with room inside for 100 troops. And flight tests are under way on a slick two-man, anti-tank helicopter designated HAVOC. The HAVOC looks strikingly similar to America's latest anti-tank helicopter, the Apache.

American military helicopter pilots envision a future conflict with Soviet rotor forces. "We see the threat as the HIND," says Marine Corps Colonel R.M. Balch. "The HIND is being built in great numbers and is exported throughout the world. It's going to be right up there with the ground troops and armor forces. We're going to have to be able to defend our transport helicopters" from the HIND.

By way of preparation, the Marine Corps has ordered 44 Bell SuperCobra gunships equipped with not only the TOW anti-tank missile, but also the new Hellfire missile—a new generation of fire-and-forget missile that does not have to be guided to its target by the helicopter crew—and the proven and

## "ROTORHEADS"

Affectionately referred to as "rotorheads," helicopter pilots must combine enormous dexterity, physical and mental quickness, and the kind of bravado that guarantees cool-headed performance in the middle of heavy enemy fire. Most chopper pilots in Vietnam had their ships struck by enemy lead at close range. But there wasn't time to worry about it. Taking off from an unfamiliar landing zone with an overloaded helicopter full of wounded troops requires tremendous concentration. A pilot who stopped to worry about getting shot could make a flying mistake and ruin everyone's day.

Vietnam was particularly dangerous for helicopter crews. Landing zones were often cut in the middle of lush jungle overgrowth, which provided excellent cover for enemy troops waiting to pepper incoming and departing helicopters. Landing zones were often small. Nearby enemy snipers were not required to be skilled marksmen. Tall grass inside the zone sometimes hid a bevy of obstacles including land mines and tree stumps.

In Vietnam, early helicopter crews flew without benefit of chest protectors or much insulating armor inside their ships. Even the smallest enemy arms fire easily penetrated the forward-facing plexiglass windscreens. Many pilots suffered leg wounds. Attempting to fly a helicopter without use of one or both feet, which rested on the directional control pedals, was usually a fatal mistake. Fortunately, Army assault helicopters, then and now, carry two pilots.

Since Vietnam, many advances have been made in helicopter technology. Today's helicopters are far more survivable when confronted with light enemy arms fire. Breakthroughs in computers, lasers, and thermal imaging enable today's helicopter crews to target and deliver weapons with accuracy and improved safety. However, one thing hasn't changed: the helicopter's role as a close-in air support vehicle for ground forces. By virtue of this, helicopters fly much lower and slower than their fast-moving counterparts, jet fighter aircraft. Therefore, helicopters remain more susceptible to enemy fire. Rotorheads have a better chance of ending up dead than do their jet jockey cousins. Knowing this, why would anyone want to fly military helicopters?

Several reasons. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are very particular about who flies their $40 million jet fighters. Besides going through exhaustive training, you must have a college degree. You must be an *officer*. While some Army helicopter pilots are officers with college degrees, not all fall into this category. The Army lets ordinary enlistees who have undergone the proper training and demonstrated acceptable performance, fly helicopters. These pilots are called "warrant officers," and enjoy more privileges and higher status than ordinary enlistees, called "grunts." A warrant officer's helicopter is more than a flying machine, it is a ladder for higher status in the Army's pecking order.

Safety provides another incentive. While flying a military helicopter is dangerous, it is less harrowing than crawling through the jungle on one's belly. At least helicopter pilots seem to think so. Becoming a helicopter pilot also provides a potentially lucrative skill for post-service employment.

Flying a helicopter provides a pilot with the security of both the shield and sword during combat's confusion and chaos. Said one rotorhead not long ago, "When I went to Vietnam, I knew I was going to be shot at. I wanted to be able to shoot back."

**M.H.**



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

reliable AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile. Previously the exclusive purview of jet fighter aircraft, the Sidewinder can knock out a HIND, an MiG Soviet jet fighter, or anything else that flies in the way. In 1981, for example, a pair of Sidewinders launched from U.S. Navy F-14 fighters made short work of two of Libya's MiGs.

**The Best is Yet to Come**

Meanwhile, the U.S. Army, with over 7,000 helicopters in current inventory, has begun accepting delivery of what it hopes will be as many as 1,200 Hughes AH-64 Apache "tank-buster" gunships, part of a $7.3 billion program. The Apache's two-man crew can unleash a variety of surprises including a 30 millimeter chain-gun, 2.75 inch rockets, TOW and Hellfire anti-tank missiles, and a new lightweight air-to-air missile still in development. Apache also incorporates two new, high-tech systems; Target Acquisition and Designation System and the Pilot's Night Vision System (TADS/PNVS). With TADS, the gunner uses any of three viewing channels—optical, television, or forward-looking infrared (FLIR), to search for, detect, and identify potential targets. PNVS provides the pilot with thermal images which aid him to fly at night at very low altitudes. The system would be particularly important in a European conflict, where anti-tank helicopters would have to fly fast and low, dipping over, below, and alongside vegetation and other cover to avoid detection. The Army calls this "Nap-of-the-Earth" flying. The technique demands enormous pilot concentration during the day, and without a system such as PNVS, it would be suicidal at night or during poor weather.

All this may seem rather advanced, but pales in comparison with what the military has in mind for future rotorcraft. One concept will be deployed by the early 1990s. It's called JVX and it has the "rotorheads" inside the Pentagon salivating. A prototype, the XV-15, has been flying for over a decade. JVX lands and takes off like a helicopter, but flies like an airplane. Two large turbine engines, one mounted on the end of each wing, swivel to provide hover and vertical lift capabilities and lock down like airplane engines to provide speed and range unheard of in an ordinary helicopter. The model currently on the boards will carry up to 24 troops and a crew of two, and carry advanced weapons similar to those mounted on anti-tank helicopters. Range wil be quadrupled over present medium-lift helicopters. Speed will also jump to more than 340 miles per hour.

As future helicopters go increasingly high-tech, they will adopt many characteristics of today's advanced jet fighter planes. Technology will enable the next generation of rotorcraft to perform more missions under more conditions with greater speed than ever before. The helicopter will continue in its role as the American military's most versatile machine.



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# BOOK REVIEWS

## Pipes' Peace

**Survival Is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's Future,** *by Richard Pipes (New York: Simon and Schuster, $16.95).*

*Reviewed by* Arch Puddington

One consequence of the post-Afghanistan cooling of U.S.-Soviet ties has been the publication of a steady stream of books and studies analyzing the nature of the Soviet system and setting forth recommendations on how America can more effectively conduct relations with its rival superpower. Richard Pipes's book ranks among the most important of these. A professor of history at Harvard and former director of East European and Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council, Mr. Pipes is a preeminent authority on Soviet history and strategic thinking. He is also a figure of some controversy within the fraternity of Kremlinologists, having attained a kind of pariah status for his unremitting criticism of détente during the 1970s. Given the prevailing view that the resurrection of détente should stand as the principal goal of American policy, *Survival Is Not Enough* is not likely to enhance the author's popularity with the foreign policy establishment.

### Domestic Imperialism

Mr. Pipes has written a powerful criticism of Western attitudes towards the Soviet Union, attitudes based on clichés, illusions, and no small amount of wilful self-deception. At the heart of the problem, he believes, is a failure to recognize the relationship between the USSR's totalitarian internal system and its expansionist foreign policy. He is scornful of the view that Soviet foreign and domestic policies are but tangentially linked, or not linked at all, noting, "Historical evidence suggests that the foreign policy of every country is a function of its domestic conditions and an extension of its internal policies." It is, he adds, particularly important to understand the political system/foreign policy relationship, because the Soviet system is a product of two especially dangerous currents: the Russian political tradition and Marxism-Leninism.

Of the two, Mr. Pipes believes the Russian tradition to be the more important. He explicitly rejects the notion that socialism is inherently repressive, observing that 20th century socialist parties throughout Western Europe have embraced parliamentary democracy and divested themselves of utopianism and commitment to the class struggle. Pre-revolutionary Russia, on the other hand, was both internally autocratic and imperialist in its relations with its neighbors. Russian imperialism, moreover, did not derive from a paranoid fear of invasion, but rather was basic to the system. The rulers of Old Russia, like the Kremlin leadership today, employed foreign conquest as a means of securing internal legitimacy. As Mr. Pipes notes: "Permanent conquests serve to justify the permanent subservience of Russian society."

Since the seizure of power in 1917, the Soviet leadership has improved upon the pre-revolutionary imperialist tradition by developing new and uniquely efficient methods of regimenting its own people. This enables the Soviets to maintain relative calm within the imperial orbit while working assiduously to destabilize their adversaries, a development unprecedented in the history of imperial powers. Moreover, the Kremlin is abetted by the gullibility of crucial segments of the Western elite. To these elites, the idea that the Kremlin pursues a Grand Strategy towards eventual world domination is an absurdity; they insist, against all evidence, in seeing the Soviet leadership as sharing similar values and political goals. The Soviets, for their part, are only too ready to exploit differences within the democratic world. They work hard to neutralize various constituency groups and foment divisions among the countries which form the Western alliance.

East-West trade provides a revealing example of how the Soviets implement a strategy of divide and conquer. By pressing for deals with declining, sunset industries in West Germany, the Kremlin has created a mass constituency for "normal" economic relations, a constituency which embraces not merely the German business class, but thousands of workers whose jobs now depend on the continuation of trade with the Soviets. In the United States, the Soviets have succeeded in transforming the business elite, the traditional target of anti-capitalist polemics, into "the most vociferous neutralist lobby" in the country.

### Gullible West

The closed character of the Soviet system also gives the Kremlin a unique advantage in the war of ideas. The Soviet definition of peace as little more than the absence of overt conflict goes generally unchallenged in international forums. Even more telling is the Soviet ability to stifle internal, popular debate over the leadership's thoughts about fighting a nuclear war at a time when a contentious and divisive brawl over nuclear policy rages

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in the democratic world. The fear and hysteria generated by open discussion of nuclear war is shrewdly exploited by the Soviets, who emphasize and reemphasize the same themes: that nuclear war would lead to the extinction of life on this planet, that the Soviet Union abhors the very thought of nuclear conflict, but, conversely, that actions which pose a threat to Soviet interests also threaten world peace. The rich dividends reaped by this kind of psychological blackmail can be seen in the reactions of world leaders to President Reagan's pointed attacks on the Soviet system, specifically in the notion that moral considerations must be set aside when dealing with the Soviet Union because of the absolute necessity of maintaining good relations with the Kremlin. The result of this kind of accommodation is, of course, quite dangerous because it encourages the Soviets to believe that they can commit any act of aggression short of nuclear war without provoking the direct opposition of the West. In similar fashion, the Soviets have won acceptance both of the Brezhnev doctrine and a double standard in the treatment of guerrilla movements: they call for political accommodation with "liberation" forces which threaten non-Communist countries and oppose indigenous forces which threaten Marxist regimes.

For Mr. Pipes, nothing could be further from the truth than the charge, much stressed in Soviet propaganda, that anti-Sovietism exists only because of pressures exerted by private interests in the capitalist world. The list of those who can be depended on to endorse, at least implicitly, Soviet criticism of American foreign policy includes businessmen who have been denied trade opportunities for security reasons, opposition politicians who take malicious glee in our foreign policy setbacks, and those who believe that defense spending deprives the poor of social programs. According to Mr. Pipes, it is "difficult to think of a group in the West which has a vested interest in bad relations with the Soviet Union." Ideological conviction, not self-interest, is the driving force behind our ability to deter Soviet expansion and stem the spread of Communism.

**Bolshevik Blues**

This conclusion would ordinarily lead one to suspect that Mr. Pipes views the future with deep pessimism. This is not the case. Despite the many advantages it enjoys in its struggle with the democratic world, the Soviet Union is itself beset by a daunting array of political and economic problems with which its rigidly centralized system is ill equipped to cope. Mr. Pipes avoids the mistake of predicting the USSR economy's imminent collapse; he believes that the country can muddle through without significant change. The Kremlin, however, cannot forever maintain itself as an imperial power burdened as it is with an economy which provides a standard of living for the Soviet people roughly comparable with many Third World countries. Reform is essential, but unlikely, since the process of economic change would inevitably pose a threat to the *nomenklatura,* the party elites who rule the country. Thus various experiments designed to provide incentives for workers and managers and inject a measure of economic decentralization have been repeatedly sabotaged by a bureaucracy protective of its power and privileges.

A further drain on the economy is the increasingly high cost of maintaining an empire. Instead of being enriched at the expense of its colonies, the Soviet Union is emburdened by a transfer of resources to the subject nations. The USSR's weak economy has also inhibited the Kremlin in its effort to gain influence in the Third World; indeed, Mr. Pipes asserts that the Soviets have had to concede defeat in their attempt to establish a global empire.

**Survival Strategy**

Mr. Pipes' prescriptions for American policy flow directly from his analysis of Soviet society and his reading of the strengths and weaknesses of the democracies. In the Third World, the United States should borrow a note from Soviet practice and employ proxy forces to check Soviet expansionist efforts. He counsels against the direct use of American troops in the belief that a protracted war would only reignite the latent isolationism of the American people.

He recommends that we exploit our economic preeminence wherever possible. This means, above all else, refusing to sell the Soviets the technologies which enhance their military capability. A policy of economic denial, he says, makes economic as well as strategic sense, since improvements in Soviet military capability made possible by our technology will ultimately compel us to spend more on defense. Technology transfer has an additional, insidious, effect: it enables the Soviets to postpone the implementation of economic reform, a development which will necessitate a transfer of resources from the military to the civilian sector. Finally, Mr. Pipes favors the use of economic sanctions as a means of punishing Soviet aggression. Here he dismisses the argument that the measures imposed by President Carter did not bring about Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, observing that our demonstrated willingness to impose sanctions may well have been a crucial factor in the Soviet decision not to invade Poland.

Mr. Pipes also cautions against the perception of arms control as a principal instrument of peace. Arms accords, he observes, do not pave the way for broader political settlements. Rather the political agreements must come before arms control. Peace, in the fullest sense, will be achieved only when the Soviets exhibit a willingness to conform to internationally accepted norms of behavior; until that time, arms agreements will produce only modest consequences.

*Survival Is Not Enough* is one of the most clearly written books on U.S.-Soviet affairs in some time. Mr. Pipes reveals himself as a man with a profound attachment to the democratic West, to its political and economic institutions, and to its democratic values. He is, nonetheless, a demanding critic of those in the West, principally among our European allies, who believe that the achievements of democratic civilization can be maintained without sacrifice. The democratic world will prevail, he believes, if we neither cower before the bear, nor feed it. ☎



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# Hard Times

**Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980,** *by Charles Murray (New York: Basic Books, Inc., $23.95)*

*Reviewed by* Adam Meyerson

Charles Murray's extraordinary book, *Losing Ground,* is essential reading for anyone who cares about improving the life of poor people. He shows that America lost the war on poverty, and that progress stopped at the very moment massive federal social spending began. He therefore makes a compelling case that the premises of our social policy are tragically misconceived.

The statistics Mr. Murray amasses are irrefutable. During the 1950s, and particularly in the early and mid-1960s, millions of Americans were winning their personal wars on poverty. The number of people living under the poverty line fell from 39.5 million in 1959 to 24.1 million in 1969, or from 22.4 percent to 12.1 percent of the population. Up-by-the-bootstraps mobility was especially dramatic among black Americans. In 1959, 58.2 percent of blacks and other nonwhites were classified as poor. Ten years later, that figure had plummeted to 30.9 percent.

One might have expected this progress to accelerate in the 1970s, for by the end of the 1960s, the Federal government was putting Lyndon Johnson's Great Society into effect. Spending on AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid mushroomed; expenditures on public aid tripled, rising from $15 billion in 1968 to $47 billion in 1976 (both in 1980 dollars). Special efforts were also being made to bring blacks into the economic mainstream. The civil rights laws of the mid-60s that barred discrimination in employment were quickly followed by affirmative action rules that required discrimination on behalf of blacks.

But these interventions did not achieve what they were supposed to. On the contrary, as Mr. Murray documents, the spectacular progress against poverty abruptly ended at the close of the 1960s. In 1980, the percentage of Americans living in poverty was higher (13 percent) than it had been in 1969. Most disturbing of all, progress among poor blacks, who still had so far to go, was suddenly arrested. Middle-class blacks continued to improve their lot, and by 1980 the percentage of blacks in white-collar jobs had risen to 38 percent, up from 16 percent in 1960. But, 29.9 percent of blacks still lived in poverty in 1980, only one percentage point below a decade before. Measured by its own standards, Washington's war on poverty was thus an abysmal failure.

Contrast this experience with the other great domestic policy initiative of the late 1960s and early 1970s: environmental protection. Our tangle of environmental laws can be criticized on grounds of regulatory overkill and unnecessary cost. But at least America's air and water are substantially cleaner than they were 15 years ago. At least something is being done about public health hazards such as toxic waste dumps. One cannot make a similar claim about Federal anti-poverty programs. The Federal government did not reduce poverty, and its intervention coincided with an end to the progress that was already taking place.

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### Seeds of Failure

Although massive social spending did not begin until the late 1960s, Mr. Murray argues that the seeds of its failure were planted earlier in the decade. Between 1960 and 1970, he contends, the environment for poor people changed in three fundamental ways that destroyed opportunities for upward mobility.

**Conservatives can take little comfort from Mr. Murray's indictment of social policy.**

First, it was much more attractive to be poor and dependent in 1970 than in 1960. Not only had the level of welfare benefits risen. Not only were there new programs such as food stamps and Medicaid, from which one could benefit only by remaining poor. Not only did new rules permit shack-up boyfriends to live off AFDC benefits intended for single mothers and their children. But even work incentives for welfare recipients had the unintended effect of making welfare more attractive. For instance, allowing AFDC mothers to keep most of their earnings from part-time jobs was supposed to encourage women on welfare to work; instead, suggests Mr. Murray, it encouraged women who planned to work to go on welfare.

With all these advantages to welfare, Mr. Murray argues, fewer poor people took and kept low-paying jobs they didn't like. The decision was completely rational over the short term, for one could live as well on welfare as by working at an entry-level job, perhaps better. Over the long run, it was a disastrous trap from which there was little escape. A reliable, hard-working employee in an unpleasant, low-paying job has a good chance to advance to a less-unpleasant, better-paying position. Not so the fellow who quits every time he gets mad at the boss, and lives off his girlfriend's AFDC check until she kicks him out of the house.

The second change in the 1960s was the breakdown of law and order, both in the streets and in the classroom. In 1970, Mr. Murray shows, a frequent robber faced one-third the risk of apprehension that he faced only 10 years earlier. The likelihood of being imprisoned if arrested fell by more than half. Crime simply exploded—between 1963 and 1980 the robbery rate rose 294 percent—and its principal victims were poor people, especially poor blacks. How could slum dwellers rise from poverty if their hard-earned wages—and often their lives—were in constant danger of being stolen away?



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The collapse of education was almost as destructive. Before the mid-1960s, inner-city public schools were relatively well disciplined. Since then, most of them have become zoos, where teachers who try to establish classroom order are physically threatened, absenteeism is rampant, and virtually no one does any homework. It is hardly surprising that test scores have plummeted, and that even those who finish high school—in New York City, 78 percent of black teenagers drop out—are poor readers, writers, and reckoners. They are ill equipped for any but the most menial jobs.

The third and probably most important change was what Mr. Murray calls "the withdrawal of status reinforcements for upward mobility." As late as a generation ago, there was enormous pride and self-respect among America's working poor. Life may have been tough, and they may have had to scrounge to make ends meet, but holding a job, no matter how lowly, and supporting a family through one's own efforts, conferred high status on poor people in their own communities. As a result, poor people were rewarded socially in the short term for all those goody-goody virtues—hard work, honesty, study—that pay off economically only over the long term, perhaps only in their children's or grandchildren's generation.

This changed radically in the 1960s. Suddenly welfare lost its stigma, and the working poor were socially disenfranchised. In many poor communities, studying hard or taking a minimum-wage job made you a laughingstock, not a hero. Mr. Murray cites the horrifying story of a Newark high school that presents its Honor Society awards at an evening event with only the honorees attending: they would be jeered off the stage if the ceremony were held in regular school assembly. The message was reinforced by the fashionable drumbeat of media pundits, left-wing community activists, and social workers. If "the system" of capitalism and racism was to blame for poverty, then it was pointless to improve your lot through your own efforts. Meanwhile, almost every new government program was for people who failed. There was no attention or help for those who were succeeding with difficulty. Clearly failure was more attractive.

### Conservative Failures

Conservatives can take little comfort from Mr. Murray's indictment of social policy. The policies and values he blames for thwarting upward mobility are mostly liberal and radical. But conservatives have not improved conditions for the poor when they have been in power.

On the contrary, progress against poverty stopped when Richard Nixon replaced Lyndon Johnson as president. This was not entirely Mr. Nixon's fault: he faced a radicalized Democratic majority in Congress. But Mr. Nixon happily presided over the expansion of a welfare state whose suppositions he did not question. Blacks unfairly saw Mr. Nixon as a racist trying to keep them down. He wasn't trying, but he did succeed. It is hardly surprising that blacks, already embittered by Barry Goldwater's opposition to civil rights laws, have ever since been hostile to the Republican party.

As for Ronald Reagan, it is hardly a credit to his social policy that during his first term, the number of people living in poverty rose more slowly than under Jimmy Carter. The president's great political achievement is that he has restored a sense of pride and faith in the future among a majority of Americans. But he has failed to do so among many poor people, especially poor blacks. He has cut budgets (modestly), but he has not provided a vision of opportunity for everyone.

What would such a vision consist of? To judge from Mr. Murray's analysis, it should not include one popular conservative idea: means testing that would limit major benefits such as Social Security or Medicare to people below a certain income level. This has the disastrous and counterproductive effect of making it more attractive to be poor. Instead, if budgets have to be cut, entire programs should be eliminated. It would be preferable to have fewer programs open to all people. This was the philosophy of the New Deal, which did not produce disincentives the way the Great Society did. Middle-class welfare is better than lower-class welfare, because it encourages people to be middle-class.

In education and crime, the vision of an opportunity society is rather straightforward. That crime has fallen over the last three years is the best news for poor people since the 1960s. Dramatically cutting it further should be one of the top two or three priorities of every politician and social leader who wants the war on poverty to get back on track. In education, the Reagan Administration has already made important contributions with its excellence and school discipline initiatives. Schools are slowly beginning to get better and safer, though they have a long way to go. The big challenges are what to do about the enormous number of dropouts, as well as the millions of adult illiterates, many of them recent high school graduates, who cannot participate in a modern economy.

No war on poverty will succeed unless status is restored to poor people with lowly jobs, unless it once again becomes a source of pride for poor people to make short-term sacrifices for long-term gains. Most immigrants today have this spirit, as did earlier generations. But what government can do here is unclear, for status is determined more by community values than by public policy. At the least, there should be frequent public recognition and praise of those who are struggling to make it in the system.

The toughest question is what to do about welfare itself, or, more precisely, how to provide decent help to the truly needy without encouraging others to put themselves in a position where they, too, are truly needy. Clearly many people on welfare genuinely cannot support themselves and their children. These people need help, temporary or permanent, with the basic necessities of life, and it would be cruel and draconian to cut them off. It is equally clear that many on welfare would have made different choices about their lives if welfare had been less attractive, and that we have done them no service by encouraging them to trap themselves in dependency. As a "thought experiment," but only as that, Mr. Murray suggests that we do away with all Federal social spending for working-age people, except for unemploy-



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ment insurance, and that we leave help for the truly needy to the states and private charities. I am not sure that this resolves the dilemma of how to help without at the same time hurting. It merely transfers the question to a different set of decision-makers.

Mr. Murray has the good fortune not to be a professor. (Senior research fellow at the Manhattan Institute, he was formerly chief scientist at the American Institutes for Research and wrote an earlier version of this book for The Heritage Foundation.) Many of the ideas in *Losing Ground* resemble those of Harvard's Edward Banfield (in *The Unheavenly City*), whose classes were disrupted for years by left-wing fascists. It is a mark of the greater civility off campus, and perhaps a sign of the times, that *Losing Ground* is receiving a fair hearing.

As well it should. You don't have to read *Losing Ground* to know that American social policy is a tragic failure. All you have to do is stand on the street corner in vast sections of every American city. Not just buildings but millions of spirits have been totally devastated, and young men lead lives of raucous and self-destructive desperation. Liberals and conservatives, blacks and whites alike can agree that the present situation is unacceptable. *Losing Ground* is the essential starting point for thinking about fixing it. ☎

# The Russians Are Coming

**Red Dawn,** *directed by John Milius,* 1984

**I, Martha Adams** *by Pauline Glen Winslow (New York, St. Martin's Press, $12.95).*

*Reviewed by* Susan T. Vigilante

*Morning in a peaceful Colorado town. Suddenly hundreds of armed paratroopers drop into the field behind Calumet High School. Without warning, they attack the school, killing dozens of students and teachers. The soldiers are Communist troops; the attack is the beginning of World War III.*

*A handful of teenagers escape to the mountains. They form a guerrilla band, the Wolverines, and for the next several months wreak havoc on the occupying Communist forces.*

*The United States wakes up one morning to find that Soviet nuclear missiles have destroyed American missile sites in the western states, as well as most of the country's bomber fleets and submarines. The American President declares unconditional surrender. Martha Adams, whose engineer husband was killed in the Soviet strike, discovers that the late President Reagan secretly authorized the production of an ultimate weapon, code-named* Magnanimity. *It is America's only hope. She sets out to find it before the Communists do.*

Avid moviegoers may recognize the plot of *Red Dawn,* John Milius's 1984 film about a Soviet invasion of the United States. And fans of fast-read fiction may recognize the plot of *I, Martha Adams,* a thriller by Pauline Glen Winslow, about the same thing.

Neither is a major artistic achievement. The characters of *I, Martha Adams,* are underdeveloped, the author has difficulty portraying American speech, and the book bears the telltale signs of having been written in a hurry. *Red Dawn* suffers from lazy screenwriting and very uneven direction. But it was a box office success, drawing large, enthusiastic crowds and repeat viewers.

Why should these works be so successful now? After all, it was barely a year ago that movie audiences flocked to see *Silkwood,* an anti-nuke fantasy; and the biggest entertainment event of 1984, not counting Michael Jackson's Pepsi ads, was ABC's "The Day After," on the horrors of nuclear war with the Soviets. In publishing, the bestseller lists included Dr. Seuss's *The Butter Battle Book,* an allegorical mockery of the arms race by the author of *The Cat in The Hat.*

One of the Cuban Communist commander's first actions in *Red Dawn* could be a National Rifle Association TV ad against gun control. He orders all private firearms confiscated, and tells a subordinate he can do this easily just by looking up the local gun registration forms. The invaders set up a "reeducation center" at an old drive-in movie theater. Hundreds of innocent townspeople are tortured or murdered there on the mere suspicion of being potential troublemakers. In town, essential supplies dwindle. We see the nearly empty shelves of a local store, and a housewife who apologizes to guests because she has nothing to offer but a few mouthfuls of soup. With the possible exception of the Cuban commander—a one-time guerrilla insurgent with a romantic streak and a distaste for Soviet heavy-handedness—the Communists are painted as a bad bunch: ruthless, vindictive, and cruel. But despite these displays and the applause they have garnered from anti-Communists, *Red Dawn* is not a very political movie.

### No Place Like Home

Mr. Milius draws his characters with a realism that is one of the film's strengths. The teenagers, who start the movie hiding in the mountains, do not become instant freedom fighters, not even after some of their parents have been imprisoned and executed. They first draw blood instinctively, in pure self-defense and almost by accident, when several of the kids are accidentally discovered by three Russian soldiers on a sightseeing jaunt. There is a skirmish, and the Russians are killed.

The first, unplanned taste of enemy blood gives them the courage to fight, and eventually the teenagers are transformed into astonishingly fierce and effective guerrillas. But the young warriors of *Red Dawn* are not idealists or patriots. The film holds not a single mention of freedom or democracy—or any of the ideals that make the United States worth defending, not only for ourselves

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but for the rest of the free world. In fact, the audience is never given any reason to believe these young Americans know what such principles mean, or even that they exist.

Their motives are far more basic, as is revealed in the movie's pivotal scene. One of the band, the son of Calumet's mayor, who is a collaborator, turns traitor and leads enemy commandoes to the Wolverines' hiding place. The group survives, the traitor is uncovered. It turns out that he had betrayed his comrades in order to save his father. Jed, the leader of the group, decides the traitor must be executed.

The others are shocked. If the Wolverines kill their former friend, one boy pleads, "What's the difference between them [the Communists] and us?"

"We live here!" Jed screams back. The boy is executed, and once it is done, the group is reunited and they fight on.

"We live here!" Their reasons for fighting never get more articulate than that. Though that response may be primitive, it cannot be easily dismissed. With brutal moral clarity it banishes a thousand excuses for cowardice.

The simplicity of the Wolverines' claim may be one of the prime reasons for *Red Dawn's* popularity. The younger siblings of the Vietnam generation, among whom the movie was particularly popular—and who are among Ronald Reagan's biggest fans—learned very well that when patriotism gets complicated it can be made treacherous. One minute you're explaining the ideals that make America superior to the Soviet Union, the next thing you know some wise guy is using those ideals to explain that the most patriotic course is to burn your draft card, and the really brave ones were those who had the courage to flee to Canada. After a decade and a half of such trickery, the heartfelt simplicity of "We live here!" holds tremendous appeal.

### American Nightmare

That same instinct for the simple essence of a conflict is the key to *I, Martha Adams* as well, in which the only American who is "man enough" (the heroine's phrase) to stand up to the Communist aggressors is a woman. Both plot and motivations are more political in *I, Martha Adams* than in *Red Dawn*. In many ways, it is a conservative's dream novel. Here the United Nations really *is* a nest of spies—the new Soviet America is run from the U.N. Communist revolutionaries in Central America really *are* Soviet plants. The nuclear freeze really *does* lead the world into slavery. And the book is a virtual love letter to President Reagan. In one scene, for example, the Israeli intelligence agent who helps Martha find *Magnanimity* explains how the weapon got its name:

> It was the choice of your [late] President. . . . He talked of the terrible power of the weapon. It could be used to blackmail the whole world, by a dictator. And he decided to call the project Magnanimity, because the US would build the power, but never use it. It would be held for no other purpose than to let freedom live.

As in *Red Dawn,* the reader is treated to a detailed depiction of the mechanics of a Communist takeover. Telephone systems are torn out and reinstalled; the Soviets take particular care to secure the Rockies, with their potential as a guerrilla base (rumors circulate that Afghanistan was merely practice for the Rockies); concentration camps are set up in Central Park. The conquered Americans in this novel suffer from a paralyzing inability to face the reality of Communist intentions. Even as internal passports are issued and food supplies are severely restricted; even as people are torn from their homes and "relocated"; even as thousands are jailed, tortured, or summarily executed, the vast majority of Americans cling to the absurd hope that maybe things won't get any worse. Self-delusion and sophistry lead many of Martha's acquaintances to make a smooth transition from loyal American to Communist collaborator. Army recruits blindly follow orders to round up teenagers and to evict people from their homes. Even the last surviving loyal American military men are willing to compromise, to accept something less than the total withdrawal of Soviet troops.

### Simple Strength

Only Martha Adams, a not particularly gifted, not particularly brave wife and mother from Connecticut, is unwilling to compromise. Unlike the Wolverines, her stubbornness is grounded in an articulate principle, but one of the keys to her strength is that her principle is simple enough to ward off both Soviet threats *and* Soviet promises: anything short of victory and the restoration of democracy is slavery, even if that slavery is temporarily sugarcoated or "not as bad as it could be." As Ronald Reagan's critics would say, she has a simplistic world view. And she wins.

Still, the question remains, why were these themes so popular this summer? I think it was not coincidental that this was the first summer since the American invasion of Grenada. Our post-Vietnam moral logjam was bound to end sometime soon. But Grenada seemed to really blow things open, partly because Ronald Reagan, the Great Simplifier, has that same ability to keep the unavoidable moral essence of a situation in view that empowers the heroes of *Red Dawn* and *I, Martha Adams*.

### Seize the Moment

When the President decided to invade Grenada, the prevaricators and sophists in the press and Congress sang their usual song: the invasion was a mistake; we should have talked to them first; we should have imposed economic sanctions; or, in the words of our first female vice-presidential candidate, guided them towards pluralism. But it was already too late for that. By moving from repression to outright terror, by implicitly threatening to use the American medical students as pawns with which to manipulate the United States, the Grenadian bosses crossed the line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Reagan recognized the moment, and did not deliberate further. He acted. Most Americans, and young Americans particularly, could see that line just as clearly. They not only supported President Reagan's decision, they cheered him. He had made things simple—and right—and that always feels good.



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# Hypochondria

**The Doomsday Myth,** *by Charles Maurice and Charles Smithson (Palo Alto: The Hoover Institution Press, $16.95).*

**The Good News is the Bad News is Wrong,** *by Ben Wattenberg (New York: Simon and Schuster, $17.95).*

*Reviewed by* Doug Bandow.

A little more than a decade ago, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an oil embargo on the United States. In the space of ten weeks, the price of petroleum nearly quadrupled. Americans suffered through natural gas shortages and gasoline lines. The Federal government created a new department and even regulated thermostat settings.

The experts declared a crisis. Domestic oil reserves, they warned, would run out in a few short years. Our only hope for relief lay in strict conservation of fuel by consumers and in government-subsidized, uneconomic, synthetic fuel projects.

A year ago, the Norwegian state oil company cut its price for petroleum. Both Nigeria, an OPEC member, and the British National Oil Company immediately followed suit.

Once again, the experts cried foul. Once again, the only hope lay in fuel conservation and government synfuels projects, and this time, international bankers intoned, we had also better prepare ourselves for the economic collapse of heavily indebted oil producers like Mexico and Nigeria.

In other words, if oil prices go up, we have a crisis. And if oil prices go down, we have a crisis. So say "the doom merchants," as described by Charles Maurice and Charles Smithson in their excellent book, *The Doomsday Myth.*

## Crying Wolf

The doom merchants have a long and illustrious heritage going all the way back to Thomas Malthus. In "An Essay on the Principle of Population," published in 1798, Malthus contended that widespread famine and mass starvation were inevitable, because population would increase geometrically but production only arithmetically. Malthus was, of course, wrong, but that hasn't stopped others from adopting and updating his predictions.

For example, in 1948 William Vogt in *Road to Survival* and Fairfield Osborn in *Our Plundered Planet* argued that agricultural production could not be increased enough to sustain a world population approaching three billion people. In 1968, Paul Ehrlich warned in *The Population Bomb* that mass famines in the 1970s would kill hundreds of millions of people—one-fifth or more of the earth's population. A year later, Ehrlich predicted that the oceans would die within a decade, which would lead to a dramatic decline in the fish catch and the starvation of 50 million people.

The thesis of *The Doomsday Myth* is simple: current trends never continue indefinitely because conditions change as "markets work to eliminate shortages." If resources become more scarce, their prices increase (in the absence of government price controls). As a result, consumers reduce their demand and switch to substitutes, and producers search for new supplies and develop new technologies.

This point of view is compelling both logically and empirically. Smithson and Maurice provide several examples in which "the free market has worked its 'miracle.' " For example, around the turn of the century the United States faced a timber crisis. In 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt warned, "If the present rate of timber consumption is allowed to continue . . . a timber famine in the future is inevitable." Some observers even proposed banning Christmas trees to help save America's forests. But as wood became more expensive, timber consumers adjusted their use of wood. Railroad companies turned to steel and iron bridges and culverts, developed new types of cross-tie plates and fastenings to protect the wood from wear, and treated wood ties with preservatives. Homeowners purchased more efficient stoves, builders relied more heavily on stone and metal, and manufacturers treated wood products ranging from fence posts to buildings with preservatives. By 1922 the timber emergency had passed.

## Free Market Salvation

Smithson and Maurice speculate that earlier dramatic changes in society—for which sociological causes are usually proffered—actually resulted from the natural operation of the market in response to temporary crises. The deforestation of the Mediterranean region in the seventh and eighth centuries, for example, caused the price of wood to rise; in turn, naval states adjusted their method of ship construction to sharply reduce the amount of raw timber used. The Greeks switched from bronze to iron around 1000 B.C., apparently after the price of tin, a constituent element of bronze, rose dramatically because of a trade cutoff. And the limited evidence available supports the theory that man was transformed from hunter-gatherer to farmer by economic forces, when the food available became scarcer as the population increased. In all these cases, "It was the participants in the marketplace—not government—who negated the prophecies of doom."

Smithson and Maurice argue that consumers and producers will also solve the threatened water shortage, the next predicted catastrophe. That is, if the government lets them. Indeed, state intervention is the only real danger, the authors warn. "Doomsday could arrive," but only "if we invite our own destruction by restricting the ability of the marketplace to function."

## Happy Days

If Smithson and Maurice answer the doom merchants, Ben Wattenberg, in *The Good News is the Bad News is Wrong,* rebuts the professional pessimists—the experts,

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observers, and pundits who make it sound as if "we are living in a desperate moment." Conservatives speak of declining moral values; liberals of a worsening quality of life. And, Wattenberg laments, "Almost everyone seems to agree that for a dozen or so years the economy was in shambles."

This conventional wisdom, he says, is "wrong, and more than that, dangerous." Instead, Wattenberg contends that "we live in a nation that in most respects—excuse the expression—never had it so good."

*The Good News is the Bad News is Wrong* generally bears out that conclusion. Indeed, the facts clearly show that, overall, Americans have been getting better off in nearly all aspects of their lives.

For example, most measures of health are improving. Not only has life expectancy at birth jumped 11 years over the last four decades because of falling infant and child death rates, but adult life expectancy has increased more than six years during the same period. In fact, the latter grew faster during the 1970s than at any other time in American history.

**"Doomsday could arrive," but only "if we invite our own destruction by restricting the ability of the marketplace to function."**

The rate of cancer, perhaps man's most feared disease, is falling. There is a popular perception of a "cancer epidemic," but that, Wattenberg says, is actually due to an "epidemic of life." Quite simply, people are living longer—the incidence of cancer increases with age—and more people are surviving after treatment.

New and highly effective drugs, with few side effects, are being developed to combat a host of ailments. The environment is becoming both safer and cleaner. Americans are also better off economically: real per capita income has jumped 28 percent since 1972, and the rate of poverty has dropped nearly in half over the last two decades.

### Social Improvement

Dramatic social progress continues to be made. Women compose an increasingly large share of the labor force, and blacks are also making major gains: more blacks than ever live in the suburbs, attend college, enter managerial and professional jobs, earn high incomes, and attain political office. Moreover, median school years completed by all Americans is higher; home ownership is up, even among the young. Overall crime rates are down.

In these and other areas Wattenberg has performed a powerful service by quantifying trends that many people until now have only vaguely sensed. Life is improving, and improving dramatically, for most of us.

### The Bad News

However, at times Wattenberg fails to show that his good news is really good. For example, he occasionally makes implicit moral judgments even as he disclaims any intent to make moral judgments. "Leaving aside, for the moment, the morality of abortions," he says, "a woman who has the ability to terminate a pregnancy has more 'independence' than one who does not." True enough, but whether this sort of independence proves or disproves the thesis of the book depends on the moral appropriateness of aborting 1.55 million potential human beings in 1980. Later, Wattenberg discerns "a healthy and moral society" by virtue of Americans' support for increased military spending and intervention abroad. Yet nowhere does he show that it is good news for Americans to spend $129 billion to subsidize Europe's defense, or $39 billion to protect the Japanese and South Koreans. Doing so may reflect a generous spirit on America's part, but it does not necessarily represent good judgment or common sense.

### The Good News

At other times, Wattenberg fails to show that the bad news is really bad. Take voter participation, for example, which Wattenberg finds has actually increased in congressional elections and is not as low in presidential contests as commonly thought. Since both parties were conducting major registration drives in 1984, Wattenberg concludes that "If there ever was a problem, it's probably over."

But was there ever a problem? Perhaps the real bad news is that more people, not better informed people, now are going to the polls. In that case, Wattenberg's optimistic body count at the voting booth should make us less, not more, pleased.

Why are most of us only vaguely aware of all the good news that Wattenberg sends our way? He ascribes it to the "bad news bias" of the media. The problem, he thinks, is not so much that reporters "don't get their stories right"; it is that "they too often miss the right stories." The media, Wattenberg contends, focus on negative events instead of positive processes. (Wattenberg is himself a syndicated columnist.) Thus, viewers see an urban riot, not millions of young blacks going to college. And so on.

In recent years Americans have been inundated with frightening forecasts of doom merchants and professional pessimists alike. Smithson and Maurice ably show that projections of natural holocausts, whether involving oil, timber, or water, are a dime a dozen, and never come true as long as people are allowed to adjust and innovate in a free marketplace. Wattenberg expertly disperses the depressing fog that has settled over the American political debate, that this country faces, if not doomsday, a slow and inevitable decline.

Our future is not guaranteed, of course, and none of the authors are pollyannas. But there are few clearer tributes to the practical, if not moral, virtues of a free society, than the long-term progress consistently achieved and the predicted crises constantly avoided. The message bears repeating.



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# "...One of the people it's been most useful to and used by is me."

## Ronald Reagan

on Mandate for Leadership I




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# Department of Disinformation

## Yellow Herring

On October 30, 1984, PBS's "Nova" series explored "The Mystery of Yellow Rain," the deadly showers that have afflicted the Hmong tribespeople of Laos, causing excruciating pain on contact—violent itching, vomiting, and hemorrhaging—followed by rapid death. The poison in these showers, which are usually yellow, but sometimes red or orange, has been identified as a trichothecene mycotoxin derived from fusaria molds. The fact that this toxin did not appear to occur naturally in Southeast Asia gave credence to Reagan Administration charges that the Soviet Union and its Laotian ally was using yellow rain as a weapon, in violation of the 1972 Convention banning biological and toxin weapons.

"Nova" concluded, however, "that toxin producing strains of fusarium may occur naturally in the (Indochinese) environment." It cited the hypothesis of Harvard biochemist Matthew Meselson that yellow rain was no more than bee feces (which, after all, is yellow). As if this proved his point, Mr. Meselson held a press conference to announce that bees showered him with yellow droppings when he was recently in Thailand near the Laotian border.

But this fable of the bees is merely a diversionary tactic, to distract public attention from the horrifying consequences of the Administration's charges about Soviet treaty violations. Mr. Meselson did not spit up blood or experience any agony after the bees befouled him. Neither he nor any other scientist has presented any evidence that bee feces in Southeast Asia is contaminated with trichothecenes. On the contrary, Huguette Cohen, a research scientist with Canada's Department of Agriculture, has conducted experiments that have failed to produce trichothecenes from Southeast Asian fusaria added to bee-pollen.

The Administration's charges are substantiated by a report citing hundreds of interviews with Hmong refugees and the doctors treating them. These interviews show clearly that yellow rain attacks occurred during flights by planes, often crop dusters. Until anyone can produce evidence that trichothecenes occur naturally in the region, the only "mystery" about yellow rain is how Matthew Meselson can be taken seriously.

**Rich Fisher**

## Hissteria at *The Nation*

The sixty-five pages (of typewritten copies of State Department documents) which surfaced in 1948 . . . were the only corroboratory evidence ever produced for Chambers's story that he and Hiss had spied together for the Soviet Union during the 1930s. And Chambers was the government's only witness against Hiss in his trial for perjury . . . The courts have consistently accepted the government's argument that forgery by typewriter is a fantasy, and Hiss . . . has never been able to get a hearing on this issue.

—William Reuben
*The Nation*
November 10, 1984

*The Nation* has crusaded on Hiss's behalf for three decades now, but it seems to have forgotten everything and learned nothing. A few corrections are in order.

At Alger Hiss's second trial in 1949, Hede Massing, a former underground member of the Communist Party in the 1930s, corroborated Whittaker Chambers's accusation that Hiss had been a member of the Communist Party. Two others, a Russian code clerk and a defector from the American Communist Party, had also earlier named Hiss to the FBI as an active underground Communist during the 1930s. Finally, an American couple, Noel and Herta Field, separately told Czech and Hungarian security officers in 1949 that Hiss had acted as a Soviet agent in the State Department in the 1930s.

The allegation of forgery by typewriter is equally spurious. In the last 35 years, eight different courts have found the forgery theory to be without foundation, the last time in 1983 when the Supreme Court denied Hiss's final appeal. For his first appeal in 1952, Hiss hired a team of experts to build a typewriter to match the one used to type the incriminating documents. After a year of effort, they still failed to produce an exact match. Certainly Chambers, never accused of mechanical genius, did not do what the experts could not. Nor does the forgery by typewriter theory account for the handwritten notes and rolls of microfilm which Chambers also handed over. Even Hiss's lawyers dismissed the forgery theory—they were surprised when he brought it up at his sentencing, as the authenticity of the documents had never before been questioned.

Reuben's subsequent accusation of FBI forgery is also ridiculous. His only basis for the claim is that the FBI had the technical knowledge to produce such a forgery: they *could* have done it, so therefore they did. But in the 40,000 pages of FBI files relating to the Hiss case, there is no evidence of FBI involvement with Chambers prior to Hiss's indictment, though the documents could



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only have been produced and planted with Chambers's full cooperation. A wealth of circumstantial evidence, exhaustively detailed in *Perjury* by Allen Weinstein, decisively contradicts any such conclusion. As Garry Wills has pointed out, "Belief in Hiss now becomes a task on the heroic scale. People must labor at such blindness."

**Cait Murphy**

# Affluent Soviety

"That the Soviet economy has made great material progress in recent years—certainly in the near-decade since my previous visit—is evident both from the statistics (even if they are below expectations) and from the general urban scene, as many have reported. One sees it in the appearance of solid well-being of the people on the streets . . ."

—John Kenneth Galbraith
*The New Yorker*
September 3, 1984

Mr. Galbraith is clearly as misinformed about the Soviet economy as he is about America's. His rosy picture of an improvement in Soviet living standards over the last 10 years is contradicted by emigré reports and by statistical evidence of a public health catastrophe.

The Soviet Union is the only industrial country where infant mortality is rising and life expectancy is coming down. In 1971, 22.9 of every thousand Soviet babies died in their first year of life. By 1984 Western experts estimate this figure had risen to a tragic 40 per 1,000, three times as high as in the United States and Western Europe.

In 1964 the average life expectancy for males was 67 years and for females, 76 years. By 1980, however, the average Boris could expect to live to only 62 and the average Natasha only to 73.

The decline in health of the average Russian is accompanied by poor and in some instances declining living standards. According to Gertrude E. Schroeder, professor of economics at the University of Virginia, "After more than 60 years of centrally planned socialism, Soviet living standards remain drab and essentially primitive by Western standards." In 1980, for example, there were only nine cars per 100 families in the Soviet Union. Meat consumption in the Soviet Union is lower than in various Eastern European nations, and less than half that of the United States.

"Solid well-being" may be visible in central Moscow and central Leningrad, but in most of the country's cities, according to emigré reports, food lines are longer than ever in recent history.

**Adam Wolfson**

# Bunker Mentality

We recently received in the mail a plea for support (moral and financial) from Norman Lear, the producer of such TV sitcoms as "All in the Family." It was a six-page letter on behalf of People for the American Way, the lobbying organization founded by Mr. Lear "to promote and protect the individual rights and personal freedoms of all Americans." The letter is all about the rising threat of the Religious Right, and what Americans can look forward to in the next four years if these people are not put out of action immediately. Herewith three of the direst of the threats.

1. "Supreme Court vacancies filled with the advice and consent of the Reverend Jerry Falwell and other religious leaders."

This charge, also made by Walter Mondale and his running mate during their recent campaign, was dismissed by one White House spokesman as "ridiculous." Lamarr Mooneyham, National Field Director for the Moral Majority, agreed, explaining, "Not even the President [of the United States] selects Supreme Court Justices. He can only nominate them." The Senate then either approves or rejects the nominee. Mr. Mooneyham reminded us that, far from selecting Supreme Court justices, Rev. Falwell opposed President Reagan's nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor. When Walter Mondale, in his first debate with the President on October 7, suggested that Jerry Falwell was going to handpick judges, the President replied, "I have only appointed one member of the Supreme Court, Sandra Day O'Connor. And I'll stand on my record on that, and if I have the opportunity to appoint any more [judges], I'll do it in the same manner that I did in selecting her."

2. "A President ready to redouble his efforts to impose religious exercises and mandated prayer in our public schools."

The President's prayer amendment received 56 votes in the Senate last spring but never came to a vote in the House. It states that "No person shall be required by the United States or by any state to participate in prayer [in a public institution]" and that "Neither the United States nor any State shall compose the words of any prayer to be said in the public schools." Under these circumstances it would be impossible for the President or anyone else to "impose" either "religious exercises" or "mandated prayer" on public school children.

3. "Judges required to swear an oath of allegiance to the fundamentalist planks written into the Republican Party's platform."

After careful scrutiny we can find no fundamentalist planks whatsoever in the 1984 Republican platform. Nowhere does the party take a position on such questions as whether the world was created in seven calendar days, or whether the prophet Jonah did in fact spend three days in the belly of a large fish before being spewed onto the shore at the Lord's command.

(Possibly, Mr. Lear was referring to the Republicans' affirmation of support for "the appointment of judges who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life." But we doubt even Mr. Lear would come right out and declare himself opposed to families and innocent people.)

**Susan Vigilante**



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policy
REVIEW

The Romans were paranoid, if you like. They conquered central Italy to make Rome secure, Gaul to make northern Italy secure; eventually they had to go all the way to Britain just to have security for downtown Rome.

Edward Luttwak
*Beyond Containment?*
*The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations*

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